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From Gunboats to Good Neighbors: 
U.S. Naval Diplomacy in Peru, 1919-1942 
 
Joel C. Christenson 
 
 This dissertation examines the role naval power played in the evolution of U.S. policy toward 
Latin America during the interwar period, when the United States abandoned armed interventionism 
in favor of the policy of the “Good Neighbor.”  Specifically, it focuses on two oft-overlooked types of 
naval diplomacy the United States used to exercise influence in the South American nation of Peru: 
the employment of U.S. personnel as naval advisers to the Peruvian government, and the use of U.S. 
naval vessels as agents of public diplomacy on “goodwill” cruises and port visits in Peruvian waters.  
It argues that the United States relied on the former while interventionism remained the accepted 
policy toward much of Latin America but was considered untenable south of the Caribbean (roughly 
1919-1932), and embraced the latter after renouncing intervention in the interests of becoming a 
“Good Neighbor” (roughly 1933 through World War II).  This research demonstrates that naval 
power was a much more flexible, integral part of U.S. diplomacy in Latin America during the 1920s 
and 1930s than historians have recognized.  And importantly, it begins to bridge a persistent gap 
between the literatures on American diplomatic and naval history – neither of which captures the full 
extent of the nation’s efforts at naval diplomacy in the interwar period or adequately addresses the 
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been possible without the support of others. 
 I would like, first of all, to thank the members of my dissertation committee.  Very 
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to Dr. Bradley Coleman, who introduced me to graduate education in history in the summer 
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excellence from my work at every turn.  He has done more than he knows to shape me into 
the historian that I am today.  He is an excellent scholar and teacher, and an ideal mentor.  I 
am blessed to be able to call him amigo.  Dr. Elizabeth Fones-Wolf, chair of the WVU 
Department of History, has helped nurture this project from seminar paper to completed 
dissertation.  I hope one day to repay her generous, unwavering support of my work, and of 
my professional development.  Special thanks are also in order for Dr. Jack Hammersmith 
and Dr. Aaron Sheehan-Dean, both of whom served thoughtfully and without hesitation on 
my dissertation committee despite having a thousand commitments of their own.  I am 
grateful for their contributions. 
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and board during my numerous (and sometimes lengthy) research visits to the DC area.  
Without this support I would never have been able to complete this project. 
 As this is a project that seeks, in part, to tell a compelling story about the Peruvian 
Navy, special thanks are in order to two leading authorities on the subject – both of whom 
were gracious in offering me their valuable perspectives.  Dr. Daniel Masterson of the U.S. 
Naval Academy took time out of his busy schedule to respond thoughtfully to numerous 
emails, and to talk with me in person about my project.  Dr. Jorge Ortíz Sotelo of Peru, a 
leading voice on Latin American naval history, has been a source of valuable advice and 
support.  I look forward to working with both of these fine scholars in the future. 
 It is always gratifying when others find one’s research not only interesting, but 
worthy of financial support.  I am particularly fortunate to have received funding from a 
number of excellent institutions.  Special thanks go to the U.S. Navy’s Naval History and 
Heritage Command, which honored me with the Rear Admiral John D. Hayes Pre-Doctoral 
Fellowship in Naval History for the 2011-2012 academic year.  The Hayes Fellowship made 
it possible for me to take some much-needed time off of teaching, and, for a time, to devote 
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all of my professional energies to research and writing.  The Naval History and Heritage 
Command is one of the real gems in the federal government’s historical establishment.  It 
was my good fortune to receive not only crucial funding from the Command, but thoughtful 
feedback on my work from its top-notch staff of historians.  Dr. Michael Crawford (Senior 
Historian), Dr. Timothy Francis, and Mr. Robert Cressman all provided helpful direction and 
criticism along the way.  I am profoundly grateful also to Rear Admiral Jay DeLoach, former 
Director of Naval History, who took an interest in my work at the 2010 annual meeting of the 
Society for Military History.  From our first meeting, he supported my research and opened 
the doors of NHHC’s fantastic resources to me.  I appreciate it, and always will. 
 I offer heartfelt thanks to United States Southern Command, and again to its former 
Command Historian, Bradley Coleman, for helping to sustain this project through four 
historical research internships.  Through those experiences I learned just how important 
timely, relevant historical knowledge is to the world of contemporary policymaking and 
military operations – especially in the American “neighborhood.”  Thanks go also to the 
WVU Department of History, which supported my research with a departmental dissertation 
fellowship as this project wound its way toward a productive conclusion.  I also owe a 
significant debt of gratitude to the Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt Institute (Hyde Park, New 
York) and the Herbert Hoover Presidential Library Association (West Branch, Iowa), both of 
which awarded me grants-in-aid to conduct invaluable research in the Roosevelt and Hoover 
libraries, respectively. 
 Good, patient archivists are a blessing to every historian who has ever felt 
overwhelmed stepping into the world of primary source research.  At the National Archives 
in Washington, DC and College Park, Maryland, I have benefitted from the wise counsel of 
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Mr. David Langbart (diplomatic records), Mr. Mark Mollan (navy records, downtown DC), 
and Mr. Nate Patch (navy records, College Park).  Mr. Matt Schaefer at the Herbert Hoover 
Presidential Library in West Branch, Iowa, made my visit there more productive than I could 
have hoped.  His kind assistance, both in person and, in the months after my visit, by email, 
has been invaluable.  Mr. John Greco of the Naval History and Heritage Command’s 
Operational Archives provided friendly, valuable archival support during my numerous visits 
to the Navy Yard. 
 The WVU Department of History is a special place, filled with special people who 
helped make my doctoral studies a joy.  Outside of those faculty I have already mentioned, I 
feel particularly blessed to have had the opportunity to work with Dr. Peter Carmichael, who, 
more than anyone else, drove home to me the very valuable truth that what one sees as a 
historian depends on where one sits.  It took all the scholarly energy I could muster to avoid 
being completely taken in by Civil War history while studying under his direction.  Also, Dr. 
SilverMoon made my exploration of colonial and post-colonial Latin American history a 
pleasure.  I miss her counsel.  Special thanks are due also to Martha May and Becky Warnke 
of the History Department’s staff.  They answered every question I ever asked with patience 
and professionalism, and went the extra mile for me on more than a few occasions.  The 
Department is lucky to have them. 
 If one’s friends are the measure of one’s experiences, my time at WVU has been 
exceptional.  Special thanks go to Josh Esposito, with whom I share a love of history, 
football, and good IPA.  He is one great amigo, and I am excited to see where his excellence 
as a scholar and teacher takes him.  Golf outings with Joe Rizzo and Jordan Lieser provided 
much-needed diversions from the rigors of teaching and writing during the few months of 
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were both generous and patient in sharing their expertise on the Civil War and 
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alone – while I was traveling for research and conferences, and, more often, when I was 
holed up in my basement office studying for comps, grading, preparing lectures, or writing 
for months on end.  All the while, she built a thriving business and became the kind of 
mother every man dreams that his child could have.  I don’t know that I can ever make up for 
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 This dissertation examines the considerable role naval power played in United States 
foreign relations with the South American nation of Peru from the 1920s to the early 1940s, a 
period when Washington abandoned the practice of armed intervention in its hemispheric 
policy in favor of what President Franklin D. Roosevelt called “the policy of the good 
neighbor.”
1
  Specifically, it focuses on two types of non-coercive naval diplomacy the United 
States used in Peru during those years to help move its Latin American policy to a more 
sustainable non-interventionist basis.  First, it examines the American commitment to send a 
team U.S. Navy personnel to Peru as advisers (known as a naval mission) on naval affairs.  
Second, it explores the frequent employment of U.S. naval vessels and personnel in highly 
visible cruises and port visits to Peruvian waters for the purpose of cultivating goodwill.  
Both activities were central, this dissertation argues, to American efforts to close a turbulent 
period in the early twentieth century – a time when the relations of the United States with its 
southern neighbors turned on the use of force, actual and threatened.  Peru provides an 
appropriate focal point for such a study of the interwar policy of the United States toward 
Latin America because, geographically, it falls outside of the Caribbean zone where the 
United States had long relied on intervention, and because, unlike countries of South 
America’s east coast and southern cone, as an Andean nation on the continent’s west coast 
Peru did not have socioeconomic or cultural ties with Europe strong enough to preclude it 
                                                          
1
 In his first inaugural address in March, 1933, Roosevelt declared that “In the field of world policy I would 
dedicate this Nation to the policy of the good neighbor – the neighbor who resolutely respects himself and, 
because he does so, respects the rights of others – the neighbor who respects his obligations and respects the 
sanctity of his agreements in and with a world of neighbors.”  Although it was a general declaration intended to 
guide U.S. relations throughout the world, the “Good Neighbor Policy” soon became associated most closely 
with Latin America.  See Franklin D. Roosevelt and Samuel I. Rosenman, The Public Papers and Addresses of 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, 13 vols., vol. 2 (New York: Russell & Russell, 1969), 14. 
2 
 
from developing a closer association with the United States.  In short, during the interwar 
period U.S. foreign policymakers viewed Peru as something of a clean slate, on which it 
would be possible to chart a new, less antagonistic course for U.S.-Latin American relations.
2
  
It was in Peru during these years, this dissertation contends, that U.S. foreign policy made 
use of naval power to help alter the direction of its relations with Latin America.  It is 
necessary, therefore, to understand American naval diplomacy in Peru in order to 
comprehend how U.S. policy in Latin America began moving “from gunboats to good 
neighbors.” 
APPLIED AND HISTORIOGRAPHICAL SIGNIFICANCE 
 
 This dissertation’s focus on the intersection of foreign relations and naval affairs 
makes it timely and relevant.  More than any other arm of national military power, the work 
of a nation’s navy is intimately connected with its foreign policy.  This is true because, as 
naval theorist Ken Booth notes, warships routinely perform far more than fighting functions 
in the service of nations’ interests:  they are “visible signifiers and representatives of a 
country’s intentions and commitments,” he writes, a fact that makes them valuable adjuncts 
                                                          
2
 All studies of U.S. relations with Latin American nations have to confront the challenge posed by the usage of 
the words “America,” “Americas,” and “American.”  In this study, I use the words “United States” and 
“America” interchangeably, and I use the word “American” to refer to people, ideas, policies, and possessions 
that have their origins in the United States.  I do this not out of cultural insensitivity, but because, of all the 
peoples of the Western Hemisphere, only citizens of the United States refer to themselves, their ideas, and their 
national possessions as “American.”  Often, I use the word “Washington” interchangeably with “United States” 
when referring to decisions taken or policies pursued by the United States toward Latin America.  I use the 
phrases “Latin America” and “Latin American” to refer to the nations of the Western Hemisphere south of the 
United States and their peoples.  I do not refer to Latin American peoples in this study as “American,” because 
citizens of Latin American nations refer to themselves by their respective nationalities – Peruvian, Chilean, 
Cuban, and so on.  I do, however, use the word “Americas” to refer to the nations inhabiting the Western 
Hemisphere.  For a succinct summary of the logic underlying these choices in nomenclature, see Lester D. 
Langley, America and the Americas: The United States in the Western Hemisphere, The United States and the 





  Navies can undertake diplomatic tasks that are difficult if not impossible 
for ground and air forces to perform because, unlike those forces, naval ships possess the 
capability to operate independently of large foreign bases for prolonged periods of time.  
Moreover, because of their range and independence relative to armies and air forces, naval 
vessels possess a unique capability to respond quickly to crisis situations. 
 Plying the seventy-one percent of the globe covered by the oceans, naval forces have 
long been just this kind of asset to the foreign policy of the United States.  Indeed, 
throughout its history the U.S. Navy has fulfilled a number of political, social, and 
humanitarian functions – functions short of war – in support of American national policy.
4
  
For example, from the years of the early republic throughout the nineteenth century, the U.S. 
Navy devoted most of its peacetime attention to protecting the flow of American commerce 
overseas.
5
  In the early twentieth century, as it grew in size and complexity to accommodate 
expanding U.S. interests in the world, the Navy routinely engaged in intervention operations 
(known as “gunboat diplomacy”) to quell unrest in Latin America and East Asia.
6
  During the 
Cold War, when not rendering wartime service, U.S. ships often engaged in contingency 
operations of a diplomatic nature, such as staging a blockade in the Caribbean in 1962 to 
                                                          
3
 Ken Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy  (London, New York: Croom, Helm, Crane, Russak, 1977), 34-35. 
4
 The seventy-one percent figure comes from the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.  
(NOAA).  See NOAA, “Ocean.”  Accessed February 10, 2013.  http://www.noaa.gov/ocean.html.    
4
 For more on the U.S. Navy’s role supporting American commerce in the nineteenth century, see John H. 
Schroeder, Shaping a Maritime Empire: The Commercial and Diplomatic Role of the American Navy, 1829-
1861  (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1985). 
5
 For more on the U.S. Navy’s role supporting American commerce in the nineteenth century, see ibid. 
6
 On U.S. gunboat diplomacy in Latin America in the early twentieth century, see Donald A. Yerxa, Admirals 
and Empire: The United States Navy and the Caribbean, 1898-1945  (Columbia: University of South Carolina 
Press, 1991).  On similar operations in China in the early twentieth century, see Kenneth J. Hagan, This People's 
Navy: The Making of American Sea Power  (New York: Free Press, 1991), 193-280. 
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disrupt the flow of Soviet nuclear weapons and delivery systems to the island of Cuba.
7
  And, 
as has become routine in recent years, American naval ships have conducted cruises in 
friendly waters aimed at providing medical care to foreign populations and providing 
humanitarian relief.
8
  Indeed, it is fair to say that the U.S. Navy, which has not fought a 
major naval battle (a fleet action) since 1944, has devoted more time and effort to essentially 
diplomatic missions over the past seven decades than it has to conducting combat 
operations.
9
  This reality makes the Navy’s role in U.S. diplomacy a fruitful area for study. 
 The utility of navies to foreign policy is not limited to the global reach of ships and 
hardware, however.  It stems also from the diplomatic nature of naval officership.  
Throughout American history, to a much greater degree than personnel from other military 
services, naval officers have served as de facto U.S. diplomats overseas.
10
  This is especially 
true in Latin America, where in the early twentieth century naval personnel frequently led 
intervention and occupation operations, and where, since 1920, the United States has 
dispatched naval personnel to advise foreign governments in naval affairs.
11
  Initially a niche 
arrangement extended to only a handful of Latin American countries, U.S. naval advising in 
the Americas grew considerably during World War II as the United States stepped up efforts 
                                                          
7
 See Curtis A. Utz, Cordon of Steel: The U.S. Navy and the Cuban Missile Crisis, The U S Navy in the Modern 
World Series (Washington: Naval Historical Center, 1993). 
8
 See James Stavridis, Partnership for the Americas: Western Hemisphere Strategy and U.S. Southern 
Command  (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2010). 
9
 For an excellent recent treatment of the last major (fleet-level) U.S. naval battle, the Battle of Leyte Gulf 
(October, 1944), see H. P. Willmott, The Battle of Leyte Gulf: The Last Fleet Action  (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2005). 
10
 David F. Long, Gold Braid and Foreign Relations: Diplomatic Activities of U.S. Naval Officers, 1798-1883  
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1988). 
11
 Among the most notable, high profile naval officers to write about his experiences as a “gunboat diplomat” 
during this period was Rear Admiral William B. Caperton, whose unpublished memoir discusses the diplomatic 
nature of early twentieth century naval officership at great length.  See William Banks Caperton, History of Flag 
Career of Rear Admiral W.B. Caperton, U.S. Navy, Commencing January 5, 1915, RG 45, ZN Box 936, 
National Archives.  
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to improve hemispheric defenses.  This wartime initiative had not only the strictly military 
aim of improving Latin American proficiency in national defense, but also the diplomatic 
objective of helping to forge an anti-Axis unity throughout the Americas consistent with U.S. 
security aims.  The United States remained heavily involved in naval advising in the post-war 
years as the triumph of victory over the Axis Powers gave way to deep new tensions with the 
Soviet Union.  During the Cold War, when the United States made fighting communism a 
priority of its inter-American policy, U.S. naval and military advising were important parts of 
its inter-American policy.
12
  This presence endures today, as naval advisers serve together 
with Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps personnel in joint Military Groups (known as 
“MilGroups”) throughout Latin America that establish and maintain military-to-military 
contacts with partner nations, provide advice to those nations’ military establishments, and 
coordinate bilateral and multilateral military training and exchange programs.
13
  The 
persistence of the practice of U.S. naval and military advising, and its important place in 
U.S.-Latin American relations, make it a fertile area for historical inquiry, as well. 
 This research is historiographically significant, as well.  It helps to bridge a persistent 
gap between the literatures on American naval and foreign relations history, neither of which 
fully recognizes the important role naval power played in U.S. policy toward Latin America 
during the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s.  In this way, this dissertation is responsive to recent calls 
of scholars of diplomatic and military history for a deeper, more nuanced conversation 
                                                          
12
 See Edward C. Stewart, "American Advisors Overseas," Military Review 45, no. 2 (1965): 3-9. 
13
 See Tony Payan, Cops, Soldiers, and Diplomats: Explaining Agency Behavior in the War on Drugs  (Lanham: 
Lexington Books, 2006), 100-01.  For more on the expansion of U.S. military and naval advising in Latin 
America during the early Cold War, see Robert O. Kirkland, Observing Our Hermanos de Armas: U.S. Military 
Attachés in Guatemala, Cuba, and Bolivia, 1950-1964, Latin American Studies: Social Sciences and Law (New 
York, N.Y.: Routledge, 2003). 
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between the two fields.
14
  Scholars of American naval history have generally devoted little 
attention to the activities of the U.S. Navy in Latin America during this period, instead 
focusing their attention on those decades’ broader innovations in maritime strategy and on 
bureaucratic fights over the size, structure, and distribution of the U.S. fleet.
15
  Naval 
historians who have addressed the Navy’s role in U.S. diplomacy have either not placed 
significant attention on the Americas, or have focused their inquiries on earlier chronological 
periods.
16
  Those few who have examined U.S. naval diplomacy in Latin America during the 
interwar period have, meanwhile, largely confined their inquiries to the Caribbean area that 
bore the brunt of U.S. “gunboat diplomacy” interventions, and say little about the 
                                                          
14
 Thomas Zeiler et al., "The Convergence of Military and Diplomatic History: A Roundtable," Passport: 
Newsletter of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (2012): 30-37. 
15
 For example, Edward J. Marolda’s edited volume of essays by leading figures in U.S. naval history contains 
pieces entitled “FDR at War, 1913-1921,” “Franklin D. Roosevelt and Naval Strategy, 1933-1941,” and “The 
Evolution of the U.S. Fleet, 1933-1941: How the President Mattered.”  See Edward J. Marolda, FDR and the 
U.S. Navy, 1st ed., The Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt Institute Series on Diplomatic and Economic History 
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998).  In his history of U.S. sea power from 1890 to 1990, George W. Baer 
briefly addresses the importance of Latin America to U.S. strategists during World War II, but says nothing of 
naval advising or goodwill cruising in the Western Hemisphere.  See George W. Baer, One Hundred Years of 
Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890-1990  (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994).  The same is true of 
Kenneth Hagan’s classic one-volume history of American sea power from the American Revolution through 
1990.  See Hagan, This People's Navy: The Making of American Sea Power.  Robert G. Albion’s classic study 
of naval policy is similarly silent on the Navy’s role in U.S. diplomacy in Latin America between the world 
wars.  See Robert Greenhalgh Albion and Rowena Reed, Makers of Naval Policy, 1798-1947  (Annapolis: 
Naval Institute Press, 1980).  Peter Karsten’s study of the U.S. Navy officer corps in the 19th and early 20th 
centuries contains one chapter on the Navy’s role in U.S. diplomacy, but devotes only eight pages to Latin 
America and the Caribbean – most of which, for the period in question, address U.S. gunboat diplomacy in the 
Caribbean.  See Peter Karsten, The Naval Aristocracy: The Golden Age of Annapolis and the Emergence of 
Modern American Navalism, 1st Naval Institute Press (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2008). 
16
 Richard Challener’s study of the U.S. Navy’s role in foreign policy worldwide focuses its Latin American 
attention gunboat diplomacy operations in the Caribbean from 1898 to 1914.  See Richard D. Challener, 
Admirals, Generals, and American Foreign Policy, 1898-1914  (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973). 
Charles Oscar Paullin’s landmark work on the diplomatic activities of U.S. naval officers, the first study to treat 
the topic, was written in 1912 and covers the period 1778 to 1883.  See Charles Oscar Paullin, Diplomatic 
Negotiations of American Naval Officers, 1778-1883  (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1912).  David F. Long’s 
effort to update Paullin’s work retains his chronological scope, ending in 1883.  See Long, Gold Braid and 
Foreign Relations: Diplomatic Activities of U.S. Naval Officers, 1798-1883.  William R. Braisted has done 
innovative work on the diplomatic roles of U.S. Naval officers in China in the interwar period, but there is no 
comparable work that sheds light on the vital diplomatic roles that Naval officers played in Latin America.  See 
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employment of naval power south of the Caribbean, where U.S. policy had long deemed 
armed intervention to be impractical.
17
  These studies provide little analysis of the U.S. 
Navy’s active agenda of goodwill cruising in South American waters during the period, and 
are silent on the advising work undertaken by U.S. naval missions in Peru and other countries 
throughout the period.
18
  This dissertation is offered as a partial corrective to these 
deficiencies in U.S. naval historiography. 
 Historians of U.S. foreign relations in the Western Hemisphere during the interwar 
period have likewise said little about the significance of naval power to U.S. diplomacy.
19
  
Scholars of U.S.-Latin American relations whose studies focus on U.S. armed interventions, 
the turn in U.S. foreign policy toward “good neighborism,” and the role of cultural 
interaction in that shift have generally not acknowledged the considerable importance naval 
power played in bringing about that transformation.
20
  Among the only works of foreign 
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relations history that does address American naval diplomacy in the hemisphere during this 
period, Eric Roorda’s superb study of U.S. relations with dictator Rafael Trujillo’s 
Dominican Republic, is necessarily limited in scope to the Caribbean.
21
  No diplomatic 
histories of inter-American relations address the Navy’s engagement in goodwill cruising 
during the years of the “Good Neighbor Policy” under the Franklin D. Roosevelt 
administration.  Moreover, none recognize in this activity the origins of U.S. public 
diplomacy in Latin America, something most place either during World War II or the early 
Cold War.
22
  And aside from a brief recognition by Joseph Tulchin that the Woodrow Wilson 
administration sent a U.S. naval mission to Peru in 1920 for essentially diplomatic reasons, 
scholars of U.S. foreign relations history have also been largely silent on the service of U.S. 
Navy personnel in advisory missions in Latin America during the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s.
23
  
As a work of U.S. foreign relations history as well as of naval history, then, this study 
endeavors to demonstrate the centrality of these activities to the course of U.S. inter-
American policy during this period. 
 Studies in Latin American history have devoted greater attention to military and naval 
aspects of U.S.-Latin American relations.  The landmark work in this regard is Robert L. 
Scheina’s masterful, broad study of Latin American naval history, Latin America: A Naval 
History, 1810-1987, which contains a brief chapter on foreign naval missions in South 
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America between the world wars, but which, because of its breadth and careful attention to 
the institutional development of Latin American navies, does not fully analyze the 
significance of those missions’ work to foreign relations.
24
  In its brief four-page treatment of 
the U.S. naval mission to Peru during the 1920s, Lawrence Clayton’s 1999 contribution to 
the University of Georgia Press’s landmark “United States and the America” series, Peru and 
the United States: The Condor and the Eagle, does recognize the mission’s significance to 
diplomacy between Peru and the United States.  Clayton’s work, however, focuses intently 
on the mission’s contributions to Peruvian aviation (certainly an important contribution) and 
does not address the broad, diplomatically significant work the mission did for nearly a 
decade to directly overhaul other elements of the Peruvian Navy.
25
  The best treatments 
available on U.S. naval missions in Latin America come, not surprisingly, from a Latin 
American scholar.  Jorge Ortiz Sotelo, a retired Peruvian naval officer and scholar of naval 
history, has written superb accounts of the work done by the U.S. naval mission to Peru 
during the 1920s.  Much of Ortiz’s work concentrates on naval education reforms directed by 
the U.S. mission at the Escuela Naval, Peru’s naval academy.
26
  In addition, he has produced 
work (published in Peru in the Spanish language) that sheds light on the development of the 
Peruvian Navy’s submarine force and other reforms enacted under U.S. oversight during 
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  Ortiz’s work is remarkable not only for its attention to the specific labors of 
the naval mission in Peru during the 1920s, but because it situates that work in the flow of 
Peru’s domestic politics.
28
  However, neither Ortiz’s work nor the work of other scholars 
operating within the vein of Latin American history places explicit focus on U.S. naval 
missions’ significance to the course of U.S.-Latin American relations during Washington’s 
transition from interventionism to good neighborism in the interwar period.  This dissertation 
seeks to draw out that important connection, and in so doing, make a valuable contribution to 
Latin American historiography as well. 
ORGANIZING THEMES 
 
 Several themes flow throughout this dissertation and form its analytical backbone.  
First, it raises questions about the nature and development of U.S. empire in the Western 
Hemisphere in the twentieth century.  Throughout its history, the United States has sought to 
influence the shape and character of inter-American relations.  In the early years of their 
nation’s adolescence, for example, Americans saw their own successful revolution against 
Great Britain as an example for other nations of the hemisphere struggling for freedom from 
                                                          
27
 On the mission’s support for developing a modern submarine force in the Peruvian Navy, see Ortíz Sotelo, 
Apuntes Para la Historia de los Submarinos Peruanos  (Lima: Biblioteca Nacional del Perú y Asociación de 
Historia Marítima y Naval Iberoamericana, 2001). 
28
 For example, see Ortíz Sotelo, "Las Rebelliones Navales del Callao, 1932 y 1948," Apuntes 45, Segundo 
Semestre (1999): 83-95.  Daniel Masterson’s excellent analysis of Peruvian civil-military relations from the 
early 1930s through the 1980s provides a very brief overview of the U.S. naval mission to Peru as part of its 
treatment of the Leguía era, drawing on primary and secondary sources referenced throughout this dissertation.  
Ortiz’s work, although not cited, was important as well.  In his preface, Masterson thanks “a Peruvian armed 
forces officer [Ortiz] who must remain anonymous” due to the unsettled political conditions that prevailed in 
Peru when the book was published in 1991.  See Daniel M. Masterson, Militarism and Politics in Latin 
America: Peru from Sánchez Cerro to Sendero Luminoso, Contributions in Military Studies (New York: 





  In 1823 U.S. President James Monroe was sufficiently impressed 
by his nation’s position in the Americas that he unilaterally declared the Western Hemisphere 
off limits to further European colonization, staking a claim to hemispheric leadership.  The 
United States remained an ambitious but strategically weak force in hemispheric affairs into 
the late nineteenth century, when, strengthened by an industrial boom, Washington began to 
stake a more active claim to leadership.  In 1889 the United States convened the First 
International Conference of American States in Washington, a meeting that produced 
landmark economic agreements and laid a foundation for closer cultural links throughout the 
Americas.
30
   
 Americans looked anew at their neighbors to the south in the early twentieth century, 
increasingly convinced that maintaining a growing, vibrant economy at home required them 
to take a more active role in managing affairs in Latin America.  That emerging consensus 
grew stronger for military-strategic reasons after the United States began construction on an 
inter-oceanic canal across Panama in 1904.  Upon its completion in 1914, protection of the 
Panama Canal would become a central organizing principle of U.S. national defense, 
confirming that Central America and the Caribbean were the heart of the new American 
empire.
31
  U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt underscored this strategic reality in articulating 
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his December 1904 “Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine, which declared that American 
interests in the region were so important that the United States would employ military force 
to protect them if necessary.
32
  It was a turning point in U.S. relations with the nations of 
Latin America, in the Caribbean basin and beyond.  In subsequent years, Roosevelt and his 
successors – Republican and Democrat alike – demonstrated a firm resolve to uphold this 
commitment.  Between 1900 and 1919, the United States deployed military forces to 
intervene in its new Caribbean empire on twenty-six different occasions to protect U.S. 
interests and enforce order.
33
  The era of American “gunboat diplomacy” had begun.
34
 
 The high costs of World War I, both in blood and in treasure, caused the United 
States to reevaluate the nature of its Caribbean empire.  For nearly two decades the empire 
had been maintained by force, threatened and actual, and by war’s end Americans were tiring 
of the expensive, open-ended commitments their government was making to occupation 
operations in countries like Nicaragua, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic.  They were also 
increasingly convinced that, devastated by four years of savage warfare, European nations 
were unlikely to pose any significant threat to U.S. interests in the region.  Both the 
Democratic and Republican parties read the prevailing public sentiment and quietly dropped 
all approving mentions of interventionist operations from their election year platforms in 
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  A consensus began to form in Washington that the United States should cultivate a 
broad political stability in region favorable to its interests without resorting to force.  That 
consensus strengthened throughout the decade as Latin American resentment at U.S. gunboat 
diplomacy mounted.  That anger boiled over when the issue of U.S. interventionism came up 
for discussion at the Sixth International Conference of American States in Havana in 1928, 
where a chorus of “anti-American diatribes” from Latin American delegates convinced U.S. 
diplomats that they had to find a new basis for U.S. policy toward Latin America, and fast.
36
  
Thus accelerated the turn in U.S. policy away from armed intervention in Latin America that 
would culminate with President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s declaration of a non-interventionist 
“Good Neighbor Policy” in 1933. 
 But at the same time that U.S. policymakers were orchestrating the beginnings of a 
pullback from the Caribbean, initiating a fundamental transformation in the American 
empire, they became intent on significantly expanding the United States’ commercial and 
strategic influence further south in Latin America – on the South American continent.  Prior 
to the end of World War I, South America had been firmly on the outside of the U.S. empire.  
For years the concentration of American economic and security interests in the Caribbean 
and Central America had made it unnecessary for U.S. officials to contemplate extending 
gunboat diplomacy missions further south.
37
  Moreover, in terms of commercial and military 
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influence, South America (especially its east coast and distant southern reaches) had 
historically been the purview of Europe.  However, the unprecedented carnage that 
devastated Europe between 1914 and 1918 led European nations that had maintained military 
and naval advisory missions in South America (Germany, France, Britain) to recall their 
personnel for service on the western front.  At the same time, European trade in the Americas 
fell victim both to wartime economic dislocations and to naval warfare that made the safe 
passage of commerce across the Atlantic all but impossible.  Together, by war’s end these 
forces produced a collapse in European strategic and economic influence in the Western 
Hemisphere. 
 Foreign policymakers in the administration of U.S. President Woodrow Wilson 
viewed these developments as a grand opportunity for the United States, as did American 
businessmen keen on exploiting South America as a source of raw materials and as an export 
market for finished U.S. goods.  The question confronting Washington at the dawn of the 
1920s was how best to integrate South America into the changing U.S. empire:  for practical 
reasons, the empire had to be kept politically stable, but the American public was 
increasingly uncomfortable with using armed force to do the job.  It was amid debates over 
these weighty issues about fundamental national interests that a request arrived from the new, 
ardently pro-U.S. president of Peru, Augusto B. Leguía (see Appendix 1, Photo 1), to furnish 
his government with a team of U.S. naval officers (known as a naval mission) to “reorganize 
and direct” the Peruvian Navy.  As this dissertation explains, over time U.S. foreign 
policymakers came to view the naval mission that followed as an almost ideal type of 
solution to the challenges they confronted balancing the United States’ aspiration to draw 
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South America into its imperial fold with prevailing political realities that made armed 
intervention there inconceivable.  Once in place, the U.S. naval mission to Peru gave 
Washington the ability to begin expanding its strategic and economic influence on the 
continent while at the same time helping to cultivate political stability without having to 
wield the threat of intervention. 
 It is in a consideration of the U.S. naval mission to Peru that this study’s second 
organizing theme, closely related to the first, emerges:  U.S. relations with Peru during the 
interwar period are best understood as an ongoing negotiation in which both nations, despite 
wide disparities in economic power, military might, and political influence, exercised 
significant influence over the course of the relationship.
38
  On its surface this might seem an 
odd assertion to make, given this study’s use of the term “empire” to describe the framework 
within which the United States has pursued its interests in the Americas.  But in embracing 
the term, this study’s analysis rejects the simplistic view of empire as a vehicle for the 
outright domination of weaker nations by stronger ones.  It accepts instead a more 
sophisticated view of imperial relationships in which both the stronger and weaker nations, at 
various turns, succeed in advancing their own interests despite the broad and persistent 
inequality in power between them.
39
  Such was certainly the case in U.S.-Peruvian relations 
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during the eleven-year  rule of Peruvian President Augusto Leguía (1919-1930), a period 
know in Peruvian history as El Oncenio.   
 From his first few months in office, Leguía, whose Patria Nueva (“New Fatherland”) 
approach to national development called for developing intimate economic and political ties 
with the United States, demonstrated a keen ability to leverage U.S. power to advance his 
own objectives of growing Peru’s economy, settling its borders, and strengthening his hold 
on power.  These concerns led him almost immediately to seek a naval mission from the 
United States, something that Washington, eager to expand its economic and strategic 
influence in South America in the wake of World War I, quickly proved willing  to provide.  
Throughout the ensuing decade that the mission served his government (1920-1930), Leguía 
used it to secure new naval arms from the United States, develop a national aviation system, 
and counterbalance the domestic influence of Peru’s politically active Army.  This is not to 
suggest that, under Leguía, Peru’s relationship with the United States was that of an equal 
dealing with an equal.  Nor is it to suggest that Leguía got everything he wanted from the 
relationship.  Certainly he did not.  Leguía would undoubtedly have preferred to receive far 
more than the $100 million in foreign loans he secured from the United States between 1920 
and 1930.  Moreover, he surely would have liked to build a substantially larger, more 
powerful naval fleet than was possible given his nation’s limited fiscal resources.  But as this 
dissertation explains, at every turn Leguía proved to be a shrewd negotiator in his dealings 
with Washington, often pushing U.S. foreign policymakers further than they wished to go in 
lending him economic, naval, and political support.  The things he did through that adept 
maneuvering to advance Patria Nueva during his Oncenio were significant, and do not 
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conform to the results one might expect had Peru experienced complete domination by the 
United States. 
 The closeness of the relationship Leguía forged with the United States points to the 
third of this dissertation’s organizing themes: that there has often been a divergence between 
the ideals the United States has championed in the Americas and the reality it has helped to 
create.  Most often, scholars have pointed to the years of the “Good Neighbor Policy,” World 
War II, and the Cold War when assessing the origins of U.S. support for dictatorship in Latin 
America.
40
  But in the immediate aftermath of World War I, as U.S. President Woodrow 
Wilson trumpeted the ideals of democracy and national self-determination and labored to 
create the League of Nations, the United States deepened its relationship with Leguía even as 
clear evidence emerged of his growing repressiveness and ambition to establish a long-
lasting dictatorship.  When, very early in his rule, he began shutting down opposition 
newspapers, purging high-level officers from Peru’s Army, and imprisoning political 
adversaries, the United States looked the other way and continued to give him material and 
political support.  From Washington’s perspective, the most important thing was that Leguía 
was demonstrating an enthusiasm for U.S. financial and military methods, and a desire to 
attract ever-greater amounts of American influence within Peru.  In that regard he was unique 
among Latin American leaders of the time.  Expanding economic and strategic influence in 
South America was the overriding priority of U.S. inter-American policy in the early 1920s, 
and Leguía was seen by U.S. foreign policymakers as a willing partner who could help them 
accomplish that goal.  He was a member of Peru’s mestizo aristocracy, someone, U.S. foreign 
policymakers believed, whose strong hand could corral Peru’s majority-indigenous 
                                                          
40
 This case is made most forcefully by Bryce Wood in his follow-up to his famous work on the origins of 
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor Policy.  See Bryce Wood, The Dismantling of the Good Neighbor 
Policy, 1st ed. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985). 
18 
 
population and lead it to a prosperous future that for reasons of racial inferiority would be 
otherwise impossible for Peru to achieve.  Of course, they knew, an autocrat could better 
protect American interests, as well.   
 Accordingly, throughout the 1920s, the United States intensified its relationship with 
Leguía even further.  American capital flooded into Peru, and U.S. companies secured 
valuable concessions from Leguía himself to exploit the country’s abundant natural 
resources.  Meanwhile the U.S. naval mission, whose members became integral members of 
Leguía’s inner circle and constituted a vital element of broader U.S. policy in Peru, cultivated 
as close an association with the Peruvian Navy as the United States enjoyed with any naval 
establishment in the hemisphere.  By the late 1920s, such inroads caused American foreign 
policymakers to see the entirety of the U.S. relationship with Leguía as a resounding success.  
However, they also obscured the harsh realities that confronted Peruvians who opposed 
Leguía’s rule, and gave U.S. policymakers a false sense of security that Leguía’s popularity 
among his countrymen was following the same upward trajectory as Peru’s impressive 
economic growth.  Throughout the decade, U.S. policy became personally tied to Leguía – 
helping strengthen his rule into the entrenched dictatorship he sought – and as time went on, 
this association made it increasingly difficult for American foreign policymakers to see (let 
alone comprehend) the deep fissures that Leguía’s repressive rule was opening beneath the 
veneer of prosperity his economic policies had created.  Thus did the United States openly 
back a Latin American dictator, and clearly expose itself for the first time in South America 
as a nation whose professed ideals and behavior were often two very different things. 
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 Finally, this study adopts a broad view of naval power and demonstrates the 
importance of non-coercive naval activity to relations between nations.
41
  That is, it 
emphasizes the diplomatic significance of naval activities beyond combat operations and 
gunboat diplomacy, which together have tended to dominate treatments of naval affairs in the 
literatures of both foreign relations and naval history.
42
  Throughout the 1920s, 1930s, and 
into the 1940s, the U.S. Navy’s roles advising the Peruvian Navy and conducting highly 
public goodwill cruises to Peruvian shores constituted a large share of the overall diplomatic 
give-and-take between the United States and Peru.  During the Leguía years, the American 
naval mission to Peru was a primary vehicle through which U.S.-Peruvian relations were 
conducted.  Mission members were integral parts of Leguía’s inner circle, holding positions 
of high rank and authority in the Peruvian Navy.  Mission personnel, especially their chief 
(who occupied the highest uniformed position in the Peruvian Navy), often enjoyed more 
direct access to the president than the U.S. Ambassador in the country.  Not only did this 
facilitate ever-closer relations between the United States and Peru during the 1920s, it laid 
the groundwork for an extraordinarily close institutional association between the U.S. and 
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Peruvian navies that would endure for decades even as winds of politics blew in wildly 
different directions.   
 That mutual fondness between the two nations’ navies proved vital, for example, to 
U.S.-Peruvian cooperation in hemispheric security affairs as the clouds of war gathered in 
Europe and the Pacific in the late 1930s.  The Peruvian Navy lobbied heavily from 1935 
through 1937 for the establishment of a new U.S. naval mission to replace the one that had 
been withdrawn after Leguía’s 1930 overthrow.  Sent to Lima by the Franklin D. Roosevelt 
administration in 1938, that mission paved the way for more intimate links not only with the 
Peru’s Navy, but with its aviation establishment, Army, and political leadership after the 
years of drift that had followed Leguía’s downfall.  In total, these naval activities helped 
fashion a security partnership between the United States and Peru that enhanced 
Washington’s efforts to build inter-American unity and defend the Western Hemisphere from 
external threats.  Before and during World War II, elements of the U.S. Fleet made goodwill 
visits to the Peruvian port of Callao that gave public expression to this emerging security 
partnership.  Meanwhile, in Washington, the U.S.-Peruvian naval relationship (and U.S. 
naval activities in Latin America more generally) was a regular topic of discussion among 
high-level officials in the Roosevelt administration who were charged with hemispheric 
security efforts. 
 This is not to suggest, however, that naval cooperation always made for smoother 
relations between Washington and Lima.  Indeed, especially during Leguía’s Oncenio, it 
often complicated the relationship.  The fact that mission personnel served as officers in the 
Peruvian Navy while retaining their rank and status in the U.S. Navy, for example, raised 
difficult questions about what status they should assume in the event that Leguía’s 
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government went to war with another nation or moved to forcibly quell a domestic 
disturbance.  It also blurred lines of authority and opened the way for some officers, most 
notably aviation chief Harold B. Grow (Commander, U.S. Navy), to develop close, personal 
friendships with Leguía that made it all but impossible for the naval mission to remain 
neutral in national affairs beyond the Navy.  This was true in large part because the Peruvian 
president made it a priority to keep the naval mission – and by extension, the Navy – 
politically close.  It was true also because Leguía saw the Navy as the ultimate guarantor of 
Peru’s security and territorial integrity, and made its expansion a priority of his 
administration.  Throughout the decade he effectively used the naval mission to advance that 
goal – giving naval mission chiefs prominent roles in advocating for naval expansion, using 
naval mission contacts to facilitate arms purchases in the United States, and, during the 1930 
revolution that overthrew him, calling on naval mission members to take an active role in 
preserving his regime.  In each of these instances and in others, close naval cooperation made 
American diplomats’ jobs more difficult.  But just as the numerous successes did, these 
complications demonstrated the centrality of naval power to the U.S.-Peruvian relationship. 
AN OVERVIEW OF PERUVIAN GEOGRAPHY 
 
 To appreciate why naval power was so central to the U.S.-Peruvian relationship 
between the World Wars, it is important to understand the dominant features of Peru’s 
geography (see Appendix 2, Map 2) as well as the basic contours of its national history since 
independence from Spain.  Situated mid-way down the west coast of South America, Peru 
possesses a coastline of nearly fifteen-hundred miles in length that stretches from Ecuadorian 
frontier in the north to the Chilean border in the south.  Hugging the coast is Peru’s arid costa 
(coastal) region, a narrow stretch of land that ranges, on average, between twenty and ninety 
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miles in width between the Pacific Ocean and the heights of the Andean mountains which 
run the length of the country and form its dominant geographical feature.  Home to Peru’s 
capital city, Lima, as well as most of Peru’s mestizo population (persons of mixed indigenous 
and European descent), the costa has long been the country’s economic and political power 
center.  It is a predominantly a desert land whose main contribution to the nation’s economic 
life in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was as a provider of exportable raw 
materials, the most prominent ones being guano (the calcified droppings of coastal birds, 
used as an agricultural fertilizer) and nitrates (substances such as saltpeter, components both 
of fertilizers and explosives).
43
 
 Acting almost as a wall, Peru’s sierra (mountainous) region runs the length of the 
country, separating the western costa from the country’s vast eastern selva (rainforest) 
region.  Rising to a maximum height of more than twenty-two thousand feet, the Andes 
mountains constitute a formidable geographical obstacle within Peru, and throughout its 
national history, their persistent presence has significantly complicated the task of achieving 
the economic, social, and cultural cohesion so necessary to modern nationhood.  Seat of the 
pre-colonial Inca Empire, the sierra has remained home to the largest concentration of Peru’s 
large, vibrant indigenous population since independence.
44
  Throughout its national history, 
Peru has had difficulty forging socioeconomic linkages across this harsh topography.  As a 
result, the sierra is economically and socially distinct within Peru, as is the even more 
isolated eastern selva that it separates from the costa.  Comprising nearly sixty-percent of 
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Peru’s total geographical area, Peru’s rainforest region is home to less than ten-percent of the 
country’s total population.  It is a region rich in natural resources that Peruvians and 
foreigners alike have long viewed, often misguidedly, as the economic future of the whole 
country.
45
  Accentuating the selva’s appeal has been the fact that rivers originating there 
combine to form the headwaters of the mighty Amazon River, South America’s largest 
navigable waterway, which gives Peru direct shipping access to the Atlantic Ocean and 
solidifies its claim to be a transcontinental nation.
46
  Still, largely cut off from the nation’s 
economic and political center in the costa, Peru’s selva remains tremendously isolated. 
 Peru’s geographic reality, then, is that of a nation of three largely distinct 
socioeconomic regions.  Over time, Peru’s challenging geography has made overland trade 
with neighboring countries very difficult.  At the same time, though, it has made ground 
invasions of Peru difficult propositions for potential enemies, and has done much to enhance 
Peru’s territorial security.  In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the periods vital to 
any understanding of Peru’s security orientation during the interwar period, these two 
realities came together to accentuate the importance of the Pacific coastline to Peru’s national 
identity.  On the one hand, the coast came to serve as Peru’s most important economic and 
political linkage to the international community.  Its foreign trade and communications with 
other nations of the world were almost wholly dependent on ocean-going modes of 
transportation.  On the other hand, though, this dependence helped make the Pacific coastline 
Peru’s greatest strategic vulnerability.  The latter would be demonstrated with devastating 
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clarity in the later 19th century, when Peru and Chile went to war to settle a mineral rights 
dispute centered in the coastal desert that spanned the frontier they shared with Bolivia. 
THE WAR OF THE PACIFIC AND ITS AFTERMATH 
 
 The War of the Pacific fought against Chile between 1879 and 1883 was the defining 
experience of Peru’s first century of independence, and did much to shape its economy, 
foreign policy, and strategic posture well into the twentieth century.  The war’s origins lie in 
both the economic and strategic realms.  Economically, it has roots in Peru’s development as 
a nation whose prosperity by the 1870s was tied up in a single commodity:  guano.  Over the 
course of many centuries, the rich marine life in Peru’s coastal waters and the extremely dry 
climate that prevailed in Peru’s costa region combined to preserve massive buildups of 
coastal bird droppings rich in nitrogen and phosphorous on small islands located just off 
Peru’s central coast.  The discovery of these deposits in the 1830s, some of the largest and 
richest in the world, sparked a vibrant international trade as Peru fed surging demand for 
fertilizer in the United States and in Europe.  Although Peru granted concessions to foreign 
companies to exploit the deposits, it retained for itself a majority claim to the overall revenue 
of overseas guano sales – a development that kept the Peruvian government’s coffers 
relatively full as the trade boomed from the early 1840s into the 1870s.  Unfortunately for 
Peru’s national development, wealth from the guano trade remained concentrated in the 
hands of a small group of elite merchants centered in Lima, and did not result in a balanced 
economic growth whose benefits were spread throughout the whole nation.  This lack of 
balance ensured that Peru would be in for economically difficult times when, as was bound to 
happen, disruptions in supply and demand combined to slow the trade’s frenzied pace.  By 
the early 1870s, exporters had all but exhausted Peru’s valuable guano deposits.  At that 
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same moment, a global economic depression struck that sapped international demand.  
Wholly dependent on the guano trade and without other sectors capable of carrying Peru’s 
economy forward, the country sank into crisis.
47
 
 By the early 1870s, however, Peruvian and foreign investors had begun to discover 
large, valuable deposits of nitrates (a valuable component in the manufacture of fertilizer, as 
well as explosives) in the Atacama Desert that spanned the coastal regions of southern Peru, 
Bolivia, and northern Chile.  At the time, national borders were imprecise in the Atacama due 
to the persistence of long-unsettled claims dating back to the days of Spanish colonialism.  
The discovery of nitrates ignited an investment frenzy that quickly exposed the ad hoc nature 
of the three nations’ boundaries.  In the span of a few short years foreign capital flooded into 
the region, and the three nations, sensing that the desert’s potential riches held the keys to 
their economic recoveries, immediately staked overlapping mineral rights claims.  In defense 
of Peru’s interests Manuel Pardo, founder of Peru’s first civilian political party (the 
Civilistas) and the nation’s first civilian president, nationalized the nitrate industry operating 
in the Peruvian Atacama (the region of Tarapacá) in 1875.  Among the nationalized entities 
were several Chilean and European companies that had been operating under contracts 
previously approved by the Peruvian government.  The Chilean government saw Pardo’s 
move as an affront to its national interests, and the level of bitterness and rancor among the 
three neighbors grew.  Shortly thereafter, Bolivia, the poorest of the three, sought to solidify 
its claims by enacting a small tax (ten centavos per ton) on nitrates extracted by foreign firms 
from its portion of the Atacama.  Again the Chilean government took exception, seeing the 
tax as a violation of existing agreements that Chilean firms had made with the Bolivian 
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government.  With its government’s backing, the Chilean Antofagasta Mining Company 
refused to pay the Bolivian tax, a move that resulted in Bolivian forces forcibly seizing the 
company.  To Chile, both Bolivia’s moves and Peru’s nationalizations were unjustified 
provocations.  By early 1879, the Chilean government resolved to apply force to end the 
injustices.  In February, Chilean ground and naval forces moved to seize the city of 
Antofagasta.  Bolivia responded with a declaration of war, and in April, Chile responded by 
declaring war on both Bolivia and Peru.  The War of the Pacific was on. 
 As important as economic issues were to the coming of the war, though, one cannot 
understand the countries’ embrace of military solutions without also understanding the 
strategic reality of South America’s west coast in the years before 1879.  Since achieving 
their independence from Spain, Peru and Chile had each attempted, at various turns, to assert 
dominance on their shared coast and exercise preponderant influence over the waters of the 
southeastern Pacific.  Throughout the early years of their existences as independent nations, 
wracked as they both were with internal political and economic problems, neither nation was 
entirely successful in the pursuit.  The tensions that emerged over nitrate exploration in the 
shared frontier in the early 1870s raised the stakes of this long-term rivalry considerably, and 
sparked efforts in both countries to enhance their security.  Chile was the strongest of the 
three in military and naval terms, boasting a naval fleet with faster, more modern, more 
heavily armed ships than the Peruvian Navy possessed, and an army that was better 
organized, better equipped, and better versed in modern techniques of discipline, combat 
leadership, and logistics.  Struggling under the weight of a bad economy and heavy 
indebtedness brought on by years of heavy borrowing compounded by the global economic 
depression, in the years before the war the Peruvian government was not in a position to 
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build its naval and ground forces to quantitative or qualitative parity with the superior 
Chileans.  Instead, consistent with Pardo’s preference to seek security through treaties with 
neighbors rather than through expensive military buildups, Peru opted to ally itself with 
neighboring Bolivia in the hope that, should war come, together their military establishments 
could hold the superior Chileans at bay.  In 1873 Peru signed a secret defensive alliance with 
Bolivia, the terms of which required each nation to come to the other’s defense in the event 
of Chilean aggression.  It was Peru’s delivery on this promise in the wake of Chilean 
operations against Antofagasta that prompted the Chilean government to include Peru in its 
April, 1879 declaration of war against Bolivia.
48
 
 The War of the Pacific demonstrates as clearly as anything in Peru’s national history 
the importance of coastal security and naval forces to its overall national security, for despite 
the fact that combat operations continued all the way into 1883, the war was, for all intents 
and purposes, won by Chile at sea in late 1879 – less than one year into hostilities.  That is 
because the mountainous, desert terrain and vast expanse of the Atacama Desert made 
ground invasions from one country’s territory into the other all but impossible to undertake.  
The only way Peruvian or Chilean armies could fully secure the other’s nitrate-rich deserts or 
capital city was if their navies could land them safely on enemy shores within reasonable 
marching distance of the objective.  Thus command of the sea was essential to victory.  
Accordingly, in the war’s first year, both Peru and Chile put the overwhelming share of their 
war efforts into achieving supremacy on the water.  In April, 1879 the quantitatively and 
qualitatively superior Chilean Navy initiated a passive strategy aimed at blockading Peruvian 
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ports, choking off Peru’s commerce, and denying the Peruvian government a vital source of 
revenue with which to sustain its war effort.  The problem with this strategy was that it gave 
Peru’s enterprising fleet commander, Capitán de Navio (later Almirante) Miguel Grau 
Seminario, complete freedom of action.  The Peruvian used that freedom to maximum effect.  
Throughout much of the war’s first year, Grau was unmolested by the static Chilean Navy as 
he shuttled Peruvian troops from Lima to the southern front and harassed Chilean ports and 
merchant vessels. 
 For months Chilean naval strategy failed to adapt to Grau’s activism, ceding the 
initiative at sea to the smaller Peruvian fleet.  Only when Grau’s best armored frigate, the 
Independencia, ran aground in pursuit of a Chilean ship off the southern Peruvian port of 
Iquique did Chilean fortunes begin to turn.  By historian William Sater’s estimation, the loss 
reduced the small Peruvian fleet’s operational capability by almost forty-percent, 
accentuating Chile’s naval superiority.  Although Grau remained an active and elusive 
enemy, the war turned decisively and permanently against Peru in early October.  That is 
when a new Chilean naval commander divided his fleet and trapped Grau’s Huáscar, the 
crown jewel of the Peruvian fleet, off Punta Angamos, just north of Antofagasta.  Chased by 
faster, more heavily armed ships, the Huáscar struggled to return fire.  One of the Chilean 
volleys struck the ship’s armored bridge, killing Grau instantly and depriving the Peruvian 
Navy of the strategist and tactician who had kept its war effort alive against significant odds.  
In a matter of hours, despite numerous gallant but futile attempts to outrun its Chilean 
pursuers, the Huáscar succumbed.  Chile had completed its destruction of Peruvian naval 
power, and had won command of the seas.  Peruvian shores were wide open to invasion.  
Within a month, the Chilean Army occupied the Peruvian province of Tarapacá.  Six months 
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after that, the Chilean Navy put ground forces ashore further north in Peruvian territory at 
Arica, depriving Peru of its last source of vital nitrate revenue with which to fund its war 
effort.  With complete freedom to act at sea, in late 1880 Chile succeeded in putting more 
than ten thousand ground troops ashore near Lima.  Within two weeks, despite heavy 
resistance from Peruvian soldiers fighting to defend their capital, the old city founded 
centuries earlier by Spanish conquistador Francisco Pizarro fell into Chilean hands.  The war 
would continue into 1883 as Peruvian forces took to the mountains of the sierra to mount a 
guerilla resistance.  But those actions, as effective as they sometimes were in a tactical sense, 
ultimately proved to be strategically fruitless.  In losing the naval war, Peru had completely 
lost the ability to defend its territory.  With it, Peru had lost the wider war.
49
 
 Chile’s victory in the War of the Pacific was a total one, and in many ways serves as 
confirmation of the old adage “to the victor belong the spoils.”  The Treaty of Ancón 
concluded on October 20, 1883 confirmed nearly all of Chile’s wartime gains.  It forced Peru 
to permanently cede its nitrate-rich Tarapacá region, and validated Chile’s absorption of 
Bolivia’s Pacific coast – turning the nation named for Simon Bolivar, the liberator of South 
America, into the continent’s second landlocked nation (Paraguay was the first).  The Treaty 
failed, however, to settle all of the belligerents’ concerns.  It delayed action on the fates of 
the coastal Peruvian provinces of Tacna and Arica, at the north end of the Atacama Desert, 
and instead left them up to settlement by a plebiscite to be held within ten years.  When held, 
the vote was supposed to determine whether the provinces should be ceded to Chile or 
returned to Peruvian control.  In the meantime, over Peruvian objections victorious Chilean 
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forces were allowed to occupy both provinces.  As Chapter 2 will discuss, this awkward 
arrangement (de jure neutrality, supervised by de facto Chilean control) virtually ensured that 
no plebiscite would be held within the timeframe specified by the Treaty of Ancón.  It all but 
guaranteed that the issue would continue to roil Peruvian-Chilean relations well into the 
twentieth century. 
 Peru’s defeat in the War of the Pacific shaped the basic contours of its foreign and 
defense policies from the late nineteenth century into the twentieth.  The loss of its southern-
most province was a bitter pill that, for decades, steeled Peruvian resolve to hold on to Tacna 
and Arica.  As a result, a succession of Peruvian governments between 1883 and 1919 made 
breaking the impasse over Tacna and Arica a priority.
50
  Peruvian insistence on retaining 
both provinces ran headlong into patient indifference from Chile, whose forces already 
occupied both.  The result was a long-term diplomatic stalemate that Peruvians considered an 
affront to their national honor.  At the same time, Peruvians began to take stock of the 
military and naval lessons of their defeat.  Although military concerns were largely 
overshadowed by considerable turbulence in Peruvian politics in the late 1880s and early 
1890s, Peru’s leaders began to express grave concerns over Chile’s postwar efforts to 
modernize and expand its Army and Navy.  Particularly alarming to Peru was the fact that 
Chile had begun employing German military and naval advisers in 1885.  Painfully aware 
that military and naval inferiority had been at the heart of their recent defeat, and convinced 
that their nation could benefit from outside assistance, Peruvians also turned to foreign 
advisers.  Because a ground war seemed likely if diplomacy failed to break the stalemate on 
Tacna and Arica, Peru turned first to augmenting its Army, welcoming a mission of advisers 
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from the French Army in 1895.  The move inaugurated a close institutional relationship that 
would last with few interruptions until World War II.  Not until Augusto Leguía came to 
power in July of 1919, however, did a Peruvian president view the long-running Tacna-Arica 
controversy and the nation’s military-strategic challenges as parts of an integrated whole.  
Armed with a keen awareness of the War of the Pacific’s clearest strategic lesson, Leguía set 
out to make Peru’s Navy equal to the task of serving as the ultimate guarantor of Peruvian 
security. 
STRUCTURE OF THIS STUDY 
 
 This dissertation proceeds in a roughly chronological fashion.  Chapter 1 assesses the 
unique conditions that gave rise to the U.S. naval mission sent to Peru in 1920, and how a 
convergence of interests between the United States and Peru shaped the mission and its work.  
Specifically, it discusses growing U.S. economic and strategic interests in South America 
after the First World War, and analyzes the ways in which the ardently pro-American Leguía 
believed securing a U.S. naval mission would advance his particular interests for Peru’s 
security and economic development.  Chapter 2 describes the work that the U.S. naval 
mission did to overhaul and reform the Peruvian Navy from the time of its arrival in 1920 
until the Leguía’s overthrow in 1930 – a ten-year period in which, per Leguía’s insistence, 
U.S. personnel exercised full command over the Peruvian naval establishment.  This 
treatment focuses specifically on the U.S. naval mission’s efforts to reform Peru’s system 
naval education, establish a submarine force as the foundation of Peru’s naval defenses, and 
create a national aviation system capable of furthering Peru’s security and economic 
interests.  Chapter 3 explores the specific ways in which the naval mission’s role in formal 
command of Peru’s Navy often complicated relations between the two nations while Leguía 
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was in power.  It then addresses the challenges the mission’s status posed after Leguía was 
overthrown in August of 1930, and traces how the violent unrest of Peruvian politics in the 
wake of Leguía’s fall ultimately forced U.S. authorities to withdraw the mission entirely in 
early 1933.  Chapter 4 explores Washington’s search for new ways to exercise influence in 
Peru and throughout Latin America consistent with its renunciation of armed 
interventionism.  Analyzing high-profile visits of U.S. Navy units to Peruvian waters, it 
traces the origins of the policy of employing goodwill cruises by U.S. naval ships to help 
promote good neighborism during the Herbert Hoover and Franklin D. Roosevelt 
administrations.  And finally, Chapter 5 assesses how the United States utilized both of the 
types of naval diplomacy it had fashioned during the interwar period – naval missions and 
goodwill cruising – to help ensure Peruvian cooperation in U.S. hemispheric defense plans, 




CHAPTER 1: A CONVERGENCE OF INTERESTS, 1919-1921 
 
 The U.S. naval advisory mission that arrived in Lima, Peru in September of 1920 was 
the product of a convergence of interests between the United States and the government of 
new Peruvian President Augusto B. Leguía.
51
  For the administration of U.S. President 
Woodrow Wilson, the mission was a clear and visible expression of a new postwar 
commitment to expand U.S. strategic and commercial influence in South America, filling the 
vacuum that had been left by European nations’ wartime retreat from economic and military 
activities on that continent.  Amid its efforts to cultivate a new order to ensure global peace, 
the United States set about extending its Latin American sphere of influence beyond the 
Caribbean to include the entirety of South America.  Situated on the west coast of South 
America, mid-way between the Caribbean basin, where U.S. influence was traditionally 
strongest, and the southern reaches of South America, where European influence historically 
eclipsed that of the United States, Peru was an essential focus of Washington’s influence-
building effort. 
 For Leguía, who had come into office in mid-1919, developing a close economic and 
security association with the United States was an overriding priority from day one.  The 
greater the U.S. involvement in Peru’s economic and security affairs, he believed, the better.  
Thus, throughout his eleven-year rule he proved to be a willing partner in U.S. designs.  It is 
important to note, however, that while enthusiastically cooperative, Leguía was no mere 
vassal of Washington.  Over the course of his eleven-year rule (known to Peruvian history as 
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El Oncenio) he pursued an unprecedented level of economic and security cooperation with 
the nation he often referred to as “the great republic of the north,” and did so for his own 
reasons.  The U.S. capital and expertise he attracted to Peru was calculated to advance his 
own distinct vision of a stable, secure, and prosperous future for Peru.  To realize that goal, 
Leguía believed, he had to deepen Peru’s trade and financial ties to the United States, resolve 
his nation’s several border disputes with neighbors, and consolidate his hold on power.  As 
this chapter will discuss, he saw naval advisers from the United States as essential to 
achieving each of these three objectives. 
LOOKING SOUTH: U.S. INTERESTS AFTER THE FIRST WORLD WAR 
 
 The United States emerged from the First World War as the strongest of the 
victorious Allies in economic and military terms, determined to establish a new, peaceful 
global political order and an open capitalist economic world defined by equal access to raw 
materials and export markets, and equal opportunities for trade and investment.
52
  Officials in 
the Woodrow Wilson administration believed that, more than at any time in the nation’s 
history, wartime dislocations in international commerce had demonstrated the importance of 
a robust and growing foreign trade to the basic health of the U.S. economy.  As historian 
Michael Krenn notes, the disruption of U.S. trade at the outset of World War I had briefly 
“paralyzed” business in the United States and “brought home the necessity of overseas 
commerce with ‘compelling force’.”
53
  The solution, they increasingly believed, was to use 
                                                          
52
 For more on President Woodrow Wilson’s post-World War I commitment to establishing a global order to 
ensure international peace, see Thomas J. Knock, To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New 
World Order  (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).  See also John Milton Cooper, Woodrow Wilson: A 
Biography, 1st ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2009), 454-534. 
53
 Michael L. Krenn, U.S. Policy Toward Economic Nationalism in Latin America, 1917-1929, America in the 
Modern World (Wilmington: SR Books, 1990), 2. 
35 
 
the power of the U.S. government to promote trade expansion overseas.
54
  Accordingly, U.S. 
officials began to embrace the idea that the nation’s military and naval power could be proper 
tools for helping to advance American economic interests and expand U.S. strategic 
influence.  European nations had long sent military and naval advisory missions to South 
America on the belief that helping to improve other countries’ military and naval 
establishments made for smoother, more productive diplomatic relations and facilitated 
expanded trade.
55
  Keen on dramatically expanding U.S. trade in the aftermath of World War 
I, especially in Latin America, officials in Wilson’s State Department began to see naval and 
military missions as useful accompaniments to U.S. economic policy.
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 Latin America as a whole, and South America specifically, occupied a central place 
within Wilson’s open world economic vision.  To a greater degree than other areas of the 
globe, U.S. foreign policymakers agreed, greater trade with South America could help the 
nation address two pressing postwar needs: first, the continent could grow into a valuable 
export market for American manufactured goods, and more importantly, it could supply U.S. 
industry with a nearly endless supply of vital raw materials.
57
  Both would be essential if, as 
the Wilson administration hoped, the United States was to moderate the dramatic swings that 
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had characterized its cyclical boom-bust economic performance over the past half-century.
58
  
As a coastal nation with a varied geography and a wide variety of accessible, exportable 
natural resources, the Andean nation of Peru was integral to Washington’s plans.  Peru 
appeared especially attractive to U.S. foreign policymakers because its largest pre-war 
trading partner, Great Britain, had proven unable to maintain its substantial trade presence 
there amid the economic and demographic devastation of World War I.  Britain’s overall 
share of Latin America’s foreign trade, for example, had fallen from 29-percent to 20-percent 
during the war.  By 1920 British purchases of Peruvian exports were off 10-percent from 
1900 highs, while Peruvian imports of British manufactured goods fell 32-percent during the 
same period.  The United States had had considerable success filling the void in Peru’s 
wartime trade, as U.S. purchases of Peruvian exports increased by 13-percent between 1914 
and 1919 while Peruvian purchases of U.S. manufactured goods during the war more than 
doubled.  By war’s end, the United States supplied more than 60-percent of Peru’s imports, 
and even though these wartime heights would ultimately prove unsustainable, they signaled 
an important trend: by the end of World War I, the United States had supplanted Britain as 
the dominant force in Peru’s international trade relations.
59
 
 At the same time, Peru was becoming a strategic concern for U.S. military leaders, 
who looked toward South America after World War I with a mix of optimism and concern.  
They shared in the State Department’s hope that, with Europe in disarray and U.S. power 
ascendant, the United States could expand its strategic influence in the hemisphere far 
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beyond its traditional bounds in Central America and the Caribbean.
60
  They were also 
concerned that European military and naval influence in South America, which had been 
considerable before the war, might regenerate and become a menace to U.S. interests on the 
continent in the postwar years.  France, Germany, and Great Britain had all maintained 
military or naval missions in South America in the decades before the war.
61
  The fact that 
none of these three nations (which were in the midst of postwar reconstruction efforts) 
possessed the capability to resume their military and naval advising missions in South 
America immediately following the war, however, did not assuage U.S. military leaders’ 
fears that they might once again send missions in an attempt to reopen the hemisphere to 
European commercial dominance.  In this regard, Britain was the object of greatest concern.  
U.S. military leaders viewed British activities in South America with “marked uneasiness,” 
historian Joseph Tulchin has argued, and were especially concerned about potential sales of 
British military and naval equipment to South American nations and the possible 
construction of new British coaling stations on Latin American shores.  It was these fears, 
coupled with broader concerns that U.S. Navy leaders had about their institution’s place in 
postwar American life, that ultimately caused them to embrace the idea of sending naval 
missions overseas.  Such missions, Navy Secretary Josephus Daniels acknowledged, would 
help the United States “cultivate close diplomatic and commercial relations with South 
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American countries” and would help improve the  general “international situation” 
throughout Latin America.  Moreover, naval missions would give the Navy an important role 
in the nation’s peacetime diplomacy.
62
 
 For economic, diplomatic, and security reasons, then, the Wilson administration was 
primed to respond favorably when word reached Washington in October 1919 that Leguía 
would formally request a U.S. naval mission for Peru.  Such a mission promised to give the 
United States a great deal of influence in a Latin American country outside of the Caribbean, 
the area where U.S. influence in the hemisphere had traditionally been strongest.
63
  Leguía’s 
ardently pro-U.S. orientation and Peru’s geographic location made it an attractive destination.  
Sending a mission to Peru would help establish a different kind of military involvement in 
Latin America than U.S. authorities had, by then, grown accustomed to exercising.  Between 
1900 and 1919, Washington had dispatched military forces to Latin American nations (none 
south of the Caribbean) to protect U.S. interests and enforce order on twenty-six different 
occasions.
64
  While many of those interventions had been brief, several, including those in 
Nicaragua (1912), Haiti (1915), and the Dominican Republic (1916), had gone on for years 
and required sustained, costly commitments of American military assets.
65
  In the wake of 
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World War I, when Americans had interceded for the first time in a European ground war, 
U.S. foreign policymakers accurately sensed that American public opinion was tiring of 
interventionism and would not support it indefinitely as an instrument of the nation’s 
diplomacy.
66
  Although the United States would not formally renounce interventionism in the 
Americas until the early 1930s, declining public support for such operations in the Caribbean 
made it impossible for U.S. foreign policymakers to consider using military intervention to 
advance Washington’s post-World War I objectives further south in the hemisphere.  By and 
large, the State Department was not as deeply concerned about a resurgent European military 
presence in Latin America as Navy leaders were, and believed that, going forward, it would 
be unnecessary for the United States to seek formal imperial control over South American 
nations in order to protect its strategic and commercial interests on that continent.
67
  To the 
diplomats, a mission of U.S. naval officers serving in a friendly capacity at the invitation of 
the Peruvian government represented a clear departure from traditional interventionism: it 
would give the United States a beachhead for growing its strategic and commercial influence 
in South America, but would not represent a coercive use of force.  Thus, they believed, 
Washington would not be opening itself up to the familiar charges of “Yankee imperialism” 
that had long emanated from Central America and the Caribbean.  In short, as a U.S. Navy 
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history of American naval missions would later conclude, in the 1920s, for the first time it 
became national policy to employ an arm of the United States military establishment to 
supplement “the development and expansion of our trade and political relations” and to give 
practical expression to previously “abstract expressions” of Pan-Americanism.
68
 
PERUVIAN INTERESTS: FINANCIAL AND TRADE TIES 
 
 Washington’s designs to further expand its trade, investment, and military influence 
in South America aligned well with the designs of Peruvian President Augusto Leguía, who 
came into office in July 1919 with three overriding objectives:  1) spurring economic growth 
through deepened financial and trade ties to the United States; 2) reaching favorable 
resolutions to Peru’s unsettled border disputes, especially with Chile; and 3) entrenching 
himself in power.  The first of these did much to frame Peru’s foreign relations from very 
early on.  Having served one previous term (1908-1912) as Peru's president, Leguía returned 
from exile to win the office again in 1919 on a Patria Nueva (“new fatherland”) platform that 
staked Peru’s economic future on export-led growth in its extractive industries (principally 
oil and minerals), the expansion of Peru’s transportation and communications infrastructure, 
and a substantial expansion of the nation’s social safety net.
69
  Essential to Leguía’s vision of 
a prosperous future for Peru was widespread foreign involvement in the inner workings of 
both the Peruvian economy and government.  In his assessment, infusions of foreign capital 
were necessary to give industrial and infrastructure projects the boost they needed to 
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overcome the nation’s difficult geography, which had long kept Peru’s coastal, mountainous, 
and eastern rainforest regions divided into economically distinct regions.  Similarly, he 
viewed foreign technical expertise as Peru’s only hope both for advancing into the realm of 
“modern” nations and for overcoming the longstanding socioeconomic divisions that flowed 
from the racial and cultural makeup of Peruvian society.  For both capital and technical 
expertise Leguía looked first and foremost toward the United States.
70
  It was a familiar 
pattern: during his first presidential tenure Leguía had devoted considerable energy to 
securing U.S. commercial and government loans to finance his administration's programs, 
and had invited educators from the United States to assume key positions of responsibility 
within Peru's public education establishment.
71
 
 During his second tenure (1919-1930), these same patterns would reemerge on a 
much larger scale.  Between 1920 and 1929, for example, U.S. banks and private firms 
loaned Leguía’s government more than $100 million to finance the ambitious public works, 
rail and highway construction, and defense projects that were central to the Patria Nueva 
idea.
72
  Often these loans were made through the sale of bonds in the United States, bonds 
that, on the one hand, were highly profitable for the brokers who gathered substantial 
commissions on their sale, but that, on the other, saddled Peru with an increasing debt load 
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that would be difficult to pay back as the decade progressed.
73
  However, even as they left 
Peru with a crippling debt burden, these massive infusions of U.S. capital (and the 
infrastructure modernization they facilitated) did help foster impressive economic growth in 
Peru during much of the 1920s.
74
  Moreover, they facilitated the importation of the U.S. 
technical expertise that was so important to Leguía’s vision of a prosperous economic future.  
The first substantial loan his government secured from the United States, for example, came 
with the condition that an American be appointed to oversee the Peruvian government’s 
fiscal management.  This led to the appointment of a U.S. economist, William W. 
Cumberland, as director of Peruvian customs, adviser on the government budget, and 
member of the Board of Directors of the Reserve Bank of Peru.
75
  Leguía appears not only to 
have gone along with this arrangement, but to have helped conceive of it.  In the fall of 1919 
he had made overtures to the U.S. Minister in Lima about establishing such a reserve bank, 
and of having it led a U.S. manager.
76
  And on numerous other occasions during his early 
years in office, Leguía made concerted efforts to attract North Americans with technical and 
administrative expertise to Peru on the belief that doing so would pave the way for increasing 
amounts of U.S. investment to flow into the country.
77
  To a significant extent these efforts 
bore fruit, as U.S. citizens populated key civilian ministries and departments throughout the 
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PERUVIAN INTERESTS: SETTLING BORDER DISPUTES 
 
 To understand how a U.S. naval mission in particular fit into Leguía’s broader vision 
for Peru’s future, though, it is also necessary to examine the foundations of the Oncenio’s 
foreign policy.  The centerpiece of that policy was a fervent desire to resolve Peru’s 
persistent border disputes with its neighbors, and no border concern was more pressing to 
Leguía and the nation as a whole than the longstanding one with Peru’s southern neighbor, 
Chile, which had festered since Peru’s defeat in the War of the Pacific (1879-1883).
79
  At the 
heart of the dispute was the mineral-rich province of Tarapacá, which had comprised the 
southernmost part of Peru before the war but which, along with a vast swath of Bolivia’s 
coastal Atacama Desert, was captured and occupied by victorious Chilean forces during the 
hostilities.  By the Treaty of Ancón (1883) that formally ended the war, Chile was allowed to 
keep the Bolivian Atacama and most of Tarapacá as spoils of war.
80
  The national fates of the 
northern provinces of Tacna and Arica, however, were to be decided by a plebiscite held 
within ten years of the Treaty’s ratification by both nations.  In the interim, the Treaty 
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stipulated that Chilean forces would be allowed to occupy both cities until the plebiscite 
could be held, and this was the heart of the problem that made finding a permanent solution 
so difficult.  Unfortunately, the Treaty’s terms on the timing and conduct of the plebiscite 
were not explicit, stating only that it should be held within ten years.  The practical effect of 
this ambiguity was that Chile could maintain de facto control of both Tacna and Arica 
indefinitely until the vote was held. 
 The Treaty’s lack of clarity on the plebiscite question led Peru and Chile to arrive at 
vastly different interpretations of the cities’ legal status when in 1893, predictably, the ten-
year period passed and no vote was held.  With the expiration, Peru quickly declared the pact 
null and void since no vote was held within the specified timeframe.  Chile, on the other 
hand, claimed that not only had a plebiscite not been a hard requirement of the Treaty in the 
first place, but that the ten-year window it specified was only a minimum timeframe within 
which the determining vote could take place.  The implication of the Chilean position was 
that a vote could be held – or not held – at any time in the future and the Treaty of Ancón 
would not be violated.
81
  While this uneasy status quo no doubt strengthened Chile’s de facto 
hold on Tacna and Arica (both cities were occupied by Chilean forces at the time), the 
unsettled condition of the dispute persisted and came to define the basic contours of 
Peruvian-Chilean relations for decades to come.  That the Tacna-Arica controversy, which 
remained at an impasse when Leguía took office in 1919, would play a major part in Peru’s 
foreign policy agenda in the 1920s therefore comes as no surprise.
82
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 Animated by a desire to gain the upper hand in that long-simmering dispute, once in 
office Leguía channeled his enthusiasm for all things North American into a concerted effort 
to secure U.S. naval assistance that would strengthen Peru’s strategic position vis-à-vis Chile 
(among South America's major naval powers) both in the long-term and the short-term.  
What he sought to do was leverage the power of the United States to enhance Peru’s national 
security in much the same fashion that he was using cozy financial and trade relations to 
strengthen Peru economically.  In this way Leguía’s efforts to secure naval assistance from 
the United States were entirely consistent with the central philosophical thrust of Patria 
Nueva, a vital component being the importation of U.S. technical expertise and the promise 
of close, sustained cooperation with Washington. 
 Leguía wasted no time putting his naval plans into motion.  He began lobbying for a 
U.S. naval mission well before the Woodrow Wilson administration had even extended his 
government formal diplomatic recognition.
83
  In October of 1919, as he struggled to 
consolidate his shaky rule after barely three months in office, Leguía approached the interim 
U.S. Minister to Peru and signaled his intent to request a mission of U.S. naval officers to 
“reorganize and direct” – not merely to advise – the Peruvian Navy, which he wanted to 
improve and enlarge.
84
  In this regard the naval mission Leguía was contemplating differed 
substantially from the purely advisory naval commission the United States had sent to Brazil 
in 1918, a team of officers whose main purpose was to counsel the Brazilian Navy on the 
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establishment of a naval war college.
85
  In December, as the U.S. State and Navy 
Departments discussed the desirability of sending a naval mission to Peru, Leguía subtly 
pressed Washington for action by making it clear to U.S. officials just how different a 
mission to Peru would be:  members of a U.S. naval mission to Peru were to have full 
authority to reform that nation’s naval establishment, meaning they would act in an 
“executive” capacity and exercise actual command over the Peruvian fleet.  Moreover, 
Leguía told the U.S. Minister in Lima, under his leadership Peru would “give preference at 




 Leguía’s proposal came as a welcome development to foreign policymakers in the 
Woodrow Wilson administration, who had made expanding U.S. strategic and commercial 
influence in South America the cornerstone of Washington’s hemispheric policy after World 
War I.
87
  Indeed, by early 1920 Leguía’s Peru looked like the most fertile ground in all of 
South America for postwar U.S. influence to take root.  In mid-January Secretary of State 
Robert Lansing pressed Navy Secretary Josephus Daniels to accede to Leguía’s wishes and 
allow American naval officers to be sent to Peru.  Given the broader thrust of U.S. policy 
toward Latin America, he argued, the United States should not risk passing on the 
opportunity and opening the door to the possibility that some other nation (presumably a 
European nation with a history of military ties to South America) could step into the void and 
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offer Peru a naval mission.  It was a line of argument seemingly designed to provoke a 
response.  Coming out of the recent war in Europe, after all, it had been U.S. military leaders, 
not diplomats, who had expressed the greatest concern about potential European military 
encroachment in South America.  Here, Lansing was reminding the Navy of that possibility.  
Passing on Leguía’s request, he cautioned Daniels, would make it “more difficult to use our 
influence toward the betterment of the international situation in South America.”
88
 
 The State Department’s position on dispatching a naval mission was decidedly more 
aggressive than that of the U.S. Navy, which, ironically, was the agency expressing concern 
about the diplomatic effects a U.S. naval mission to Peru might have on regional 
developments such as the still-tenuous border situation between Peru and Chile.
89
  As 
Secretary Daniels weighed the State Department’s argument, a debate about the diplomatic 
wisdom of such a mission emerged among naval officers advising both the Secretary and the 
Chief of Naval Operations.  In line with State Department thinking, Lucius Bostwick 
(Captain, U.S. Navy) advised Chief of Naval Operations Robert Coontz that Leguía’s request 
for a U.S. naval mission should be “seriously considered” by the Navy Department even 
though the United States could not hope to receive much immediate material return on its 
investment.  In Bostwick’s assessment, as in the State Department’s, the issue was not 
immediate payoff but the expansion of U.S. influence, the fundamental questions being 
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whether South American naval establishments like Peru’s should be “influenced by our ideas 
or by the ideas and ethics of our possible enemies, whether we wish them favorably disposed 
toward the United States or the reverse.”
90
  Another staff officer, Harry Yarnell (Captain, 
U.S. Navy), acknowledged the validity of the State Department’s position, and recognized 
that national policy dictated furthering the nation’s political and economic interests in Latin 
America by “all legitimate methods,” including naval missions.  But owing to the unsettled 
border situation, he advised that the time was “unsuitable” for establishing a mission in Peru.  
Another staff officer made the case more clearly: because relations between Peru and Chile 
were “not cordial,” sending a mission to Peru “might easily be considered an affront to 
Chile” and thus could prove profoundly destabilizing.
91
 
 Fearful that U.S. naval officers could become embroiled in a border war between the 
two South American nations, Secretary Daniels at first came down against a mission.  In 
early November he wrote Lansing that, while he agreed in principle with the State 
Department’s position, “the sending of such a mission could not be encouraged at any time 
when the relations of Peru with any other South American country [Chile] were unduly 
strained.”
92
  To the State Department, the Navy’s response was unacceptably cautious.  
Secretary Lansing and other officials proceeded to apply consistent pressure to change the 
Navy’s position.  In late December, Daniels relented.  He reiterated his belief that “the 
present is not an opportune time” to send a mission, but in view of the direction broader U.S. 
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policy toward Peru was heading, stated resignedly that the Navy would be “pleased to assist” 
national policy by sending a naval mission “at such time as it is considered proper to do so by 
the State Department.”
93
  Clearly, foreign policymakers in the State Department believed the 
proper time had long since arrived. 
 As 1920 dawned, the Navy Department’s reluctant approval set the stage for a quick 
consummation of the longer-term naval partnership Leguía had wanted with the United 
States.  Almost immediately, the Wilson administration began pressing Congress to pass 
legislation permitting U.S. naval officers to accept employment from South American 
governments.
94
  And just as quickly, Leguía began urging Washington to expand on the 
commitment it was then only in the early stages of making.  Specifically, Leguía wanted to 
ensure that the U.S. naval mission chief (who would head the Peruvian Navy) was an officer 
of sufficiently high rank to ensure that Peruvian officers, who may resent taking orders from 
a norteamericano, would obey his orders.  Leguía had bristled at Washington’s initial 
proposal to make the mission chief a mid-level officer, an offer the U.S. Navy had made out 
of necessity because it had few high-level officers it could spare for such duty.  When, at the 
State Department’s urging, Navy leaders subsequently elevated the position of mission chief 
to a captain’s billet, the Peruvian president was still not satisfied.
95
  In a meeting that month 
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with the U.S. Minister in Lima, he argued that the mission chief should be at least a rear 
admiral, so as to avoid “jealousies” that might arise with high-ranking Peruvian officers.  
Such problems had plagued the French military mission that had been advising the Peruvian 
Army for years, Leguía maintained, and he was “insistent” that the mistake not be made 
again within the Navy.
96
  Leguía soon backed off on this point, a move that appears to have 
been related to the fact that, as of March 1920, the United States had still not extended 
Leguía’s government the formal diplomatic recognition he so fervently desired.
97
  Perhaps in 
an attempt to smooth the way for finally establishing those relations, Leguía soon indicated 
that, after all, he would be willing to accept an officer at the lower rank of captain or even 
commander – so long as the mission intended to train Peruvian naval forces “in actual work 
at sea.”
98
  By May the United States had extended Leguía’s government its coveted de jure 
recognition, and by September the U.S. naval mission was en route to Lima.
99
  The 
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foundation for a more than decade-long naval partnership between Peru and the United States 
was established. 
 As important as a close, cooperative naval relationship with Washington was to 
Leguía’s longer-term security aims, his more immediate concern in late 1919 and early 1920 
was procuring vessels and armaments from the United States that could help even the naval 
balance with Chile immediately.
100
  In 1919  it appeared that Chile had recently acquired six 
submarines from Great Britain and was in the process of acquiring additional surface vessels 
to augment its fleet.
101
  If true, Leguía feared, these reports meant Chile was on the cusp of 
achieving a position of significant strategic advantage over Peru, which possessed only two 
aging, largely inoperable French-built submarines (acquired during his earlier presidential 
term) and a thoroughly inferior surface fleet.
102
  The revelation of Chile’s emerging naval 
superiority no doubt heightened Leguía’s fears for Peru’s security, as memories of its defeat 
in the War of the Pacific and insecurities over the still-unresolved border dispute lingered in 
the Peruvian national consciousness.  As a new technology that had proven its worth as a 
decisive instrument of modern naval warfare in the recent war in Europe, submarines 
appeared to Leguía to be the fastest and most efficient means of increasing the lethality of 
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Peru’s small naval fleet.
103
  Being deficient in submarines to Chile was therefore 
unacceptable.
104
   
 The naval balance with Chile was such a concern, in fact, that Leguía had begun 
inquiring about purchasing submarines in the United States more than four months before his 
July 4, 1919 ascent to power.  In March of that year, through an intermediary, Leguía had 
sought basic data on submarines from the Electric Boat Company (Groton, Connecticut) on 
the idea that, once in office, he might acquire several for the Peruvian Navy in order protect 
Peru from a growing Chilean threat.
105
  He continued this push for submarines after assuming 
the presidency.  In the late months of 1919, even as he struggled to shore up his shaky hold 
on power, Leguía unsuccessfully sought to contract with the Electric Boat for two 
submarines.
106
  At the same time, hedging his bets, he reached out to Italian shipmaker 
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Laurenti about the possibility of procuring several of its submarines, perhaps as a way of 
strengthening his hand in negotiations with the United States (his preferred source) by 
playing on Washington’s underlying concerns about resurgent European military influence in 
South America.
107
  Several months later, just as negotiations with Washington for a U.S. 
naval mission were coming to a fruitful conclusion, Leguía’s naval attaché in Washington, 
Luis Aubry, approached the U.S. government directly about purchasing active submarines 
from the U.S. Navy’s fleet.
108
  By mid-1920, however, the U.S. State Department had begun 
to share in some of the regional concerns that had been expressed earlier by the Navy 
Department: with a U.S. naval mission headed to Lima to take over administration of the 
Peruvian Navy, it would be imprudent to approve more overt naval support (such as 
armaments) for Leguía’s government.  Taken so closely on the heels of the decision to send a 




 This turn in U.S. policy set off a flurry of activity that clearly demonstrates both the 
urgency Leguía attached to immediate naval expansion and the shrewdness with which he 
moved to achieve it in his relations with Washington.  Rather than taking no for an answer 
and abandoning his plans to acquire submarines in the United States, in the face of Wilson 
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administration opposition Leguía simply began working around the U.S. government by 
cultivating closer direct ties with the Electric Boat Company and leveraging its connections 
to New York banks that might have an interest in financing a sale of submarines to Peru.  He 
was encouraged in this regard by advice from Albert P. Niblack (Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy), 
director of the Office of Naval Intelligence, who was less reserved about supporting Leguía 
with naval aid than his State Department and fellow Navy colleagues were.  In light of the 
Wilson administration’s opposition to selling Peru naval armaments, Niblack advised 
Alfonso Pezet, Peru’s Ambassador in Washington, that, for Peru, “it was now a matter of 




 This is precisely what Leguía set about doing.  First, he agreed in principle directly 
with Electric Boat to order four new boats of the 912-ton type, which at the time were the 
largest and most modern submarines the company produced.  To pay for the order, Leguía 
authorized his naval attaché in Washington, Aubry, to negotiate directly with private banks in 
the United States for a loan in the amount of $15 million to cover the purchase price.
111
  
However, Aubry’s efforts to secure financing through banks in New York – aided by Electric 
Boat Company representatives eager to complete the sale – quickly ran into trouble.  In late 
July one of the company’s vice presidents, Henry R. Sutphen, informed his superiors that 
after meetings with representatives of banks that had interests in South America, the outlook 
for a loan for the Peruvian government to acquire submarines was poor.  He wrote that in a 
meeting he had with representatives of the City Bank of New York, bank officials reported 
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having turned down similar loan requests from Leguía’s government some months earlier 
because of the Peruvian government’s “poor financial position.”  In that earlier instance, City 
Bank had viewed the loan request as simply too large in relation to the nation’s existing 
external debt of $34 million.  Adding nearly 50-percent to Peru’s national debt so its 
government could purchase of vessels of war would be a mistake, the bankers had concluded, 
especially in light of the fact that Peru had already “hocked almost everything she own[ed]” 
and would in all probability be unable to repay the loan.
112
  Other banks shared this 
sentiment, viewing the Peruvian government’s finances with a great deal of skepticism.  
Nevertheless, Leguía remained “insistent” on obtaining submarines, going so far as to tell 
representatives of Electric Boat that if he could not secure financing in the United States then 
“the people of Peru will take the loan.”
113
 
 Sensing that the sale was in trouble, Electric Boat Company representatives went to 
great lengths in search of a financial solution that would permit Leguía’s government to 
receive the funds it needed to make the purchase.  First, company president Henry R. Carse 
floated the idea of seeking funds from a firm with an interest in oil exploration in Peru.  
Under such a deal, he wrote to his representative in Washington, Leguía’s government would 
grant an oil concession to a foreign (presumably U.S.) firm in exchange for the money 
needed to purchase submarines.
114
  Although idea was consistent with Leguía’s Patria Nueva 
vision of economic development, it appears to have never made it out of the concept stage 
because Leguía had not given up on the idea of securing a large loan from a New York bank.  
His preferred strategy was to improve the appearance of Peru’s financial standing in order to 
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make it look more creditworthy to prospective lending institutions.  This was the impetus 
behind Leguía’s decision to have his ambassador to the United States deposit in a 
Washington, D.C. bank the proceeds (approximately $2 million) from the transfer by Peru to 
the U.S. Shipping Board of a German vessel that had been detained in the port of Callao 
during the recent World War.  Carse saw the maneuver  for what it was – an attempt to make 
Peru look like less of a lending risk.
115
 
 Neither this infusion of cash nor the oil concessions idea produced the financing both 
Leguía and Electric Boat so fervently desired for Peru.  Indeed, none of Leguía’s efforts to 
acquire submarines in his first two years in office yielded the results he sought.  But, 
determined to build up Peru’s Navy, the Peruvian president continued to press Washington to 
sell him naval hardware.
116
  As will be explained in Chapter 2, these early attempts laid the 
groundwork for the successful submarine deals his government would conclude with the 
Electric Boat Company – with the active support and assistance of the U.S. naval mission to 
Peru – in later years.  That those later purchases would take place at all given U.S. concerns 
about destabilizing the fragile Tacna-Arica situation is yet another indication of Leguía’s 
determination to exert some measure of control in his relations with Washington. 
PERUVIAN INTERESTS: ESTABLISHING A DICTATORSHIP 
 
 While U.S. naval support became a visible symbol of Patria Nueva and clear 
evidence of Leguía’s efforts to leverage the power of the United States in Peru’s ongoing 
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difficulties with Chile, it also helped him strengthen his domestic political position and 
establish a long-lasting dictatorship.  Peru’s military establishment had become a powerful 
force in the nation’s political life in the early 20
th
 century.  The Peruvian Army, for example, 
had long been under the tutelage of a French military mission that, although it espoused the 
French military ethic of obedience of military to civilian authority, was nevertheless imbued 
with characteristics peculiar to the French Army’s overseas colonial service: a keen 
awareness of its own institutional interests, a firm sense of social mission, and a penchant for 
political activism.
117
  This mix of values took root and grew as the Peruvian Army 
professionalized on the French model, a process most clearly visible in the golpe (coup) led 
by then-Colonel Oscar R. Benavides against civilian president Guillermo Billinghurst 
February 1914.  Launched in response to Billinghurst’s cuts to military budgets and his 
attempt to reign in growing Army opposition by arming working class militia, the Benavides 
golpe demonstrated, in the words of historian Daniel Masterson, that Peru’s newly 
professionalized Army “could not remain aloof from the nation’s partisan political struggles” 
and “would enter the political arena once its corporate interests were threatened.”
118
  This 
willingness to involve itself in the nation’s politics remained a hallmark of the Peruvian 
Army amid both the political instability that followed Billinghurst’s overthrow and the 
economic change that accompanied World War I.  When Leguía looked to regain the 
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presidency in early 1919, he naturally viewed Army support as a double-edged sword – 
something he had to have in order to reach power, and something he had to carefully manage 
in order to retain it. 
 In office, Leguía therefore sought to keep the Army happy while at the same time 
neutralizing its ability to disturb his grip on power.
119
  In short order he initiated substantial 
budget increases for the Army and, in a process that would continue throughout his rule, 
began systematically purging its officer corps of potentially dangerous figures while 
showering rewards on those officers he deemed politically loyal.
120
  Moreover, the energy 
Leguía poured into reforming and expanding Peru’s Navy to strengthen it vis-à-vis Chile 
played perfectly into his early efforts to weaken the Army as a potential source of political 
opposition.  In August 1919, after barely a month in power, he removed the Navy from the 
jurisdiction of the Ministry of War and established a separate Ministry of Marine with a 
political loyalist at its head.
121
  It was shortly after this that he began courting a naval mission 
from the United States, promising its officers complete control over the entire naval 
establishment.  And only a matter of months after the U.S. naval mission arrived in Lima, 
Leguía reorganized the fledgling Ministry of Marine to ensure that the North American 
officers’ control would be complete.  In a January 17, 1921 decree he established a Naval 
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General Staff whose head position, that of chief of staff of the Peruvian Navy, would be 
filled by the head of the U.S. naval mission.  The chief of staff was to have “direction over 
and administration of the entire Navy,” and his orders were to have “all the force and effect” 
of directives that came from the Minister of Marine himself.  In an indication of just how 
close Leguía intended to keep the naval mission to the center of power, the decree stipulated 
that the naval mission chief, as Navy chief of staff, was to attend all meetings the president 
held with his civilian Minister of Marine.
122
  The Lima opposition newspaper, La Prensa, 
called this particular aspect of the decree “a real resignation of the ministerial function” and a 
“humiliating delegation of sovereignty,” but the result was just as Leguía had envisioned 
it.
123
  The United States now had a direct, tangible stake in his regime. 
 With the U.S. naval mission in place and the Peruvian Navy firmly under the 
command of U.S. officers, who even held Peruvian commissions and wore Peruvian 
uniforms (see Appendix 1, Photo 2), the basic structure through which U.S.-Peruvian 
relations would be conducted for the remainder of the decade was in place.  Importantly, 
Leguía had achieved his goal of linking Peruvian security, and the political security of his 
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regime, to the United States.  It was a favorable arrangement for the Peruvian president, 
whose mutually reinforcing objectives at every turn were developing an ever-closer 
relationship with the United States and consolidating his hold on power.  Beginning in early 
1921 Leguía set himself firmly about the task of achieving both.  Through measures 
substantive and symbolic, he continued to curry favor with the U.S. financial and political 
establishments even as he moved to crack down on internal dissent.  In 1921, for example, he 
secured his first major loan from a U.S. bank, the Guaranty Trust Company of New York, 
and, as noted earlier, received a North American as director of Peruvian customs and adviser 
on government finances. A more sizeable loan from the Guaranty Trust Company followed 
the next year – the result of productive lobbying both in New York and Washington, and a 
success that paved the way for the much larger loans that would flow to Peru throughout the 
rest of the decade.
124
  At the same time, Leguía sought to fertilize the growing U.S. economic 
involvement in Peru with symbolic acts designed to ingratiate himself with the United States 
and gain further validation of his rule.  For example, on the occasion of three U.S. Navy 
destroyer divisions’ visit to the port of Callao in January 1921, Leguía declared a national 
holiday and arranged what the New York Times called “an enthusiastic reception, the docks 
being crowded with people who commented on the fine impression made by the little war 
vessels.”
125
  The next year, he presented as a gift to the city of Lima a copy of French artist 
Jean Antoine Houdon’s famous 1788 sculpture of George Washington, as “a testimonial to 
the American hero and to American ideals.”
126
  And later, in honor of the United States he 
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declared the fourth of July a Peruvian national holiday and hung a large portrait of President 
James Monroe (architect of the Monroe Doctrine) in the presidential palace.
127
   
 Leguía took these calculated measures as he continued to ratchet up pressure on his 
domestic political opposition.  Following an uprising in the eastern Amazon port city of 
Iquitos early in 1921, he moved swiftly to crush dissent against his government, beginning 
with attacks on the opposition press.  In March Leguía accused the owners of La Prensa, 
which had often been critical of his rule, of complicity in anti-government revolts, and 
promptly dispatched government forces against its offices.
128
  Decreeing it “urgently 
necessary to eliminate centers of conspiracy,” in a single day Leguía loyalists expropriated 
the newspaper’s assets, assumed control of its facilities, and resumed publishing – albeit with 
a strongly pro-government editorial bent.
129
  Such repression continued throughout the year. 
 U.S. engagement with Leguía’s government only grew as the dictatorial nature of his 
rule came more clearly into focus.  Indeed, the only debate that unfolded in Washington 
regarding the naval mission as Leguía moved against his political enemies was what position 
its members should assume in the event of revolutionary disturbances.  At no point did the 
State Department or the U.S. Navy consider recalling the mission, or even discuss whether 
the United States should continue lending support to such an increasingly repressive regime.  
The U.S. naval officers’ presence in Peru was seen too valuable to contemplate a recall.  
Accordingly, U.S. foreign policymakers attempted to find a solution that would permit the 
mission to remain, but that would ensure that American personnel did not become engulfed 
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in a civil or foreign war that could prove embarrassing to Washington.  The State 
Department’s chief legal officer identified the heart of the challenge confronting U.S. policy, 
which was inherent in the naval mission members’ dual status as officers in both the 
Peruvian and U.S. navies:  by the contracts the officers signed with the Peruvian government, 
he wrote, they were for all intents and purposes Peruvian officers and “seem[ed] to be 
obligated to fight for the present Peruvian Government if the necessity arises.”
130
  Such 
involvement in a foreign nation’s armed conflict would be clearly unacceptable.  Secretary of 
State Charles Evans Hughes agreed, declaring that it would be “exceedingly unfortunate” if 
officers of the U.S. Navy served in naval operations in support of a revolution against Peru’s 
government, in suppression of such a revolution, or in a Peruvian war against another South 
American nation.  The obvious solution, he believed, was to develop more stringent contracts 
when – not if – the mission was renewed after its initial two-year stint in Lima expired in 
1922.  Until that time, Hughes concluded, “the judgment and discretion” of the mission’s 
officers should govern their conduct, and they “should never allow themselves to be placed 
in a position, by the Peruvian Government, where they might be called upon to take part in 
naval engagements in either domestic or foreign war.”
131
 
 That Washington did not consider withdrawing U.S. naval support from Leguía is not 
surprising, given the amount of effort he had put into courting the United States, and 
especially in light of the direction broader U.S. policy toward Peru was trending in the early 
1920s.  By the end of 1920 it was becoming clear that the United States was fully invested in 
Leguía’s success.  In December of that year, after more than twelve months of increasingly 
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close relations between Washington and Lima, the Latin American Affairs Division of the 
State Department recommended that the Secretary of State issue some statement reaffirming 
U.S. “intolerance” for armed uprisings against governments (such as Leguía’s) of 
“established authority.”  This was an ironic move, given that Leguía had come to power in an 
Army-backed coup and received de jure recognition from Washington within a year despite 
Wilson’s general policy not recognizing governments that had come to power by force.
132
   
 The deepening U.S. commitment to Leguía was based on more than compatible 
economic and political visions of the future.  There was a distinct racial component 
underlying it that suggested to U.S. policymakers that Leguía’s dictatorial methods were not 
so much a nuisance that U.S. policy had to live with, but, rather, were the right prescription 
for the infirmities that had long ailed Peru.  This racial underpinning is clearly visible in 
correspondence between U.S. diplomats in Lima and Washington in the early 1920s.  The 
U.S. Chargé d’Affaires in Lima in 1921, Frederick Sterling, gave U.S. views their clearest 
expression in a remarkable dispatch to Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes that 
December – a moment when, amid Leguía’s assaults on his political foes, Sterling deemed it 
appropriate to consider “what type of government is best suited to the development of Peru.”  
Ninety-percent of Peruvian society consisted of either “pure Indians” or “mestizos,” he 
wrote, and of the ten-percent who could be considered “white,” only one-tenth (or, one-
percent of the society as a whole) could be “classed as intelligent, having a national 
consciousness and a desire for the development of the country on modern lines.”  This social 
fabric, Sterling suggested, had long prevented “steadfast principles of government” from 
taking root in Peru and had consigned the country to a history of chronic political instability 
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and economic stagnation.  Given this poor outlook, he urged, it was worth considering 
whether or not “during its present state of civilization” Peru was “not better served by an 
honest and progressive, if autocratic, administration” such as Leguía’s.  After all, Leguía was 
a son of the one-percent of Peruvians Sterling had classified as “intelligent.”  And as the 
ardently pro-American Peruvian president had clearly demonstrated, he had the national 
consciousness and desire for “modern” development that Washington foreign policymakers 
increasingly believed could only come from embracing the U.S. model of development.
133
  
Moreover, Sterling continued, Leguía had the foresight to recognize that without firm 
leadership, Peru would remain mired in the socioeconomic “weakness and inefficiency” 
toward which its society’s racial make-up naturally inclined it.  Thus, Leguía’s political 
purges and deportations, attacks on the opposition press, and demonstrated “firm intention to 
maintain his power at any cost” were, in Washington’s view, simply harsh but necessary 
medicine.  Sterling concluded that the dictator was “the ablest president that Peru has had for 
many years,” and deserved the “entire support” of the United States.
134
  Thus did the United 
States continue, through its naval mission and other measures, to involve itself intimately in 
the inner workings of the Peruvian state even as it recognized the dictatorial nature of the 
government its support was strengthening. 
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 The U.S. naval mission that took charge of the Peruvian Navy in 1920 was the 
product of a convergence of interests between Washington and Lima.  Intent on promoting 
his Patria Nueva vision of national development, President Leguía believed that the 
mission’s presence in Peru would strengthen U.S. investors’ confidence in the country and 
would enhance its prospects for receiving the infusions of capital he deemed necessary to 
facilitate long-term economic growth.  At the same time, he saw the mission as a vehicle for 
strengthening Peru’s position in its long-simmering border dispute with Chile, and by 
extension, for enhancing the nation’s security.  A student of Peru’s naval history, Leguía 
knew that the mountains and desert comprising the Peruvian-Chilean frontier made a land 
invasion of Peru from the south virtually impossible, and that, during the War of the Pacific, 
Chilean ground forces had been able to land on Peruvian shores and march to victory only 
after the Chilean Navy had destroyed Peru’s fleet in battle at sea.  Thus Peru’s national 
security depended on strong naval defenses.  In Leguía’s view, having U.S. personnel in 
positions of command authority over the entire naval establishment gave Peru the greatest 
chance to successfully overhaul its fleet and achieve meaningful naval reform that would 
render the Peruvian Navy capable of serving as the backbone of the nation’s defenses.  
Strengthening the Navy as an institution, the president knew, would yield domestic political 
benefits as well.  Specifically, it would cultivate the Navy as a valuable political ally and 
would aid his efforts to undercut the significant influence exercised by the Peruvian Army in 
national politics.  In this way, Leguía saw the presence of the U.S. naval mission an 
important step toward consolidating his own political position and achieving the overriding 
goal of entrenching himself in power. 
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 For its part, the administration of U.S. President Woodrow Wilson viewed the 
sending of a naval mission to Peru as an opportunity to provide meaningful assistance to an 
enthusiastic ally, and as a means of advancing its postwar goal of expanding U.S. strategic 
and commercial influence throughout Latin America.  The goal was to fill the void left by the 
wartime retreat from South American military and commercial affairs of European nations 
such as Britain that had historically maintained intimate ties on the continent.  Leguía’s Peru, 
with its seemingly insatiable appetite for North American capital and know-how, looked like 
an ideal point of embarkation for putting this plan into motion.  From the perspective of U.S. 
foreign policymakers, a naval mission in Peru would help pave the way for increasing 
amounts of American investment in Peru, and would aid in the expansion of U.S. trade in 
South America.  U.S. Navy leaders were initially less enthusiastic about the idea, but did 
worry about a possible resurgence in European military and naval involvement in South 
American nations.  In the end, the diplomats and the sailors agreed that a naval mission 
would be an appropriate tool for advancing U.S. objectives in Latin America beyond the 
traditional sphere of U.S. influence in the Caribbean: it would give Washington an 
unprecedented opportunity to influence an important South American nation from within, 
and because it was invited by a friendly government, would not suffer from the problems that 
had long plagued armed U.S. interventions further north.  
 To the officials in the U.S. State Department and the U.S. Navy who orchestrated the 
naval mission to Peru, the potential rewards of this new type of arrangement were well worth 
the risks Washington would assume.  Early in the mission’s tenure in Lima, both agencies 
acknowledged the complications that could flow from having U.S. personnel become officers 
in Peru’s Navy – especially if, as seemed possible, Peru went to war with a neighbor or a 
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revolution broke out against the Leguía government.  Together, they took steps designed to 
insulate the naval mission from these potentially dicey situations.  They saw no problems, 
however, with offering overt support (which the naval mission clearly was) to a dictator 
(which, very early on, Leguía revealed himself to be).  Unencumbered by any worries in this 
regard, in short order members of the U.S. naval mission set themselves about the task of 
completely reforming the Peruvian Navy.  Their efforts would further strengthen ties 
between the United States and Leguía, help fortify his autocratic rule, and lay the 




CHAPTER 2: THE WORK OF THE U.S. NAVAL MISSION TO PERU, 1920-1930 
 
 The U.S. naval advisory mission sent to Peru in 1920 was a primary vehicle through 
which Washington exercised influence and promoted its interests in that nation during the 
Oncenio of President Augusto Leguía.  At the same time, it served as the principal 
mechanism through which Leguía secured the naval assistance he wanted from the United 
States, advanced his naval priorities, and ultimately, helped strengthen his hold on power.  
That the United States and Leguía each succeeded in using the naval mission to secure their 
objectives is clear from the things the mission accomplished during its more than twelve-year 
stint in Lima.  From the time of its arrival in 1920 until Leguía’s overthrow in 1930, U.S. 
naval officers directed a wholesale transformation of the Peruvian Navy on the U.S. model, 
establishing enduring organizations and traditions that have served, as Peruvian scholar Jorge 
Ortiz Sotelo has noted, as the “backbone” of the Peruvian Navy ever since.
1
  Serving 
simultaneously in the U.S. and Peruvian navies and enjoying complete authority to effect 
change as best they saw fit, naval mission members threw themselves into the work of 
instituting meaningful, long-term reform patterned on U.S. Navy values and traditions, and in 
support of the broader U.S. policy goal of cultivating long-term influence for the United 
States in Peru. 
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 The U.S. naval mission’s major accomplishments in Peru during this period fell into 
three broad areas: the creation of a rigorous system of naval education, the establishment of a 
submarine force as the foundation of Peru’s naval defenses, and the formation of a national 
aviation system.  Each afforded naval mission personnel opportunities to share knowledge 
and practices in areas of recent innovation within the U.S. Navy, and more broadly, each 
clearly supported the goals Leguía had for both naval reform and national development.  As 
it worked to bring about changes in these areas, though, the mission’s broad executive 
powers did help open a fissure within the Peruvian Navy’s officer corps between younger, 
more junior officers who favored the mission and saw its work as essential to Peru’s naval 
future, and older, established officers who resented the intrusion of U.S. officers into their 
ranks and viewed the mission’s broad authority over the Peruvian Navy as a subversion of 
the nation’s sovereignty.  Leguía’s repressive methods, including his liberal use of political 
imprisonment and exile, helped contain much of the senior-level opposition within the Navy 
for most of the Oncenio.  Moreover, they opened paths of advancement to junior-level 
officers who embraced the U.S. naval mission’s presence in Peru.  These officers’ 
progression through the ranks did much to cement a positive long-term relationship between 
the U.S. and Peruvian navies in subsequent decades. 
BUILDING A SYSTEM OF NAVAL EDUCATION 
 
 Both the United States and Leguía viewed the creation of a rigorous system of naval 
education for junior officers as the foundation for a meaningful, long-term modernization of 
the Peruvian Navy.  Early in the mission’s tenure this meant devoting considerable attention 
to the reform of Peru’s Escuela Naval (naval academy) at La Punta, whose directorship was 
deemed the mission’s most important detail.  In order to successfully plant the seed of U.S.-
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style naval reform, one member of the mission wrote, it “would be necessary to start with the 
youth of the country” and build long-term support for change within the Peruvian Navy’s 
officer corps.
2
  The reform program put into effect by the officer assigned to lead the Escuela 
Naval, Charles Gordon Davy (Commander, U.S. Navy, who held the rank of Capitán de 
Navío in the Peruvian Navy) reflected this goal of using the academy as a seedbed for long-
term institutional change.  Upon assuming the directorship on February 9, 1921, Davy 
outlined a reform program focused on improving the academy’s academic quality, instilling a 
focus on naval professionalism, ensuring that the school’s cadetes navales gained significant 
experience at sea. 
 The challenges confronting Davy’s reform vision were significant.  In a dispatch to 
the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI, which oversaw the mission’s activities in Peru) near 
the end of his first academic year at the Escuela Naval’s helm, Davy reported having found 
the academy in deplorable condition.  “Influence” outweighed merit in the cadet admissions 
process; textbooks were scarce and outdated; examinations emphasized rote memorization 
over comprehension; discipline was “lax” and poorly administered; at-sea training for cadets 
was non-existent; and perhaps of greatest concern to the proud Annapolis graduate, there was 
“little of the military or naval in the atmosphere” around the school.
3
  Davy immediately 
sought and received from President Leguía both the authority to dissolve the numerous 
boards and committees that had previously governed the academy’s rules and regulations, 
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and the power to promulgate new standards “as he deemed advisable” for the academy’s 
future administration.
4
  The subsequent re-writing of the academy’s rules and regulations 
required an immediate two-month postponement of the start of the first academic year under 
U.S. leadership, and resulted in a complete restructuring of the academy’s executive and 
academic departments such that they “closely resemble[d]” those of the U.S. Naval Academy 
at Annapolis, Maryland.
5
  Under the new structure, an executive officer responsible to the 
academy’s director would supervise the company-sized student body’s day-to-day military 
activities and administer discipline, while reorganized academic departments would govern a 
new curriculum that ranged from naval engineering and navigation to mathematics, foreign 
languages, the sciences, literature, and history.  Such a structure was necessary, Davy 
concluded, in order for the school to meet its mission of “giving the state young men whose 
physical, mental, and moral aptitudes enable them to be officers in the first line of defense of 
the fatherland: the Navy.”
6
 
 Davy’s highest reform priorities as Director were, as his initial restructuring of the 
academy suggests, strengthening the school’s academic program and fostering a culture of 
naval professionalism.  Reforming the academy’s curriculum in accordance with U.S. norms 
required, first, a substantial departure from the lecture-based learning model that had long 
been dominant.  It was a model, he wrote, in which course instruction proceeded from “rigid 
outlines” while cadets’ workloads consisted principally of absorbing instructors’ in-class 
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  Davy instituted what he called “practically a reversal” of the lecture-based model, 
one that required “more work” and “more application” from cadets and lightened the lecture 
burden on instructors.  To carry this reform to fruition, the academy would have to be 
stocked with sufficient numbers of “modern” Spanish-language textbooks spanning the 
entirety of the curriculum.  It was a burden that Davy took up personally, translating a 
number of U.S. Naval Academy and U.S. Naval Institute texts covering naval engineering, 
mathematics, and the sciences. 
 Essential to improving the academy’s academic quality for the long-term was shoring 
up both the cadet admissions process and cadet retention standards.  Nominally governed by 
merit, in practice the academy’s admissions process had long been “afflicted with certain 
defects,” noted the professional journal of the Peruvian Navy, the Revista de Marina (which 
Davy edited), in its November-December 1921 issue.  Too often, new cadets were admitted 
solely on the strength of the colegio (high school) diplomas they presented, the Revista 
concluded, a method Davy believed did not take adequate stock of the entirety of prospective 
cadets’ skills and aptitude.  Not giving admissions authorities a view of the whole person, he 
maintained, left room for influence peddling in the admissions process and permitted too 
many “poorly prepared” candidates into the academy who had “no serious intention of ever 
making the Navy their profession.”
8
  To address the problem, he refocused admissions on 
clear physical standards and on the results of an annual competitive examination designed to 
test academic aptitude.  Candidates who met basic physical requirements would compete for 
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a set number of spots in the entering class through an examination covering mathematics 
(arithmetic, algebra, and geometry), as well as grammar, geography, and history.  Following 
that, candidates would be subjected to an assessment of their overall “presence” by an 
admissions board that would score candidates’ education, general demeanor, and overall 
potential to become good naval officers.
9
  To ensure that the academy drew the best qualified 
candidates from the widest possible pool, and to overcome what Davy saw as the very real 
problem of having a student body drawn excessively from the local area of Lima and its port, 
Callao (which, in his view, undermined the Navy’s claim to be a truly national institution), 
the new admissions policy also aimed to ensure geographical diversity.  Under rules he 
established, in situations where multiple candidates hailed from the same Department or 
Constitutional Province of the country, admission would be granted to the candidate with the 
highest merit as established through the revamped competitive examination process.
10
 
 As he moved to strengthen the admissions process, Davy also sought to address the 
academy’s problem of retaining large numbers of academically deficient cadets from one 
year to the next.  For example, in his December 1, 1921 report to ONI, Davy noted that more 
than 90% of the 1920 entering class (the last full class to matriculate before his arrival) 
finished its first year academically deficient in one or more subjects.  To ensure such laxity 
did not continue, he approved three new measures aimed at raising academic standards:  the 
first raised the bar for “academic sufficiency” from 55% to 60% on graded work (the national 
standard in Peru was 50%); the second required the expulsion or “turning back” of 
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academically deficient cadets on an annual basis; and the third extended the academic year 
from ten to eleven months.
11
  These policies took rapid effect.  During the first year of 
Davy’s directorship, 26 of the 71 cadets who had completed the 1920 academic year were 
dropped from the academy altogether while another 30 were forced to repeat various classes 
in order to retain their positions at the academy.  Combined with the fact that only 17 new 
cadets gained admission through the first competitive entrance exam administered on Davy’s 
watch, for the academic year beginning on May 1, 1921, the result was a student body for the 
school’s first year under U.S. direction of only 62 cadets – nine fewer than the previous year 
and well below the optimum level of 80 that Davy thought necessary in order to keep the 
Navy adequately supplied with junior officers in the future.  Confident, however, that higher 
quality was more important than quantity, he reported happily at the end of that year that the 
academy’s new admissions and academic standards had had a “magical effect”:  cadets 
carried a larger workload and performed better, fewer were deemed academically deficient, 
and faculty morale had improved.
12
 
 More rigorous academic standards supported Davy’s efforts to foster a culture of 
professionalism at the academy.  Instilling professionalism began, Davy insisted, with 
strengthening the ties that bound the academy and its cadets to the Peruvian Navy.  Upon 
assuming the directorship he had complained that the academy had more the atmosphere of a 
civilian university than a military institution.  As a whole, he wrote, it “lacked a good many 
of the fundamental principles of a military school.”  Under the previous director, cadets were 
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free to consider themselves “as boys at school and not as part of the Navy.”
13
  Davy therefore 
took several early steps to bring the academy firmly within the Navy’s control.  First, he 
established a requirement that new cadets entering the academy take an oath similar to the 
one taken by new midshipman at the U.S. Naval Academy, a measure intended to reinforce 
the message that, by entering the academy, cadets were entering naval service.  Moreover, it 
would enforce that commitment by exacting a promise from new cadets to remain in the 
Navy for five years after graduation.
14
  Second, he secured the dissolution of the academy’s 
disciplinary board and reserved for himself, as director, the power to administer cadet 
discipline – a power he called “one of the fundamental functions of command,” and one that 
he had lacked upon assuming the directorship.  Employing this power, Davy went after what 
he considered one of the most damaging holes in the academy’s system of discipline by 
doing away with weekend leaves that had previously been so liberally distributed that, more 
often than not, a majority of cadets slept off academy grounds on Saturday nights.  This was 
a problem in practice, he reported to ONI, because so many cadets hailed from the local 
Lima-Callao area, and because many routinely extended their weekend visits into Monday 
morning (cutting into the academic and training week) without prior authorization and 
without real fear of consequence from the academy’s disciplinary board.  This ready access 
to the comforts of family life for one day every week “effectively ‘undid’ any good work of 
military development of the week,” Davy argued, and contributed mightily to the lax civilian 
atmosphere which Davy saw permeating the institution.  It nurtured a harmful perception that 
cadets “still belonged to their fathers and mothers and not to the State,” he wrote, and more 
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 Davy pursued other reforms in attempt to break those bonds of familial dependency 
and replace them with a strong ethic of naval professionalism that bound cadets to the 
academy, to the Peruvian Navy, and by extension, to the Peruvian state.  Central to this, he 
believed, was ensuring that the academy could provide for the physical and material needs of 
cadets during their academy tenures, a particularly significant challenge in light of the status 
quo prior to the U.S. naval mission’s arrival in Peru in 1920.  Under its previous 
administration, owing to scarce resources, the academy had maintained a policy that required 
entering cadets to provide for their own uniforms, personal equipment, and to meet their own 
food costs during the first year of studies – the idea being that the government would assume 
responsibility for those costs in subsequent years.  In practice, however, many second, third, 
and fourth-year cadets were also left to provide for themselves because, as Davy wrote, 
provisions purchased by scarce government appropriations were often distributed among 
upperclassmen according to “whose families or friends could muster the required influence” 
to secure them.  This weakened the link between the academy and the Navy it served, Davy 
argued, and created an economic inequality among cadets of an unhealthy and “most 
pernicious condition” that endangered the school’s ability to meet its mission of producing 
naval officers for the state.
16
  Given Davy’s desire to differentiate the academy from Peru’s 
civilian universities as well as his insistence on drawing cadets fully into the nation’s naval 
service, he deemed it essential that the national government shoulder the burden of supplying 
all necessities cadets required throughout their academy educations.  Near the end of his first 
                                                          
15
 See “Condition,” 3. 
16
 See “Condition,” 3. 
77 
 
year at the helm, Davy reported proudly that inequality among cadets was shrinking due not 
to a massive infusion of funds, but to a “democratic” rationing of supplies by academy 
officials.  Moreover, he noted that although a shortage in funds had kept the policy from 
going into effect, new academy regulations called for each cadet to receive an annual 
allowance of 40 Peruvian Pounds for the purchase of academic and military supplies 
“essentially naval in character.”
17
 
 Developing naval professionalism at the academy required more than meeting cadets’ 
material needs, however; it required strengthening the bonds of service among cadets, 
between cadets and the academy, and between the academy and the Navy.  An article in the 
March-April 1924 issue of the Revista de Marina explained the importance of these linkages 
to an effective naval service and a sound national defense.  Written by a U.S. naval officer, 
translated into Spanish, and republished from the Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute, the 
article (entitled “El Servicio Naval,” or “The Naval Service”) argued that the overall quality 
and efficiency of a nation’s Navy was derived principally from the “espíritu de cuerpo” 
(esprit de corps) among its officers, which could not be developed through rules, regulations, 
or decrees, but had to “come of its own accord through love of the service.”  Love of service 
took firm root, the author suggested, in officers’ aspirations to serve the whole nation in an 
institution (the Navy) that “belongs to the people of the country” and is wholly dependent on 
its people both for annual appropriations and for necessary “moral support.”  In an incisive 
passage which echoed the role Leguía envisaged the Peruvian Navy playing in the 
socioeconomic life of Peru, the author further noted that, no matter how small or seemingly 
unimportant, every action a naval officer took in the service of the nation contributed to 
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country’s security and “protect[ed] its future development.”  A healthy naval service infused 
with sufficient esprit de corps was thus integral to the life, security, and prosperity of the 
nation as a whole.  As the Escuela Naval was in Davy’s view, in the author’s view the naval 
academy was a place where the seeds of effective esprit de corps – abiding friendship, 
brotherhood, and fealty to naval service – could take root and grow.
18
 
 In an effort to shape an environment conducive to the growth of an esprit de corps, 
Davy instituted placed heavy emphasis on team sports and athletic competitions, and adapted 
a number of traditions in effect at the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis, Maryland.  And to 
strengthen cadets’ ties to each other and to the academy, Davy presided over the 
incorporation of traditions similar to many in effect at the U.S. Naval Academy.  Among the 
most symbolically important of these was the adoption of the tradition of the class ring 
featuring the academy seal on top, and years of matriculation and graduation on the sides.  
Embraced for the first time by the Escuela Naval’s class of 1925, as the Revista noted, the 
class ring would serve as a physical reminder of cadets’ experiences at the academy as well 
as their bonds to one another and to the institution.  Moreover, it would become “a symbol of 
union and strong fellowship” among those who wore it.
19
  The adoption of a class ring 
tradition followed closely on the heels of the establishment the year before of the “Class of 
1924 Association,” formed by that year’s graduating class for the purpose of maintaining 
“that spirit of comradeship that should be traditional among all who graduated from the 
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Peruvian Naval Academy and, at the same time, to keep the highest ideals of honor, honesty, 
truth, self-denial and enthusiasm for the institution.”
20
 
 While making efforts to forge a lasting spirit of comradeship among cadets, Davy 
sought to focus the academy squarely on its mission of supporting the Navy, and on the 
Navy’s mission of defending the nation.  To this end, under his leadership the academy 
adopted as its motto “Mihi Cura Futuri,” translated from Latin by a cadete navale in a 1922 
essay as meaning “to me is entrusted the future.”
21
  In practice, this cadet wrote, the motto 
drew a clear and unmistakable link between cadets’ academy experience and the subsequent 
naval service all were required to render: 
“I study to develop my intelligence; I awaken my spirit to strengthen my 
character; I educate my muscles to increase my physical strength, so that 
tomorrow, when I carry the noble title of naval officer, I can transfer this 
knowledge – this moral, intellectual, and physical strength – to sailors whose 
instruction or preparation is entrusted to me, thus forming in them the 





Intended to reinforce to cadets that the academic, physical, and moral challenges they 
confronted during their academy educations were preparation for future naval service, “Mihi 
Cura Futuri” was also intended to instill in them an appreciation for the Peruvian Navy’s 
reason for being: to prepare for and fight the nation’s wars.  Cadets therefore had to prepare 
on the assumption that war was an “inevitable” eventuality:  modern war represented a 
“struggle of minds,” and as such, the “national energies” required to fight it had to be 
developed and matured over time and could not be the “fruits of an instant.”  It was only at 
the Escuela Naval, this cadet concluded, that minds and spirits of Peru’s young men could be 
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molded into those of officers capable of defending the nation.  For cadetes navales, then, 
“Mihi Cura Futuri” was far from a meaningless generality.  It was a concise expression of 
Davy’s vision of the Escuela Naval as an integral part of Peru’s naval service.  As the cadet 
essayist concluded, its unmistakable meaning was that in preparing for the future, “Yo me 
preparo para la guerra” (I prepare myself for war).
23
 
 To strengthen this institutional focus, and to ensure that Peru’s cadetes navales 
received an “appropriate balance of theory and practice” in preparation for the rigors of naval 
officership, Davy moved to require all cadets to participate in at-sea training early and often 
during their academy educations.  Upon his arrival he had identified the lack of sea training 
as a significant flaw in the academy’s overall training program, noting that throughout their 
entire four-year academy experience cadets “never enjoyed the advantages of  service on 
board ship” until they received their appointments as midshipmen following graduation.
24
  
Together with his plans to reform the academy’s academic program, remedying this 
deficiency required a complete restructuring of the whole institution’s yearly calendar 
consistent with Davy’s promise that, on his watch, the academy would work “twelve months 
a year and thirty days a month.”
25
  Months after taking charge of the academy, he approved a 
new schedule that compressed the academic year from two five-month sessions into one 
eight-month period (from early May through December), reduced cadet vacation from two 
one-month periods to one (April), and established a full three-month period for sea training 
during the summer months of January, February, and March.
26
  Indeed before Davy even 
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welcomed the first entering class of his tenure, in March of 1921, he dispatched the 
academy’s fifty-six upper class cadets (none of whom had any experience serving on board a 
naval vessel) on a training cruise of the Peruvian coast north and south of Lima aboard the 
Almirante Grau and Coronel Bolognesi in order to expose them to service at sea, acquaint 
them first-hand with the nation’s coastline, and as a “reciprocal function” permit the people 
of Peru’s port cities to become familiar with the Navy.
27
 
 Deemed a success by Peruvian and U.S. personnel in 1921, in subsequent years the 
crucero de verano (summer cruise) became a mainstay of the academy program and a 
cornerstone of the broader Navy’s annual training agenda.  As an indication of both the 
growing strength of the Peruvian Navy and the increasingly close naval, political, and 
economic ties developing between the Leguía government and the United States, in 1925 the 
annual cruise ventured for the first time far from Peruvian shores – to the American naval 
base at Balboa, at the Pacific end of the Panama Canal.  In Panama, Peruvian ships transited 
the Canal and cadets visited U.S. submarine base at Coco Solo while the Almirante Grau 
received repairs at U.S. naval facilities.  A similarly ambitious itinerary characterized the 
1926 cruise, which was the first to incorporate two new submarines Peru had recently 
acquired from the Electric Boat Company of Groton, Connecticut.  And, in a reflection of 
just how close the ties were growing between the academy and the Peruvian Navy, between 
1927 and 1930 the geographical scope and substantive complexity of the crucero de verano 
grew even further: Peruvian cadets visited ports in Colombia, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, 
Honduras, El Salvador and Chile (in addition to Panama), and learned firsthand how Peru’s 
surface vessels were beginning operate in tandem with Peru’s newest naval assets – 
                                                          
27
 Ortíz Sotelo, Escuela Naval del Perú: Historia Ilustrada, 98. 
82 
 
submarines and naval aircraft.
28
  Indeed, thanks in large measure to Davy’s leadership, by the 
late 1920s the Escuela Naval had become a bastion of naval professionalism and an integral 
part of the Navy it existed to serve.  Moreover, during the time of the U.S. naval mission, it 
molded the generation of officers who, for decades to follow, would look favorably on the 
United States and effect a long-term closeness between the Peruvian and United States 
navies. 
ESTABLISHING A MODERN SUBMARINE FORCE 
 
 The Navy became the linchpin of Peruvian national defense under Leguía, who saw 
unresolved tensions with Chile as Peru’s most pressing foreign policy concern.  Recalling the 
War of the Pacific (1879-1883), he saw Peru’s coastline as its greatest security 
vulnerability.
29
  In the decades following that costly war, Chile had maintained a significant 
military superiority over Peru, the backbone of which was a pronounced naval advantage that 
successive Peruvian governments in the late 19th and early 20th centuries proved unable to 
overcome.
30
  Leguía saw in the relatively new and rapidly advancing technology of 
submarines the potential for Peru to achieve significant advances in its coastal defense 
capabilities without going to the expense of a major expansion of its surface fleet.  In his 
view, submarines’ ability to move stealthily while submerged meant cash-strapped Peru 
could acquire more national security from a relatively smaller number of submarines than it 
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could by purchasing a comparable number of new, more expensive surface ships.  This meant 
that even though Peru could not afford to build or buy its way to numerical parity with the 
Chilean Navy, it could substantially narrow the overall capability gap with Chile without 
breaking the bank.  Thus did Leguía make the acquisition of submarines the centerpiece of 
his plans for building Peru’s naval strength upon assuming the presidency for the second time 
in early July of 1919. 
 This initiative to establish a modern submarine force in the 1920s represented a 
continuation of efforts Leguía had made earlier, during his first presidential term (1908-
1912), when the Peruvian Navy was for a time under the tutelage of a small French naval 
mission, and when border disputes with each of Peru’s neighbors – including one with 
Ecuador that nearly led to war in 1911 – made strengthening the nation’s defenses a central 
concern.
31
  Seeking a budget-friendly way to quickly boost the capability of Peru’s coastal 
defenses, during that period Leguía had accepted the French naval mission’s 
recommendation to enact a modest, defensively-minded naval expansion program that 
emphasized the acquisition of “small unit” assets such as torpedo boats and submarines.  As 
Jorge Ortiz Sotelo notes, such assets were capable of high speeds and possessed low surface 
profiles that would significantly improve the Peruvian Navy’s ability to challenge enemy 
capital ships along Peru’s coast.
32
  Moreover, as a commission of Peruvian naval officers 
concluded in endorsing the purchase of two French submarines in 1910, Peru’s limited fiscal 
resources made submarines the only immediately viable option for counteracting the superior 
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naval power of potential enemies.  In supporting the purchase, the commission noted 
approvingly the words of former First Lord of the British Admiralty George Goschen, who in 
1900 famously characterized the submarine as a “weapon of the weaker nation.”  For a nation 
dealing with unsettled border questions, experiencing economic upheaval, and facing a 
persistent naval inferiority vis-a-vis its historical rival (Chile), the Peruvian Navy of the early 
twentieth century found hope in Goeschen’s admonition that “the nation which possesses it 
[the submarine] will cease to be weak, and will become really powerful.”
33
 
 The service lives of the two submarines Leguía’s government purchased from France 
in 1910, the Ferré and the Palacios, were active but short.  Both were decommissioned 
shortly after the U.S. naval mission arrived to take charge of the Peruvian Navy in 1920, a 
time when Leguía, eager to deepen Peru’s relations with the United States, had already begun 
looking to replace the French-built boats with a larger number of modern submarines built in 
the United States.  Leguía’s strategic rationale for doing so was laid out by his naval attaché 
to Washington, Luis Aubry, in a May 1920 public address in Lima.  The submarine 
represented an economical way to rapidly boost Peru’s coastal defenses, the career officer 
and submarine advocate argued.  He stressed that that the submarine’s value had been proven 
by the fact that “the two most powerful fleets in the world were not able to do anything 
against it” during the recently concluded “Great War” in Europe, and suggested that Peru 
was uniquely positioned to benefit from the submarine’s acceptance as a weapon of modern 
war.  Echoing themes Leguía had struck while pushing for submarine acquisitions during his 
first presidential tenure, Aubry argued that given Peru’s geographic position, unsettled 
borders, and especially its unresolved difficulties with Chile, the nation could not stake its 
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future security on diplomacy alone, but would have to back its foreign policy with credible 
force.  Submarines were the ideal fit for Peru’s precarious strategic situation, he continued, 
because the nation found itself “in a state of incipient military and naval development” 
relative to its likely enemies – again, Chile foremost among them.  Moreover, Peru had 
“scarce resources” it could devote to strengthening its defenses.  A modest fleet expansion 
whose centerpiece was six submarines, complemented by six destroyers, would solve “eighty 
percent of the country’s vulnerability,” he concluded, adding that such a program would 
constitute “the best insurance policy” for denying potential enemies all-important control of 
Peruvian coastal waters.
34
  And, considering Peru’s greatest vulnerability to invasion lay in 
its coastline, like Leguía, Aubry saw that submarines would help ensure Peruvian control 
over the invasion route future aggressors would most likely take into the country.
35
 
 Leguía’s aim of making submarines a cornerstone of Peru’s national defense had a 
substantial impact on both the composition of the U.S. naval mission and the work it 
undertook upon its arrival.  As early as the spring of 1920, when negotiations for a mission 
were just getting underway, Leguía had informed Washington of his desire to receive officers 
with expertise in submarine warfare who could serve as instructors for the Peruvian Navy.
36
  
This desire was met in the person of Lewis D. Causey (Commander, U.S. Navy), a 1906 
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graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy who had commanded a submarine division in the waters 
off Ireland and the Azores during World War I, and who had led the U.S. Navy’s fledgling 
submarine school at New London, Connecticut, in the war’s waning days.
37
  With these 
qualifications Causey was given command of the Naval Division (operating fleet) of the 
Peruvian Navy and the rank of Capitán de Navío.  And, as the naval mission’s resident 
submarine expert, he was pressed into service almost immediately to provide Leguía with 
advice on the shape of Peru’s future submarine force. 
 Clearly favoring the acquisition of American-built vessels, Leguía had delayed two 
important decisions on submarines until after the American mission’s arrival in order to avail 
himself of its officers’ counsel.  First he looked to his new Naval Division commander to 
weigh in on a proposal, which was already before the government, that provided for the 
purchase of two Italian-built submarines.  The proposal had originated with Lima’s 
Asociación Naval Pro-Marina, an organization of naval enthusiasts that had long lobbied the 
government for a stronger Navy and raised funds for naval acquisitions when government 
appropriations fell short of desired levels.
38
  Convinced of the utility of submarines following 
the European war, the Asociación had initiated a fundraising drive early in 1919 – before 
Leguía’s July return to the presidency – to acquire new submarines for the Navy.  By early 
1920 it had raised enough money to enable the government to contract with the Italian firm 
Ansaldo San Giorgo for the construction of two 430-ton submarines, and to provide a down 
payment of two-million Italian lira so construction on those vessels could begin.  On 
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Leguía’s request, the naval mission examined the deal immediately upon its arrival, before its 
members were even fully established in their positions in the Peruvian Navy.  Not 
surprisingly given Leguía’s inclinations and Commander Causey’s desire to remake the 
Naval Division along U.S. lines, the mission found the Italian submarines’ specifications 
inadequate to the nation’s needs, recommended that the contract be terminated, and called for 
as much of the down payment as possible to be recovered for future use.
39
  Only weeks into 
its tenure in Lima, the U.S. naval mission was not prepared to lay out a complete set of 
recommendations on future naval acquisitions, but in voting to kill the Italian submarine deal 
its members clearly agreed with Leguía that in the future Peru should look to the United 
States rather than to Europe for such purchases. 
 The demise of the Italian contract foreshadowed the naval mission’s action on the 
other pressing decision Leguía faced early on regarding the future of Peruvian submarines: 
what to do with the aging Ferré and Palacios, which had fallen into disrepair.  Employed 
heavily in Peruvian naval exercises during their early years in the fleet (1913-1915), the 
French-built submarines’ operational effectiveness quickly fell victim to the same economic 
dislocations that affected much of South America following the outbreak of World War I.
40
  
Specifically, during the war the Peruvian Navy could not acquire the replacement batteries 
from France it needed to keep the boats supplied with electrical power while submerged.
41
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Incapacitated by a lack of adequate power, the vessels were therefore in a highly vulnerable 
position by the time a commission, chaired by Commander Causey, was appointed in April 
of 1921 to assess their military value and determine their service fates.  In short order 
Causey’s commission found that the submarines’ condition was so far gone that the “the cost 
of making them...of any military value was so great that it was inadvisable to undertake the 
job.”  The commission recommended that “due to their age and obsolete type,” the Ferré and 
Palacios be decommissioned, dismantled, and that the materials in them be reused in the 
construction of a future submarine base on San Lorenzo Island adjacent to the port of 
Callao.”
42
  These recommendations, which helped clear the way for future purchases of U.S. 
vessels, were entirely consistent with Causey’s broader assessment of the rest of the Peruvian 
fleet.  In general, he found, Peru’s surface fleet was similarly outdated and in poor condition: 
all of the Navy’s surface vessels were considerably older than the two French-built 




 By the time he reported to Leguía on the Naval Division’s condition in mid-1921, it 
was clear to Causey that the entire Peruvian fleet would require a substantial updating and 
overhaul, and that Peru would have to acquire new surface vessels and submarines in order to 
adequately defend its lengthy coastline.  In the near-term, however, the country’s poor fiscal 
outlook precluded even a modest acquisition program focused on the kinds of defensive arms 
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(submarines, airplanes, and “a destroyer or two”) he believed were essential to ensuring 
Peru’s future security.
44
  Importantly for Leguía’s naval ambitions, even as mission members 
recognized Peru’s immediate fiscal troubles, they assumed that eventually the United States 
would step in to help.  Even though “the money for the purchase of any of these acquisitions 
is not absolutely available,” Causey wrote, the plan “was to proceed with the idea in view of 
making money available” in the United States for Peru’s naval purchases.  Together with the 
scuttling of the Italian submarine deal the previous year, then, the decommissioning of Peru’s 
two French-built submarines before they could be plausibly replaced signaled that although 
the time for substantial naval acquisitions had not yet arrived, the U.S. naval mission was 
paving the way for that eventuality by doing away with vestiges of European naval influence. 
 The cause of the submarine in the Peruvian Navy received a considerable boost with 
the arrival of Clark H. Woodward (Captain, U.S. Navy) as new head of the naval mission and 
Chief of the Peruvian General Staff in July 1923.
45
  Within four months of his arrival, 
Woodward, whose rank in the Peruvian Navy had been elevated by Leguía to 
Contraalmirante (Rear Admiral), articulated an overarching strategy for Peru’s national 
defense that formalized the Navy’s status as the unequivocal guarantor of the nation’s 
security, and laid out a far-reaching naval program emphasizing the need to acquire modern 
submarines from the United States.  He arrived at this conclusion by identifying Peru’s 
strategic predicament even more closely with its geographical reality and its longstanding 
Chilean troubles than his predecessor had.  Peruvian geography dictated that the country’s 
                                                          
44
 Causey wrote that “Due to the limited finances of the country, the Mission could only recommend small and 
less costly acquisitions, the exact number I do not remember, but the general idea was to concentrate on 
aeroplanes, submarines, and a destroyer or two.  Ibid, 6. 
45
 “Nuevo Jefe Estado Mayor General de Marina,” Revista de Marina VIII, no. 4 (Julio y Augusto, 1923): 505-
508.  See also “Brief Summary,” 5. 
90 
 
“correct” strategy for national defense was “essentially naval,” Woodward wrote, because its 
nearly 1,500-mile coastline was both its greatest economic asset and its greatest strategic 
vulnerability.  Peru’s “impossible mountains” and coastal deserts “force her to look to the sea 
for communications,” he argued, and the natural obstacles that divided its distinct coastal, 
mountainous, and Amazonian regions meant that Peru’s flows of international and domestic 
commerce were wholly dependent on the sea.  This dependency on sea communications was 
so great, Woodward continued, that the government could not even concentrate its army in 
any part of the country “without recourse to the sea.”  The greatest challenge to Peruvian 
national security, then, was the fact that successive Peruvian governments had consistently 
failed to maintain naval defenses capable of securing the nation’s territorial waters from the 
threat of enemy attack.  The disastrous results of the War of the Pacific, in which Chile 
landed its Army on Peruvian soil from the sea, had clearly demonstrated the grave 
consequences that attended naval ill-preparedness.
46
 
 In the new Chief of the General Staff’s view, Peru’s “first defense” therefore had to 
be made at sea, and while securing “command of the sea” had to be the Navy’s ultimate goal, 
at a minimum his proposal for naval acquisitions argued that Peru should strive to be able to 
deny such command to Chile.  Again he pointed for reference to the War of the Pacific, 
recognizing that “although Chile possessed a superior Navy [during the war], it dared not try 
to disembark an army on Peruvian soil until the last Peruvian ship was sunk.”  Moreover, 
Woodward argued, even though Peruvian ground forces fought valiantly against the 
subsequent Chilean ground invasion, it was the Peruvian Navy’s defeat at sea that made an 
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  With the current state of the Navy in late 1923, Woodward’s assessment 
of the situation concluded, Peru was “absolutely indefensible by sea.”  Should Chile or 
another potential enemy attempt another invasion of Peruvian territory, the ships of Peru’s 
existing fleet would be “completely useless” in preventing or even hindering it “no matter 
how weak the enemy force employed in the attack.”
48
 
 Woodward stressed that the time for Peru to build a modern submarine force was 
therefore at hand.  Recognizing that a significant buildup of the Navy might be politically 
difficult to undertake absent some immediate national catastrophe, and taking stock of Peru’s 
limited fiscal means, he dismissed as impractical any notion of building an offensively-
minded Navy and instead recommended an “adequate defense” that would – “like firefighters 
and police forces in a city” – be capable of responding effectively to emergencies and, in his 
words, nothing more.  Woodward stressed that in Peruvian history “the clouds of war have 
sometimes appeared quickly and the storm has erupted without warning,” a reality that made 
it extremely difficult to prepare for war once it was underway.  Failing to plan ahead entailed 
“enormously high costs not only in money, material, and time, but what is more painful, in 
human lives.”
49
  In its current state, he continued, the Peruvian Navy was powerless to resist 
the pressure an enemy navy would no doubt apply in its littoral – the lifeline on which the 
coastal nation’s  security and economic well-being depended.
50
  The costs of inaction were 
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therefore, in Woodward’s view, unacceptably high.  But should Peru decide to undertake 
even the modest preparations that “responsible” nationhood required, including construction 
of “a sufficient number of submarines with which to successfully attack the enemy’s fleet,” 
he argued, the effort would in all likelihood compel the enemy to abandon or significantly 
change both its war plans and the assumption of Peruvian naval weakness on which those 
plans would certainly be based.
51
 
 Woodward’s proposal was forceful not just because it made the acquisition of 
submarines a priority, then, but because it spoke clearly about the advantages they offered to 
nations able to devote few resources to national defense.  Submarines would not only be 
capable of harassing enemy vessels that approached the Peruvian coast with little fear of 
being harmed in the process, he wrote, but could also mount attacks on enemy merchant 
ships, surface combatants, and troop transports that an enemy might bring to bear in 
attempting an invasion.  Moreover, submarines’ range and relative freedom from observation 
by enemy surface ships (sonar technology had not yet been fully developed) meant that they 
could operate independently and effectively against enemy naval forces not only in Peru’s 
territorial waters, but in moderately distant enemy waters as well.  This, Woodward argued, 
meant that in the event of war, submarines could observe and inform on enemy ship 
movements before an enemy fleet reached Peruvian waters, and could do so without 
significant fear of being discovered by enemy scouting vessels.
52
  But perhaps the greatest 
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benefit submarine operations afforded Peru, he suggested, was that they gave the nation a 
measure of naval power out of proportion to both the tonnage of its fleet and the funds in its 
treasury: “the best defenses against submarines are constant vigilance and high speed, 
conditions that cause excessive fatigue on [the enemy’s] personnel and significant strain on 
materiel,” he noted.  This meant that “the constant threat of [Peruvian] submarines in 
proximity decays an enemy fleet to the point that...it will be so exhausted that his defeat may 
become an easy matter.”
53
  Moreover, Peru’s possession of a credible submarine force would 
compel an enemy fleet to divert resources and attention to the protection of its own ships, 
hampering the effectiveness of enemy offensive operations and decreasing the threat to 
Peru’s coastal security. 
 The acquisition program Woodward recommended on these grounds was ambitious 
and costly.  Its centerpiece was the purchase of six U.S.-built R-Type submarines, but it also 
included a call for six U.S.-built destroyers, twenty-five naval aircraft, and large numbers of 
torpedoes, mines, depth charges, and shells as well as the construction of a new submarine 
base on San Lorenzo Island and a number of other naval building projects ashore.  The hefty 
bill for this naval overhaul, more than six million Peruvian Pounds, would be paid using 
loans secured from U.S. banks.  The loans would be repaid over time using the proceeds of a 
new national defense tax proposed by Leguía, while the initial “down payment” needed to 
get ship construction underway (approximately 170,000 Peruvian Pounds) would come from 
the reliable coffers of the Asociación Naval Pro-Marina.
54
   
 Although expensive, Woodward’s late 1923 proposal was not as fiscally impractical 
as it would have been had his predecessor proposed it even one or two years earlier.  That is 
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because American lenders’ confidence in Peru had begun to grow by late 1923 in response to 
increased U.S. influence over Peru’s national finances.  As noted in Chapter 1, the first 
significant loan that Leguía’s government secured from a New York bank, in 1921, had come 
with the condition that he appoint an American citizen, economist William W. Cumberland, 
as administrator of Peruvian customs.  Once in place, Cumberland’s charge quickly expanded 
to include advising Leguía on the national budget and serving as a member of the board of 
directors of the newly established, U.S.-designed Reserve Bank of Peru.
55
  With these closer 
financial ties to the United States, what followed was a period of greater fiscal stability and 
economic growth – if also greater indebtedness – within Peru.
56
  Between 1924 and 1928, 
more than ten times the amount of foreign capital entered Peru than had come in during the 
1919-1923 period, and as Barbara Stallings notes, the increasing enthusiasm of American 
bankers for investments in Peru during these years meant that Leguía no longer had to 
“cajole” them or threaten to seek loans in Europe, while the U.S. State Department no longer 
had to “intervene to encourage the [American] banks to lend” to support its ally, Leguía, in 
Peru.
57
  This increasingly favorable lending climate no doubt gave Woodward confidence 
that his bold recommendations for a larger, better armed Navy would be well received both 
within Peru, where improved defenses at sea promised to better secure the nation’s foreign 
and domestic commerce, and in the United States, where the contracts for Peru’s new naval 
vessels would undoubtedly be let. 
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 Yet only part of Woodward’s ambitious naval expansion proposal ended up becoming 
reality.  Developed in consultation with Leguía and without the U.S. State Department’s 
knowledge, his recommendations came as a complete surprise in Washington, where 
President Calvin Coolidge had recently taken up his predecessor’s efforts to mediate the 
Tacna-Arica dispute between Peru and Chile.
58
  The State Department very quickly came to 
view Woodward’s proposed naval buildup as profoundly destabilizing to the fledgling 
negotiations over those disputed territories.  Stung by the independence with which 
Woodward had acted, Washington immediately applied the brakes to his proposed expansion 
of the Peruvian fleet and sought to refashion it in more modest, clearly defensive terms that 
would not enflame the delicate situation with Chile.  Throughout the early months of 1924 
Woodward worked to assess just how much of a fleet expansion Washington would deem 
acceptable in the current context, and by September Leguía had concluded just such a deal: 
turning to reliable old contacts at his favored shipbuilder, the Electric Boat Company of 
Groton, Connecticut, Leguía contracted for two R-type submarines and 24 torpedoes, as well 
as for the construction of the San Lorenzo submarine base that had been envisaged in the 
original Woodward proposal.
59
  Although Leguía fully intended to continue the expansion 
and modernization of the Peruvian fleet in the future and saw this scaled-down deal as 
merely a first step, the naval purchases his government would make throughout the rest of the 
Oncenio (consisting principally of two more R-type submarines from Electric Boat, for a 
total of four) never lived up to the expectations set by Woodward in his proposal of late 
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1923.  These acquisitions did, however, have two important effects:  they made the 
submarine the operational backbone of Peru’s fleet, and confirmed the Navy as Peru’s first 
and most important line of national defense. 
 The submarine’s rise to preeminence in the Peruvian Navy while that institution was 
under U.S. tutelage made sense not only in the context of Leguía’s enduring belief in the 
submarine’s suitability to Peru’s particular defense challenges, but in view of its evolving 
place U.S. naval doctrine at the time as well.  The U.S. Navy’s civilian leaders had briefly 
entertained backing a British call to abolish submarines entirely following World War I, but 
had reversed course by the time of the Washington Naval Conference of 1922.  Indeed in the 
early 1920s, American naval planners increasingly viewed submarines as integral to the U.S. 
Navy’s future brand of warfare at sea – both in support of battle fleet operations and in 
coastal defense operations.  This was evident in the Navy’s commitment to build six large, 
long-range fleet submarines between 1921 and 1925.
60
  Yet in the mid-1920s submarines 
were not yet, in naval historian George Baer’s words, the “self-contained masters of the 
deep” they would ultimately become.  Although the U.S. Navy was beginning to realize the 
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potential of fast-moving, long-range submarines to contribute to fleet operations far from 
shore, and although American Navy planners were beginning to envisage a future in which 
long-range submarines would be integral to offensive fleet operations aimed at establishing 
and maintaining command of the seas, in the early 1920s small coastal defense submarines 
remained the heart of the U.S. submarine force.
61
  Fundamentally, U.S. naval doctrine of the 
early 1920s confirmed, the submarine remained a defensive weapon.  It is therefore not 
surprising that officers of the U.S. naval mission in Lima, who came of age professionally 
during the period of the submarine’s operational infancy, would see it as a tool ideally suited 
for Peru – a nation whose central security concerns (refusing the approach of an enemy fleet 
to its shores and ensuring the safety of its ocean-going commerce) were inherently defensive 
and revolved around ensuring coastal security. 
 In the end, the Peruvian Navy’s embrace of submarines during Leguía’s Oncenio 
demonstrates two things very clearly.  First, it shows that, although their dual status at times 
complicated U.S. diplomacy, members of the U.S. naval mission took their roles as Peruvian 
naval officers seriously.  They developed close, cooperative relations with their champion, 
Leguía, and worked earnestly to acquire the U.S.-built submarines he believed were essential 
to Peru’s defenses.  Acting as Peru’s highest-ranking naval officer, Admiral Woodward made 
Leguía’s case for a fleet expansion that had as its raison d’être an inherently Peruvian goal, 
the strengthening of the nation’s defenses vis-a-vis Chile, even though it conflicted with U.S. 
interests.  Although Woodward’s efforts did not bear the amount of fruit Leguía had desired, 
they were nevertheless instrumental in pushing the Peruvian president’s longstanding efforts 
to acquire U.S.-built submarines over the proverbial finish line.  And second, in Peru’s 
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embrace of the submarine we can also see the shrewdly-played hand of the dictator Leguía, 
who by the time he succeeded in acquiring submarines (the one naval arm he saw as 
indispensible to meeting Peru’s unique security challenges) from the United States, had spent 
portions of three decades pursuing them.  Leguía had not only argued the merits of U.S.-built 
submarines over those from other nations.  He secured a naval mission whose institutional 
views on this major issue comported perfectly with his own, and he successfully enlisted that 
mission – and by extension the power and prestige of the United States – in the cause of 
advancing his own naval priorities. 
CREATING A NATIONAL AVIATION SYSTEM 
 
 As it had with submarines, the importance Leguía attached to coastal defense led the 
Peruvian Navy to embrace another new, promising technology of warfare during the 1920s: 
the airplane, whose promise the recent war in Europe had also begun to demonstrate.  
Although the war had not answered all doubts about naval aviation within the United States, 
and although debate about the utility of aircraft in naval warfare raged within the U.S. Navy 
in the years that followed, consensus on aviation emerged early within Peruvian naval 
establishment while under the direction of the U.S. naval mission.
62
  That is because Peru, 
whose geography, principal security objectives, and limited fiscal resources precluded it from 
building a large fleet and pursuing an offensive naval strategy aimed at achieving control of 
the sea, could view aviation assets much as it did submarines – not as supplements to a great 
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armada of powerful surface vessels, but as a cornerstone of an economical, defensively-
minded naval capability.  Moreover, the development of naval aviation aligned perfectly with 
Leguía’s Patria Nueva vision of national economic development because advances made in 
the naval-military aviation realm held the promise of spillover benefits for the civilian 
economy.  Indeed, the U.S. naval mission’s efforts at developing Peruvian naval aviation in 
the 1920s would give immeasurable aid to the creation of a national system of aviation aimed 
at knitting together Peru’s distinct coastal, mountain, and Amazonian regions, as well as the 
forging of closer commercial links between Peru and the United States. 
 The emphasis the U.S. naval mission placed on aviation from its earliest days is clear 
from the pages of the Peruvian Navy’s professional journal, the Revista de Marina.  Between 
1922 and 1925 the Revista translated and republished a number of essays on the theory and 
practice of naval aviation from the U.S. Naval Institute’s Proceedings.  Although written by 
U.S. officers from a clearly North American perspective, each essay contained lessons 
relevant to the Peruvian Navy’s development of a naval air service.  The first such article, 
penned by U.S. Navy Commander D.E. Cummings and published by the Revista in late 1922, 
noted the possibilities and limitations of naval aviation, and posited that airplanes’ greatest 
value in naval warfare lay in scouting and attacking enemy naval vessels, aerial combat 
against other aircraft, and protecting friendly vessels in escort duty.
63
  Of special significance 
to the Peruvian Navy, given its emphasis on defending the coast against Chilean naval attack, 
was Cummings’s observation that aircraft were “particularly suited for scouting work, on 
account of their speed and vision,” which enabled them to spot enemy surface vessels and 
submarines at a distance and alert friendly forces to the likelihood of an impending attack.  
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Aircraft were especially valuable in scouting operations against submarines, he noted, 
because their position high above the water gave them the ability to spot submarines that 
were submerged, but operating (as most at the time did) just below the surface – a point that 
no doubt resonated with Peruvian officers who, like Leguía, were concerned about Chilean 
superiority in submarines in the early 1920s.  Because the Peruvian Navy was concerned first 
and foremost with coastal defense and operations within the Peruvian littoral, the factors 
Cummings listed as limiting the airplane’s usefulness in scouting operations (its limited 
operating radius, limited radio range, and defensibility) were less of a concern than they were 
to the globally-minded, “blue water” U.S. Navy.
64
  Because Peruvian naval aircraft would 
conduct scouting operations relatively close to shore, and would be responsible for patrolling 
a smaller area than their U.S. counterparts, they would not have to conform to the same 
exacting standards that governed U.S. acquisitions of naval planes. 
 Subsequent articles selected by Davy for republication in the Revista de Marina 
addressed the types of aircraft best suited to warfare at sea as well as the roles they should 
fulfill in support of fleet operations.  The November-December 1923 issue, for example, 
contained an article by U.S. Navy Lieutenant DeWitt Ramsey entitled “The Development of 
Naval Aviation,” which detailed the characteristics required of aircraft engaged in scouting 
and observation, bombing, and aerial combat operations.  Ramsey wrote that “large fuel 
capacity” and “seaworthiness” were essential features of naval aircraft “adaptable to long 
distance scouting flights over the sea,” and that bombing planes should be capable of “short 
run” take-offs from the decks of aircraft carriers while carrying a “full military load.”
65
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Scouting and bombing of approaching enemy vessels would be essential missions for 
Peruvian naval aviation, but these specific criteria were less important to the Peruvian Navy 
because scouting over Peruvian coastal waters involved shorter distances.  Moreover, no 
Peruvian naval aircraft – whether for scouting or bombing of enemy vessels – would fly from 
the decks of carriers.  But the publication of Ramsey’s essay underscored that in the future, 
airplanes would serve as the eyes of the Peruvian Navy in carrying out its vital coastal 
defense mission.  In practice, it also meant that Leguía and his U.S. naval mission would 
have greater flexibility in choosing the kinds of aircraft with which to equip the Navy’s 
aviation service. 
 The cause of Peruvian naval aviation received a significant boost with the arrival of 
Harold B. Grow (Commander, U.S. Navy), an aviation expert whose Proceedings article on 
the “Tactical Employment of Naval Aircraft” was published by the Revista shortly after he 
joined the U.S. naval mission in Peru in January 1924.  Charged personally by Leguía with 
directing the development and training of Peruvian naval aviation service, Grow came with a 
well-established reputation as an aviation expert, and clear views on the role aviation assets 
should play in naval warfare.
66
  Accordingly, his 1924 essay focused less on the types of 
aircraft best suited for naval aviation, or the exact specifications required, and more on the 
tasks naval aviators should carry out in order to effectively support fleet operations.  In a 
finding ideally suited to Peru’s strategic situation, for example, he differentiated between 
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“strategic” and “tactical” aerial scouting.  Strategic scouting for enemy vessels, Grow wrote, 
meant gaining “information as to the location, strength, disposition, course, etc. of the enemy 
main body and screen.”  It was a function for which naval aircraft were uniquely suited, he 
continued, because under favorable weather conditions, a single aircraft aloft in close 
proximity to a friendly fleet could give that fleet seaward visibility of up to forty miles.  
Although it would be difficult to distinguish the specific types of enemy vessels at such a 
distance, he noted, “the mere knowledge of their presence would be invaluable” even if the 
plane were prevented from drawing near the enemy fleet’s defensive screen to collect more 
detailed information.
67
  Simply alerting friendly vessels to the approach of an enemy fleet 
would buy them vital situational awareness and, importantly, time to prepare for battle. 
 Not surprisingly, Grow believed that naval aircraft also had critical roles to play once 
battle had arrived.  Securing “absolute control of the air” was air power’s first function amid 
hostilities, he argued, a task that involved seizing local control of the air and maintaining it 
throughout the period of the main fleet engagement.  This command of the skies would be 
secured by fighter aircraft whose sole purpose was to attack any scouting, fighter, or bomber 
aircraft the enemy fleet might launch in the course of its advance.  But, Grow cautioned, 
battle against an enemy fleet would not negate the need to keep scouting planes in the air.  
Indeed the strategic (longer-range) scouting flights that preceded hostilities would give way, 
in battle, to tactical scouting flights aimed at supplying commanders with “information 
concerning the enemy main body,” including damage inflicted on enemy vessels and aircraft, 
“in order to assist the commander-in-chief to dispose his force to best advantage.” 
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 In Grow’s view, still somewhat controversial in U.S. Navy circles, aviation was 
clearly an indispensible element – perhaps the indispensible element – of naval power.  In 
laying out his ideas he was careful to acknowledge, however, that as a new discipline within 
the profession of arms, aviation had not been shaped by a highly-developed body of theory 
and had not had the benefit of years of test and evaluation.  Indeed, he concluded, when it 
came to the young business of naval aviation “for once we can not study history and the 
actions of great leaders for our own edification.  True, certain principles exist in aerial 
combat...but to no source can we turn for any experience in working out our plans for the 
coordination of tactics of air units operating with the fleet.”
68
  Clearly Grow had a faith in the 
utility of air power to naval warfare, and expressed no reservations about building Peru’s 
naval air capability from this very limited base of experience. 
 By the time of Grow’s appointment as the naval mission’s point-man on aviation in 
early 1924, Leguía’s push for an aviation service within the Peruvian Navy had already 
gained significant momentum.  Indeed a month before Grow’s arrival in Lima, Admiral 
Woodward, in his case before the Peruvian congress for a naval buildup centered on 
submarines, pointed to aviation as an essential component of an effective national defense.  
Like submarines, he argued, naval aircraft delivered the nation more capability per dollar 
than significantly more expensive surface vessels could.  Given Peru’s limited resources, 
aircraft could therefore help close the capability gap with the Chilean Navy without forcing 
Peru down the financially ruinous course of building its surface fleet to numerical parity with 
that quantitatively and qualitatively superior force.  As Woodward wrote in a strategy 
document that accompanied his proposal to the congress, that was because the Navy’s 
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defensive orientation and emphasis on coastal defense meant it could content itself with 
“minor attacks” aimed at “reducing the enemy’s relative superiority by putting some of his 
ships out of action.”  Such attacks would do much to exhaust and frustrate the advance of a 
Chilean fleet to Peruvian shores, and would no doubt help prevent the landing of a foreign 
army on Peruvian soil.  In an assessment remarkably consistent with the views Grow 
expressed in his Revista essay, along with submarines, Woodward argued that naval aircraft 
would serve as the eyes of the Peruvian Navy (and indeed, of the nation as a whole):  they 
would give the Peruvian fleet greater visibility on lurking threats, and would “impose much 
caution in the employment by the enemy of surface craft, be they battleship, cruiser or 
destroyer.”  And importantly, Woodward noted, like submarines, aircraft would deliver those 
capabilities at a lower cost than a comparable number of surface ships.
69
 
 Not surprisingly given the Peruvian Navy’s emphasis on coastal defense, the aviation 
portion of Woodward’s proposal was built around the scouting mission.  But given Peru’s 
paucity of fiscal resources, it also envisioned a naval air service in which all naval aircraft 
would do double duty as both scouts and attack planes.  Although tests in the United States in 
the early 1920s were validating the airplane as a useful weapon against surface vessels, it was 
clear, Woodward stressed, that for Peru they would be most useful “in locating the enemy 
during his approach to the coast,” whether they be “behind a line of enemy scouting ships or 
behind a smokescreen made by enemy destroyers.”  Control of the air (and therefore, 
success) in naval warfare, he cautioned, would be impossible to establish without the long-
range early warning that aircraft could provide.  With sufficient warning of approaching 
enemy vessels, Peru’s naval air service could transition from strategic scouting to tactical 
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attack with relative ease – dropping depth charges in the vicinity of submerged enemy 
submarines, combating enemy planes in the air, or even, in Woodward’s words, “spreading 
gas over a considerable extent of the ocean, paralyzing enemy surface ships” – all while 
remaining safely out of range of enemy anti-aircraft guns.
70
 
 Amid the diplomatic fallout following Woodward’s December 1923 naval expansion 
proposal to the Peruvian congress, though, the planned purchase of twenty-five naval aircraft 
was cut to zero.  In fact, the scaled-back naval purchases Leguía made in 1924, which 
included two of the six submarines Woodward had envisaged, included nothing for Peru’s 
fledgling naval aviation service.  These cuts did not, however, represent a death knell for 
Grow’s early naval aviation efforts.  That is because the lion’s share of his early energies 
went into the decidedly non-controversial areas of education and training.  This emphasis 
meant that during much of his first year in Peru, Grow would have to devote considerable 
time not to acquiring aircraft, but to establishing the basic structure of Peruvian naval 
aviation and developing a training program.  To accomplish this, he focused on undoing the 
work of a short-lived French aviation mission that Leguía had invited to Peru during the 
earliest days of is Oncenio.  One of the few successes that that French mission achieved 
during its disastrous three-year tenure in Lima – which Lawrence Clayton notes was marked 
by “little success, undermined in part by spectacular accidents” – was the creation in 1922 of 
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an aviation school staffed by French, British, and American instructors.
71
  Upon his arrival 
Grow tore down this existing structure of aviation education, which had housed civil, 
military, and naval aviation in one organization, and, in accordance with Leguía’s wishes, 
initiated a program aimed at Americanizing Peruvian naval and military aviation and 
consolidating it under the watchful eye of the U.S. naval mission. 
 The process unfolded quickly, beginning with the construction of a naval air base and 
a new aviation school at Ancón, just north of Lima.  By September of 1924 the mission was 
able to report to Washington that due to Grow’s efforts, construction of the commanding 
officer’s quarters, general store house, power plant, cuartel (barracks), and water 
management systems of the school had been initiated.  Actual flying time during those early 
months was limited, though, by a lack of suitable training aircraft.
72
  It was a shortage for 
which Grow sought immediate redress.  Two months earlier, in July, Woodward had 
informed ONI that although his ambitious call for twenty-five naval aircraft had been 
scuttled, the naval ministry had placed an order with the Boeing Corporation of Seattle, 
Washington, for three training planes “exactly like the lot being built for the U.S. Navy,” 
which President Leguía had authorized for the naval aviation school at Ancón.  A hands-on 
manager, Grow took the lead in negotiating the deal with Boeing, securing funds for the 
purchase from the Peruvian treasury, bargaining with Boeing for a price of $16,300 per 
plane, and securing a promise that the new aircraft would be delivered to Peru in time for the 
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inauguration of the aviation school on January 1, 1925.
73
  An early product of the close, 
personal relationship Grow and Leguía developed between 1924 and 1930, this acquisition 
helped ensure that the fledgling naval aviation service’s survival.  Moreover, by bringing 
U.S.-built aircraft into the Navy’s inventory, it helped solidify U.S. influence over Peru’s 
nascent military-naval aviation establishment. 
 As Grow labored to establish a U.S.-style naval aviation service, Leguía’s broader 
efforts to draw U.S. commercial aviation interests to Peru also began to bear fruit.  Forging 
an integrated, “modern” national economy was a central objective of the Patria Nueva 
program of economic development, and, he believed, knitting together Peru’s distinct coastal, 
mountainous, and Amazonian regions was essential to the task.  Very early on, therefore, 
Leguía had made establishing air linkages between these regions a priority.  In 1921, for 
example, he had offered a prize for the first trans-Andean flight from Lima to the Peruvian 
Amazon port of Iquitos – a competition won by American aviator Elmer “Slim” Faucett, who 
later established one of Peru’s first commercial airlines.  Because of Leguía’s desire to 
establish a national aviation system and his favorable attitude toward foreign business 
interests, in the mid-1920s Peru became a magnet for pilots and aviation interests looking to 
either set new flight records or gain an upper hand in the struggle to corner the emerging 
South American commercial air market.
74
  By 1928, the maturation of aviation technologies 
had reduced overall risk to levels acceptable to major investors, and an intense competition 
quickly developed between two new companies for the Peruvian market, one established by 
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Faucett with a group of Peruvian investors, and the other backed by the North American 
giant Pan American Airways and its aggressive founder, Juan Trippe. 
 To manage this competition Leguía made a decision in early 1928 that united 
Peruvian naval, military, and commercial aviation in a single bureaucracy and cemented 
American control over it:  he appointed Commander Grow, by then one of his most trusted 
aides, to the newly created position of Director General of Aviation.
75
  As naval mission 
chief A.G. Howe later noted in a report to Washington, the appointment had the effect of 
bringing all aviation activities in the country “directly under his [Grow’s] orders.”  
Moreover, it ensured that Howe, as the head of the naval mission and Chief of the Peruvian 
General Staff, would “at all times be posted in connection with the aviation activities of 
Peru.”  As the competition heated up between Faucett’s company and Pan American for the 
right to establish an international passenger, mail, and cargo route between Peru and the 
United States, Howe noted, Grow’s position was “daily growing in importance to the country 
[Peru] and also to the United States.”
76
  U.S. foreign policy makers in Washington agreed 
with Howe that Grow’s position was vital to the furthering of American commercial aviation 
interests in Peru.  On January 19
th
, Secretary of State Frank Kellogg had advised the U.S. 
Ambassador to Peru, Miles Poindexter, that it was “highly desirable” that Leguía not grant 
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any aviation concession until Pan American’s representative in Peru had had the time to 
develop his company’s “projects” in the country.  Moreover, he wrote, in the future Pan 
American “would associate the Naval Air Service of Peru” (Grow’s creation) in its work.  
Two days later, Poindexter informed the Secretary, approvingly, that Leguía had placed the 
matter of the concession entirely “in the hands of Grow,” who had recently established the 
naval air service’s first link across the Andes, and who was now poised to recommend that 
the concession be awarded to Pan American.
77
 
 In addition to giving U.S. commercial aviation interests the upper hand in the 
competition for the Peruvian market, Grow’s appointment underscored the importance of the 
U.S. naval mission to broader American interests in Peru.  With this single decision by 
Leguía, Howe and U.S. diplomats noted approvingly, an enormous amount of diplomatic 
power had been invested in a mid-level U.S. naval officer – one who was a member of the 
dictator Leguía’s inner circle, and who, by virtue of that access, was in a strong position to 
advance the cause of U.S. commercial aviation interests in Peru.  And although by 1928 U.S. 
naval mission members had long held sway over the Peruvian Navy, Grow’s appointment 
represented a new, more intimate level of U.S. involvement in Peru’s sovereign affairs.  His 
support of the Pan American bid, and Leguía’s subsequent approval of it, stands as the 
clearest example of the U.S. naval mission lending direct support to American commercial 
interests throughout its tenure in Peru.  Grow’s place within the Peruvian bureaucracy gave 
the United States a measure of influence with Leguía that no civilian diplomat could hope to 
achieve.  In so doing, it directly benefited U.S. commercial interests and afforded U.S. policy 
significant amount of influence over Peru’s economic future. 
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 As Director General of Aviation, Grow continued to facilitate advances in both naval 
and commercial aviation until Leguía’s overthrow in August of 1930 ended his tenure and 
forced the U.S. naval mission to relinquish its executive authority over the Peruvian Navy.
78
  
In May of 1929, for example, he directed Leguía’s establishment of a joint Navy-Army Air 
Corps, which required that all Navy and army pilots be trained to fly missions in support of 
ground and sea operations.  That same month, new naval mission head William S. Pye 
(Captain, U.S. Navy, who held the rank of Contraalmirante in the Peruvian Navy) reported 
the successful commencement of air mail service between Peru and the United States.
79
  In 
August of that year, Grow oversaw an increase in the size of the student body of the Escuela 
Naval, by twenty cadets navales, in order to “provide for more aviators which will be needed 
for an expanding aviation service.”
80
  And from late 1929 through early 1930, he accelerated 
his longstanding efforts to procure U.S.-built aircraft for Peru’s naval air service – an effort 
that ultimately fell apart amid the freezing of international capital markets following the 
stock market crash of October 1929 and the advent of a worldwide economic depression. 
                                                          
78
 As will be discussed in Chapter 4, Grow’s close relationship with Leguía led him to undertake an active role 
in quelling the anti-Leguía uprising, which began in the southern Peruvian city of Arequipa in August, 1930.  
Grow did this in violation of the Peruvian aviation law passed in early 1929, and in violation of the regulations 
that governed his conduct as a member of the naval mission.  He was captured by forces friendly to Sánchez-
Cerro in the course of his mission. 
79
 See Head of Naval Mission to Peru (Pye) to ONI, on “Operations for Month of May,” May 31, 1929, RG 38, 
Entry 48-A (Pan-American Affairs Division), Box 4, National Archives.  Among the first letters sent by air mail 
from Peru to the United States was a short note from U.S. Ambassador Alexander Moore to President Herbert 
Hoover, dated May 3, 1929.  In his response, Hoover noted that the letter had taken thirteen days to arrive (a 
significant improvement over service by sea), and that he had “no doubt that in time this service will be speeded 
up.”  See U.S. Ambassador to Peru (Moore) to President Herbert Hoover, May 3, 1929, and President Herbert 
Hoover to U.S. Ambassador to Peru (Moore), May 17, 1929 – both contained in Herbert Hoover Presidential 
Papers (Foreign Affairs), Box 996, Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, West Branch, IA.  In February, 1929, 
Pan American and W.R. Grace & Co., Peru’s leading passenger and freight carrier at sea, formed Pan 
American—Grace Airways (known as “Panagra”); as Lawrence Clayton notes, for forty years following the 
company’s formation, Panagra “dominated the airways between Peru and the United States, serving as one of 
the principal conduits for the flow of information, people, materials, and culture between the two countries.”  
See Clayton, Peru and the United States: The Condor and the Eagle, 137. 
80






 When it relinquished command over the Peruvian Navy in August of 1930, the U.S. 
naval mission could claim an impressive record of success over its decade-long tenure.  
Improved academic and physical standards at the Escuela Naval, together with Captain 
Davy’s emphasis on professionalism and his dedication to improving the academy’s 
facilities, transformed it into a leader in South American naval and military education and 
shaped a generation of young officers favorably disposed toward the United States and the 
U.S. Navy.  At the same time, the naval mission delivered on Leguía’s desire to acquire 
modern, U.S.-built submarines and establish a base of expertise within the Peruvian Navy’s 
officer corps in their use.  In so doing, as Robert Scheina notes, the U.S. naval mission to 
Peru firmly established submarines as a cornerstone of Peruvian national defense and laid the 
groundwork for what would become, in subsequent decades, Latin America’s premier 
submarine force.
81
  And finally, the mission established a naval air service that, together with 
the submarine, became an integral part of Peru’s naval defenses at the same time that it 
served as the seedbed for commercial aviation developments that both propelled Leguía’s 
Patria Nueva vision forward and materially aided U.S.-based aviation interests. 
 These successes did come at a cost, however.  Throughout the 1920s, the naval 
mission’s place within the Peruvian state apparatus, its broad authorities, and its members’ 
dual status as Peruvian officers who enjoyed close relations with Leguía himself, helped 
firmly align U.S. policy with an autocratic leader.  Indeed, the dictator’s fall from power in 
the depths of the Great Depression would inaugurate a period of violent political turmoil 
within Peru, a defining feature of which was a rising tide of anti-U.S. sentiment within the 
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Peruvian population.  A detailed examination of the challenges that the naval mission’s 







CHAPTER 3: CHALLENGES, 1920-1933 
 
 For all the successes it achieved in the areas of naval education, submarines, and 
aviation, the U.S. naval mission’s work in Peru from its arrival in 1920 until Leguía’s 
overthrow in August 1930 came at a cost.  Its members’ dual status as officers in the U.S. 
and Peruvian navies meant that their activities often fell into gray areas between U.S. and 
Peruvian sovereignties, and posed significant challenges for U.S.-Peruvian relations.  The 
complications flowed from the fact that, on the one hand, naval mission members were sent 
to Peru as instruments of U.S. policy calculated to achieve certain national objectives, while 
on the other, they were to serve as integral parts of the Peruvian government and labor on its 
behalf to build a more efficient, effective Navy for that nation.  Over time, mission members’ 
dual status proved more difficult to manage than U.S. decision makers had thought possible 
at the outset, in large part because Leguía, far from being a mere vassal of Washington, 
proved adept at using the mission to advance his own foreign and domestic priorities.  The 
challenge was no less pronounced after Leguía’s overthrow in August of 1930, when naval 
mission members relinquished command of the Peruvian Navy and assumed an advisory 
status that still proved diplomatically difficult.  In the end, from its arrival in 1920 to its 
withdrawal in early 1933, the actions taken by the U.S. naval mission to Peru often 
contributed directly to more difficult relations between the United States and Peru. 
“VERY CORDIAL” RELATIONS 
 
 Initially the dual status of American officers aroused little concern in Washington.  
The Woodrow Wilson administration had agreed to send the mission to Peru on the 
114 
 
understanding that U.S. personnel would act mainly as trainers, consistent with Leguía’s 
request for American officers to “reorganize and direct” the Peruvian Navy and enact 
structural reforms.
1
  Indeed, once the mission was in place the rules governing its activities 
stated that members’ roles were to be limited to “merely those essential to the proper 
organization by them of the Peruvian Navy, and the instruction and training of its officers 
and other personnel.”
2
  The United States had had no previous experience sending such 
missions before approving Leguía’s request, but in the Wilson administration’s view the 
arrangement was consistent with its expansive hemispheric policy aimed at aiding Latin 
American nations “as far as possible in all cases where there is no good reason not to do so.”
3
  
The desire to extend such assistance was especially strong the case of Peru, given Leguía’s 
strongly pro-American pronouncements and obvious desire to invite U.S. capital and 
expertise into the country.  As a result, acceding to Leguía’s request that U.S. officers assume 
actual command of the Peruvian Navy was seen by American foreign policymakers in 
Washington as a means – if a unique one – of facilitating the naval mission’s work and 
keeping an enthusiastic ally happy.  Indeed, there is no evidence in the records of either the 
State Department or Navy Department to indicate that, in the mission’s earliest days, 
American officials were worried that American personnel might be called upon to direct 
Peruvian forces in a domestic or international conflict. 
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 The State Department expressed little concern about the naval mission’s unique status 
even as it strengthened ties with Leguía’s increasingly dictatorial administration.  In 
November of 1921, for example, the ardently pro-Leguía American Chargé d’Affaires in 
Lima, Frederick Sterling
4
, urged U.S. support for the “honest and progressive” Leguía 
despite the fact that earlier that year he had launched an all-out assault on Lima’s 
independent press (including the seizure of one of Lima’s largest daily newspapers, La 
Prensa), closed the nation’s oldest and most storied university for spreading anti-government 
“propaganda,” and began systematically arresting and detaining “political suspects” he 
deemed threats to his government.
5
  Four months later Sterling reported, approvingly, that 
through such repressive measures Leguía had largely succeeded in neutralizing political 
resistance to his administration, and that the successful enactment of such Americanizing 
reforms as the establishment of a Peruvian reserve bank “patterned on the lines of the United 
States Federal Reserve Act” had done much to enhance both Leguía’s personal “prestige” 
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and that of the United States within Peru.
6
  Washington’s satisfaction with the stabilizing 
political situation in Peru and the promise it held for U.S. interests ensured that when Leguía 
moved to amend the Peruvian Constitution in May 1922 to permit his reelection at the end of 
his five-year term of office, the State Department offered no objections.
7
  As the United 
States moved closer to Leguía throughout these critical months of late 1921 and early 1922 – 
months when Leguía consolidated his dictatorship under Washington’s watchful, approving 
eye – American diplomats and naval leaders consistently referred to the naval mission as a 
critical contributor to the all-important growth of U.S. “prestige” in Peru. 
 U.S. ties with Leguía grew so close during the naval mission’s first year that when 
concerns did arise about what status U.S. officers should adopt in the event of a revolutionary 
disturbance against the dictator – or worse, an international war against one of Peru’s 
neighbors – they were given little credence.  As noted earlier, when in the midst of Leguía’s 
efforts to consolidate his rule in early 1922 the State Department’s solicitor concluded that 
mission members’ contracts appeared to obligate them to fight on behalf of the Peruvian 
government should they (as members of the Peruvian Navy) be ordered by Leguía to do so, 
Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes argued that the United States should rely on the 
“judgment and discretion” of the individual officers to avoid being pulled into such a murky 
situation.
8
  The benefits of maintaining a naval mission in Peru that met Leguía’s needs, State 
Department and Navy leaders agreed, outweighed the risks that could flow from the unique 
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arrangement permitting its members to serve simultaneously in the U.S. and Peruvian navies.  
Besides, Hughes and U.S. Navy leaders further agreed, by mid-1922 information from the 
U.S. legation in Lima confirmed that Leguía had achieved a virtually unassailable position 
within Peru, while U.S. mediation of the Tacna-Arica dispute made war between Peru and 
Chile unlikely for the foreseeable future.
9
  In short, they concluded, neither concern raised by 
the solicitor in February seemed likely to develop.  Neither the naval mission’s wide-ranging 
powers nor its closeness to the dictator was seen as a significant impediment to the execution 
of U.S. foreign policy. 
 Having cast the American lot firmly with the now-entrenched Leguía, and 
recognizing the naval mission’s importance to productive U.S. relations with him, the State 
Department next sought to extend the naval mission’s tenure in Lima beyond its initial two-
year term.  In this endeavor it found willing partners in the U.S. Navy’s General Board, a 
panel of senior naval officers formed in 1900 to advise the Secretary of the Navy on naval 
policy, and in the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), which had overseen the activities of the 
U.S. naval missions in Peru and Brazil since their creation.
10
  ONI Director Luke McNamee 
(Captain, U.S. Navy) was particularly impressed with the work the naval mission had done 
throughout its first two years in Peru, and believed the expansion of such missions was 
important to the success of U.S. policy in Latin America.  “The United States should do 
everything to encourage Latin American Republics to ask for Naval missions,” McNamee 
                                                          
9
 Citing legislative successes, public approval over his handling of the Tacna-Arica problem, and suppression of 
the Iquitos Rebellion, Sterling reported to Washington in March 1922 that Leguía had “consolidated his 
position, especially with business and financial circles” and that he was “now more firmly entrenched than at 
any period of his incumbency.”  See Chargé d’Affaires in Lima (Sterling) to Secretary of State, “Report on 
General Conditions Prevailing in Peru During the Previous Month,” March 9, 1922, RG 59, File 823.00/418, 
National Archives. 
10




urged the Chief of Naval Operations in March of 1922, “and should send them wherever 
[they are] requested.”
11
  In stating this case, he made an eloquent argument that the Navy 
should do more than fulfill its historical role of protecting American interests overseas – it 
should promote those interests as well.  Latin America was where the Navy could most 
productively do this, he noted, not only because U.S. interests there were significant and 
governed by a clear, longstanding policy (the Monroe Doctrine), but because in recent years 
Washington had based its policy there on the forging of a spirit of “Pan-American union” 
throughout the hemisphere.
12
  This meant, McNamee wrote, that U.S. policy depended to a 
far greater degree than before on securing the “friendship and confidence of our southern 
neighbors” – a job for which the Navy was particularly well suited given “the importance of 
the military in these [Latin American] Republics, where the General or Admiral of today is 
very apt to be the President of tomorrow.”  After all, he suggested, it was “only natural” to 
expect that military and naval men trained by U.S. missions should, when they rose to 
positions of national leadership in the future, “look with favor on the country under whose 
tutelage they gained their education.”  In the long run, he stressed, this “favor” toward the 
United States would be “reflected in their political, financial and economic relations” and not 
merely in their military and naval relations.
13
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 At the same time they helped foster goodwill toward the United States, McNamee 
further argued, naval missions throughout Latin America would help advance Washington’s 
post-World War aim of rolling back and replacing European influence in the Americas and 
paving the way for U.S. supremacy.  Indeed, when the Woodrow Wilson administration 
decided to accede to Leguía’s request for a U.S. naval mission in 1920, it did so in large part 
because it harbored concerns that European powers that had long maintained dominant 
economic and strategic influence in South America (principally Great Britain) would seek to 
re-establish themselves there after recovering from the devastation of the recent World 
War.
14
  The successes the U.S. naval mission had achieved in Peru throughout its first two 
years had helped to hold this feared development at bay, and importantly, he stressed, had 
done so on the relative cheap.  Indeed, McNamee argued, the great benefit of missions such 
as the one in Peru was that they furthered American interests and “cost us nothing.”  Naval 
missions were therefore “the most potent influence I can think of in fostering close relations 
with South America,” he wrote.  They enabled the United States to “neutralize the influence 
of foreign powers” in Latin America, expand U.S. strategic (and by extension, economic) 
reach there, and perhaps most importantly, they demonstrated the kind of positive 
engagement that would keep Latin American nations from seeing in Washington’s policy 
“anything that might be construed…as apathy or as ignorant disregard of our mutual 
interests.”  Failure to send U.S. missions, McNamee concluded, would render Pan-American 
solidarity “nothing but a pious aspiration,” and would leave the U.S. interests in a 
disadvantaged position in the future.
15
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 McNamee’s two lines of argument resonated with the Navy’s General Board, which 
demonstrated a keen understanding of the diplomatic nature of naval missions’ work and, in 
turn, fully endorsed the expansion of such missions to other Latin American countries.  In a 
letter to Secretary of the Navy Edwin Denby, the Board noted that South America 
represented one of two “special spheres” in the world (the other being Asia) that the United 
States was “particularly interested in seeing developed along lines in accord with her general 
ideas of international policy.”  In its view, nothing less than “the prestige of the United 
States” – so important to cultivating international goodwill – was on the line when it came to 
the question of sending more naval missions to Latin America.  The United States should, 
therefore, not only approve future requests for such missions, the Board advised, but should 
“in a diplomatic way make it understood that similar requests from South American countries 
would not be unwelcome.”
16
  This was especially true of what the Board called South 
America’s “peculiar triangle” of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile (today known as the Southern 
Cone) – nations which, as historian Mark Gilderhus notes, have leaned politically, 
economically and culturally more toward Europe than the United States, have long been the 
“most powerful and influential” in South America, and have acted as counterweights to U.S. 
influence in Latin America.
17
  “It would be exceedingly undesirable,” the General Board 
concluded, if in these countries “dissimilar [European] sentiments, ideals and methods should 
be allowed to crop out” and spread throughout the continent.  Therefore, the Board 
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recommended, all efforts should be made to send additional naval missions to South America 
“to forestall any influences which might tend to work against the methods and ideals which 
we hope to see instituted” there, and to ensure that U.S. “naval sentiment” was positioned to 
permeate the entire continent.
18
  Given its concern about European influence in the “peculiar 
triangle” countries, the General Board saw continuing the naval mission to Peru as especially 
important, as Peru was a nation whose geographic position and extraordinarily pro-U.S. 
political orientation under Leguía aided in the task.  Accordingly, in its final set of 
recommendations to the Secretary of the Navy, the General Board urged that in addition to 
encouraging further missions, the Navy should support the renewal of contracts for naval 
mission members in Peru.
19
  Secretary Denby’s approval of the Board’s recommendations on 
May 23, 1922 helped solidify the American naval mission’s presence in Peru, and 




 On the issue of retaining the naval mission in Peru, the General Board’s position was 
in perfect harmony with that of the State Department.  In February 1922 the U.S. Chargé 
d’Affaires in Lima, Sterling, who was already on record as a strong advocate for supporting 
Leguía, wrote to Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes recommending that the contracts 
of mission members be renewed.  “From a political point of view,” he wrote, “there is no 
question but that the presence of the Mission is valuable to the United States.”  It was 
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valuable in large part because Leguía was a willing partner who was “most anxious” to have 
its stay in Peru extended.  Moreover, he argued, the mission strengthened the already “very 
cordial” relations between the United States and Peru and enhanced “American prestige.”  In 
an assessment that echoed the analyses of ONI and the Navy’s General Board, Sterling 
pointed not just to the benefits of maintaining the mission, but to the costs: should the 
mission not be renewed, he noted, “the Peruvian Government would doubtless invite some 
other foreign Power – probably Great Britain – to replace it.”
21
  Just as they did in 
establishing the mission in 1920, on the issue of extending its tenure the Navy and State 
Departments exhibited a degree of cooperation that suggests an underlying compatibility of 
views.  To both, the U.S. naval mission to Peru was an important arm of American 
diplomacy and a critical ingredient to productive relations with Leguía.  In July 1922 the 
contracts of naval mission chief Frank Freyer and Escuela Naval director Charles G. Davy 
were extended by one and two-and-a-half years, respectively, while arrangements were made 




CHALLENGES: THE WOODWARD INCIDENT 
 
 Diplomatic difficulties with the naval mission began to appear only after its initial 
two-year contracts had been renewed and it experienced this first turnover in personnel.  
Their emergence is traceable to the fact that, in committing to extend the mission, 
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Washington  confirmed the wisdom of the curious arrangement whereby its naval personnel 
served as officers in the Peruvian Navy.  Continuing the mission gave this arrangement an air 
of permanence, and made it a durable symbol of Washington’s support for Leguía.  These 
developments emboldened the dictator to pursue his long-desired expansion of the Peruvian 
fleet, just as American banks’ growing confidence in Peru made a naval buildup seem more 
possible than before.  As the odds of some sort of Peruvian naval expansion grew in 1923, 
the State Department began to perceive the challenges that this type of involvement in Peru’s 
sovereign naval affairs could pose for U.S. policy in the region. 
 Up to that time the State Department had expressed only approval of Leguía’s 
methods and praise of the naval mission’s activities on his behalf.  But the prospect of a 
Peruvian naval buildup directed and supervised by American officers acting as agents of 
Leguía’s government gave U.S. foreign policymakers pause.  The U.S. legation in Lima 
expressed fears that Leguía’s naval ambitions could destabilize fragile relations between Peru 
and Chile and disrupt President Warren Harding’s nascent efforts to mediate the Tacna-Arica 
dispute between the two neighbors that had festered since the War of the Pacific (1879-
1884).  In February 1923 the U.S. Chargé d’Affaires in Lima, who earlier had made the case 
for strong American support for Leguía despite his dictatorial ways, warned that in the 
context of U.S. mediation, even small U.S. naval contracts made with Leguía could be 
interpreted as hostile by Chile and stoke opposition to U.S. policy in the region.
23
  With this 
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in mind the State Department pursued a cautious policy aimed at supporting Harding’s 
efforts and finding a workable solution that would lower bilateral tensions between Peru and 
Chile and bring permanent stability to that troubled border region.
24
  Central to that cautious 
policy was maintaining a favorable environment in which bilateral discussions could make 
unimpeded progress.  From the State Department’s perspective, that seemed to rule out a 
significant expansion of the Peruvian fleet. 
 It was in this tense environment that Clark H. Woodward, who took over as the new 
chief of the U.S. naval mission in July 1923, took his highly public stand in favor of a major 
enlargement of the Peruvian fleet and, for the first time, clearly demonstrated that U.S. 
mission members’ dual status could significantly complicate U.S. foreign relations.  The 
difficulties began with a public address Woodward gave at a memorial honoring Peru’s 
foremost naval hero, Contraalmirante Miguel Grau Seminario, in Lima’s port of Callao on 
October 27, 1923 – the day celebrated as “Navy Day” in the United States.
25
  Woodward had 
been instructed by the Navy Department in Washington to render honors to Admiral Grau, 
whose death aboard the Peruvian ship Huáscar in battle with the Chilean Navy during the 
War of the Pacific made him a martyr, by laying a wreath at the monument built in the 
Peruvian officer’s honor.  Charged with an essentially diplomatic task and acting a 
representative of the United States, Woodward briefly paid homage to Grau at the beginning 
of his remarks, calling him an able, energetic, and “brave” naval commander.  The majority 
of his speech, though, was far from routine.  In short order, he shifted from praising Grau to 
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exhorting the gathered crowd to avoid repeating what he saw as the mistakes that made 
Grau’s death such a crushing blow to the nation’s fortunes.  Wading deeply into the realm of 
Peruvian naval policy, Woodward shed his ceremonial role representing the United States 
and seamlessly assumed another role: that of Peru’s most senior naval officer.  Stepping 
firmly beyond the bounds of his assignment from Washington, Woodward proceeded to 
articulate a number of naval preparedness lessons he believed Peru should draw from the 
War of the Pacific, and made a forceful argument to the gathered crowd that, to avoid a 
similarly tragic fate in the future, Peru needed to significantly strengthen its naval defenses.
26
 
 The heart of Woodward’s argument at the Grau memorial was that, as the linchpin of 
Peru’s security, the Navy must never again be put in a position where its continued existence 
as a credible fighting force could be threatened in a single battle.  It must be made larger and 
more capable.  Despite the “heroism” Grau exhibited in the War of the Pacific’s decisive 
Battle of Angamos (October 8, 1879), and despite the fact that he had done “all that a mortal 
could do with the inadequate means” he was provided, Woodward argued, the admiral had 
been “sacrificed on the altar of his country” by his government’s “lack of foresight” and 
failure to maintain a navy equal to the nation’s security challenges.
27
  The outcome of 
Angamos had given the Chilean Navy command of the sea and had made it possible for Chile 
to land an invading army on Peruvian soil.  That, he continued, made the outcome of the war 
(Chilean victory) a foregone conclusion.
28
  Moreover it had demonstrated with tragic force 
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the truth, for Peru, of the maxim “he who is victorious at sea, is victorious also on land.”  The 
present gathering at Grau’s memorial, Woodward noted, afforded him the opportunity to 
“take from the pages of history some of the bitter lessons that should be learned from the sad 
facts of 1879, when Peru – owing to its failure to truly prepare – was obligated by her enemy 
to accept peace because the statesmen of the country had provided only a small navy unable 
to compete with the enemy.”
29
  Sadly, he continued, even the bitter peace that followed the 
War of the Pacific could not convince successive Peruvian governments to prepare and 
maintain adequate naval defenses.  In words echoing similar criticisms American officers had 
of U.S. preparedness, Woodward noted that “as the work of the navy in times of peace is not 
prominent,” public interest in naval affairs has a tendency to decline, permitting “desires of 
economy take precedent in the mind of the statesman.”  “Unfortunately,” Woodward argued, 
the economy mindset “manifests itself in a dangerous way: in a policy of poor preparation, 
and in a reduction of the fleet to a point much lower than that needed to ensure security.”  
The real danger of the peacetime economy mindset, he concluded, was its staying power: 
absent some national crisis, “little or no interest is taken in naval affairs” until “the clouds of 
war begin to loom on the horizon.”
30
 
 As he would later argue while making his specific recommendations for building up 
the Peruvian fleet, in his remarks at the Grau monument Woodward made the case that over 
the long term, ill-preparedness invited greater foreign aggression and proved more costly 
than a policy of modest, proactive preparation.  Fundamentally, he argued, by failing to 
maintain adequate naval defenses Peru was neglecting the very important fact that, for 
coastal nations, national power and naval power “march in parallel.”  Given the nation’s vast 
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coastline and wholesale dependence on the sea for commerce and communications, he 
stressed, maintaining “a weak navy is only preparation for defeat – a defeat that would mean 
humiliation and disaster” for Peru.  Should it continue maintaining a poor naval 
establishment, Woodward suggested, Peru would soon learn the very difficult lesson that 
“national weakness causes more wars than national power.”  Thus, he urged, the efficiency of 
the Navy (and, for that matter, the Army) was “not something to be thought of only when 
war is imminent.”  And the ability of the naval officer, whose job was to safeguard the 
nation’s security regardless of the Navy’s material condition, was extraordinarily limited in 
this regard.  The reality, Woodward concluded, was that in the absence of a change of course, 
the nation’s future battles would be lost long before hostilities commenced: they would be 
lost by statesmen in the halls of parliament, in the Council of Ministers, or in the various 
ministries of government where important resource decisions went against the interests of 
stronger naval defenses.  Building a Navy equal to the task of ensuring Peru’s security thus 
placed a special burden on the statesman.
31
 
 Fully embracing his role as a Peruvian officer, Woodward then proceeded to define 
what an adequate naval defense for Peru should look like.  Its centerpiece, he argued, must be 
the acquisition of enough capable vessels to deny potential enemies the ability to threaten 
Peruvian shores, as Chilean naval and ground forces done in the War of the Pacific.
32
  As 
justification Woodward cited French naval strategist René Daveluy’s assessment of Peru’s 
predicament in that war.  “If Peru would have been superior at sea,” Woodward quoted 
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Daveluy, “it would have protected its territory without the need of a single soldier.”  While 
the nation’s “first concern” in the wake of the war “should have been the reorganization of its 
navy,” he further cited Daveluy, in the decades that followed, Peru ignored the causes of its 
defeat, minimized the Navy, and foolishly dedicated the lion’s share of its scarce defense 
resources to the Peruvian Army.
33
  The implication was that for nearly four decades Peru’s 
national policy had ceded control of the sea to an enemy it still very much feared, and with 
whom it still had an unresolved border dispute.  The solution, which Woodward would spell 
out in considerable detail later, was the acquisition of vessels capable of securing and 
maintaining command of the seas – not necessarily “battleships or cruisers of grand power,” 
which Peru could not afford, but “destroyers, submarines, and airplanes which, although 
small, play a very important role in naval warfare.”  “If sufficient in number and properly 
managed,” he concluded, “they will be capable of stopping an enemy squadron of much 
larger, more powerful ships.”
34
 
 Woodward’s address, and reaction to it in other South American countries, caused 
alarm in Washington.  After the admiral’s remark’s began hitting newspapers in Chile and 
Argentina, Frederick Simpich, a former State Department official working as a writer for the 
Saturday Evening Post and Colliers, reported to Orme Wilson of the Department’s Division 
of Latin American Affairs that Chilean and Argentine officials had expressed to him “a 
strong dislike” for naval missions such as the ones the United States maintained in Peru and 
Brazil.  Simpich noted that officials in both countries’ Washington, DC embassies recognized 
that the United States was “within its rights” to send such missions, but that the sight of 
American officers drawing pay from these Governments created “suspicion and hostility” 
                                                          
33
 Ibid, 792. 
34
 Ibid, 793. 
129 
 
because the American officers’ efforts were “helping to increase the [size and capability of 
the] navies of the countries,” and because those improved navies “might be employed against 
Chile and Argentina in the future.”  Moreover, Simpich noted, the officials had singled out 
Admiral Woodward’s Navy Day activities for criticism: his action of laying a wreath on the 
statue of Admiral Grau had “created a painful impression” in Chile in light of Washington’s 
stance as independent arbitrator of the Tacna-Arica dispute as well as its position as an 
advocate of “plans and conferences for the limitation of armament[s]” throughout Latin 
America.
35
  At the same time, another official in the Department’s Division of Latin 
American Affairs cautioned State Department leaders that assistance provided to Peru by the 
United States through its naval mission would almost invariably “cause much comment in 
other South American countries,” and that “this Government…will be severely criticised 
therefor [sic.]” because of the mission’s activities.
36
 
 The State Department was taken by surprise because Woodward had crafted his 
remarks at the Grau monument and his subsequent recommendations for a naval buildup 
(detailed in Chapter 2) in close consultation with President Leguía and without notifying 
Washington of his intentions.  The fleet expansion he proposed called the purchase of six 
destroyers, six submarines, and twenty-five military aircraft, as well as for the refurbishment 
of the remainder of the Peruvian fleet and the construction of new stations ashore.  In total, it 
was a massive buildup given the diminutive stature of the Peruvian fleet at the time.  The 
price tag for all of this, reported to be approximately 6 million Peruvian Pounds, far exceeded 
the size of the modest proposals Woodward’s predecessor had contemplated.  The size and 
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cost of the Woodward program, in the State Department’s view, was unacceptably large and 
threatened to undermine the impartiality that underlay President Calvin Coolidge’s fledgling 
efforts to mediate the Tacna-Arica dispute.
37
  If Woodward’s proposal were enacted, U.S. 
foreign policymakers feared, other nations of the South America would see the United States 
– and not just its naval officers in Peru – as proposing a destabilizing expansion of Peru’s sea 
power at a time when Peruvian-Chilean relations begged for caution. 
 Upon receiving word of Woodward’s proposed expansion program, Secretary of State 
Charles Evans Hughes pinpointed the heart of the diplomatic problem it posed for the United 
States:  such a quantitative and qualitative increase in Peru’s Navy, Hughes wrote to Navy 
Secretary Edwin Denby, could easily be interpreted by the Chilean government as a hostile 
act by the United States because, even though Woodward made the recommendation in his 
capacity as a “Peruvian” naval officer, the fact was that he remained a commissioned officer 
in the United States Navy and continued to draw pay from the American treasury.  Foreign 
governments, he suggested, would not necessarily understand the unique circumstances 
under which U.S. officers in Peru served the Leguía government.  The danger, he concluded, 
was that if the impetus for a buildup of Peru’s Navy appeared to come from the United 
States, it would undercut nascent U.S. efforts to find an “impartial” solution to the Tacna-
Arica dispute.  Not surprisingly, the State Department quickly sought to distance itself and 
the Coolidge administration from any implication that American policy advocated a 
destabilizing expansion of the Peruvian Navy.  In fact, in attempting to control the damage 
Secretary Hughes asked the Navy Department to have Woodward abandon any plans for 
enlarging the Peruvian fleet or, if that proved impossible given his contractual status as an 
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arm of the Peruvian state, that he “at least not to push the matter of increased armaments for 
Peru.”
38
  Woodward’s deep involvement in Peru’s sovereign naval affairs had made him an 
advocate of a policy, Peruvian naval expansion, that threatened to derail his own nation’s 
interests in solving a persistent, seemingly intractable problem in inter-American affairs.  The 
controversy surrounding the Woodward proposal ended up subsiding when Washington gave 
its blessing to more modest, “entirely defensive” naval building plans that were designed to 
meet Leguía’s desires while not upsetting the delicate Tacna-Arica situation.  However, the 
episode did cause significant “embarrassment” in Washington, and underscored the unique 
diplomatic problems that could arise from permitting U.S. naval personnel to serve 
simultaneously in the U.S. and a foreign naval establishment.
39
 
 The difficulties that the naval mission’s deep involvement in Peru’s sovereign naval 
affairs could cause for U.S. foreign policy came even more sharply into focus in the months 
that followed.  In March of 1925, the U.S. Ambassador to Chile, William Collier, reported 
that the press in the Chilean capital of Santiago had begun expressing grave concerns about 
Peru’s unfolding naval building plans.  A February 24, 1925 article in El Mercurio had noted 
that Peru’s impending purchase of two R-Type submarines from the Electric Boat Company 
was being received “with a great deal of interest by the public,” and suggested that even 
though Peru professed to be building its fleet “to guard coastwise and international 
commerce,” it seemed likely that the acquisition of submarines with the blessing of the U.S. 
naval mission was “merely the first step in the unfolding of Peru’s plans.”  The article 
expressed concern that “the submarines that have been ordered are twice as large as those of 
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Chile,” and that under U.S. tutelage Peru appeared also to be arming a large air force 
equipped with naval airplanes.  In sum, the article noted fearfully, it appeared that Peru had 
plans to create a fleet “that will make her one of South America’s foremost naval powers.”  A 
February 27 editorial in the same paper suggested that the only objective of such an 
aggressive program – one intended to “create an Army and Navy capable of competing with 
ours” – was “revenge” for Chile’s triumph in the War of the Pacific.   It went so far as to 
suggest that Leguía was plotting “a war of revenge” in order to “make Peruvians forget the 
persecutions that attend the regime of Mr. Leguía.”
40
 
CHALLENGES: A MILITARY MISSION 
 
 Despite such concerns the United States remained committed to keeping its naval 
mission in Peru even as it became clear, following the Woodward episode, that overt U.S. 
military support for Leguía could compromise Washington’s broader interests in the region.  
Triggered in part by Leguía’s desire to expand the Peruvian fleet, these concerns were 
heightened by the dictator’s persistent pursuit between 1920 and 1925 of a U.S. military 
mission to provide his Army with the same kind of direction and assistance that the American 
naval mission was providing to the Peruvian Navy.  He first considered seeking a U.S. 
military mission while courting the naval mission in 1919 and 1920, but, perhaps recognizing 
that Washington saw a naval mission as better suited to promoting its interests in the region, 
opted to take what he could get at the time and revisit the issue of a military mission in the 
future.
41
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 Leguía’s tenacity in pursuing a U.S. military mission in subsequent years 
demonstrates very clearly that he was far from a passive recipient of U.S. actions and that, 
indeed, he intended to play the United States for maximum benefit.  In April of 1923, months 
after the renewal of the naval mission’s contracts had cemented U.S. ties to his government, 
Leguía dispatched his son, Juan, to raise the idea of a U.S. military mission directly with 
Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes in Washington.  The tack the younger Leguía took 
in broaching the idea reflects his father’s attentive focus on Washington’s interests in South 
America, and specifically, its desire to supplant Europe as the dominant strategic and 
commercial player on that continent.  In his meeting with Hughes, Juan Leguía presented the 
idea of a military mission for Peru as an opportunity for the United States to continue rolling 
back European influence in South America.  He indicated that his father was contemplating 
terminating Peru’s longstanding French military mission, on the grounds (which Hughes 
recognized as suspect) that the mission’s chief, a figure widely respected in Peru, was 
engaged in graft against the government.  The younger Leguía proceeded to state that his 
father would “probably remove” the mission chief from command of the Peruvian Army, and 
then said that in “his own view” Peru’s Army, like its Navy, would be better off in the future 
under the charge of American officers.  For his part, in relaying the substance of his 
conversation with the younger Leguía to U.S. Ambassador Miles Poindexter in Lima, 
Secretary Hughes advised that from a policy point of view he considered the moment 
“inopportune” for sending Leguía a military mission because the Tacna-Arica dispute 
remained unresolved, and because the United States did not want to disturb ongoing Pan-
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American discussions on limiting military and naval armaments.
42
 
 Still Leguía persisted.  He gauged U.S. willingness again in 1924 in the hope that the 
glacial progress being made in the U.S.-brokered talks on Tacna-Arica might soften 
Washington’s resistance.
43
  His August 1924 query came to Washington via naval mission 
member Charles Gordon Davy, the Director of the Escuela Naval (Peruvian Naval 
Academy), who relayed a message to Ambassador Poindexter with a familiar ring to it:  
“great dissatisfaction exists [within the Leguía administration] with the French Military 
Mission,” and Leguía would likely seek a new mission “from some other country” when the 
French contract expired.  Sending the request through the U.S. naval mission, whose 
members were firmly on the inside of the dictator’s inner circle, made it clear that, to Leguía, 
“some other country” was the United States.  As it had the year before, though, Washington 
held firm.  Despite some very limited progress in negotiations, a solution on Tacna-Arica 
remained elusive, and relations between Peru and Chile continued to be strained.  Together, 
this meant that the moment was still inopportune for the United States to comply with 
Leguía’s wishes.  As Ambassador Poindexter noted, should the United States comply with 
Leguía’s request, “the junction of both a Naval and a Military Mission from the United States 
in one country would give a handle that the anti-United States press [in Latin America] 
would be quick to grasp.”
44
 
 Undaunted, Leguía tried again in late 1925 when the untimely death of the French 
                                                          
42
 Secretary of State to U.S. Ambassador to Peru, April 26, 1923, RG 59, File 823.20/2a, National Archives. 
43
 The French military mission to Peru is discussed in Chapter 1.  Secretary of State to U.S. Embassy in Peru 
(Telegram), April 26, 1923, RG 59, File 823.20/2a, National Archives.  See also U.S. Ambassador to Peru to 
Secretary of State (Telegram), May 2, 1923, RG 59, File 823.20/3, National Archives.  This telegram mentions 
that Leguia had considered asking for an American military mission at the same time he requested a naval 
mission in 1920, but that “since that time never suggested [the idea] to [the American] Embassy.” 
44
 U.S. Ambassador to Peru to Secretary of State, August 27, 1924, RG 59, File 823.20/10, National Archives. 
135 
 
mission chief presented him with an opportunity to again force the issue with Washington.  
Approaching Poindexter directly in late December, Leguía again stressed that he wanted an 
American officers to direct and administer Peru’s Army.
45
  State Department fears of 
destabilizing the Tacna-Arica negotiations persisted, however, and continued to weigh 
against complying with Leguia’s request.  But the dictator’s persistence finally forced the 
American diplomats to be more forceful in responding.  On the one hand, the Washington 
needed to maintain a happy and compliant Leguía who favored American commercial 
interests in Peru and who continued to look to the United States for capital and technical 
expertise.  On the other hand, though, it was clear that the United States had to be sensitive to 
broader regional concerns and could not grant Leguía all that he asked.  As Secretary 
Hughes’s response to this Leguía overture demonstrates, from that point forward, the 
objective became containing him – ensuring he had enough U.S. support to maintain his 
ardently pro-American leanings, but not so much that he could threaten regional stability.  So 
long as the Tacna-Arica situation remained unresolved, Hughes instructed, it would remain 
“impossible” to send a military mission to Peru.  But rather than risk alienating a firm ally 
even further with such an outright denial, the Secretary noted, the ambassador should only 
explain to Leguía that the 1920 law that had authorized naval missions for Latin America in 
the first place had covered only naval personnel and did not specifically authorize sending 
personnel from other military services.
46
  By taking this approach, Hughes believed, the 
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United States could stall the issue further, keeping Leguía in the pro-American fold while 
protecting its impartiality before the world as arbitrator of the Peruvian-Chilean border 
dispute. 
 Containing Leguía’s ambitions became more of a challenge after the U.S. Congress 
passed, and President Calvin Coolidge signed, legislation in May 1926 authorizing the 
sending of U.S. Army and Marine Corps personnel to military missions abroad.  This action 
removed what had become the State Department’s key public justification for not sending 
Leguía a military mission.  Because the real, underlying reason (Tacna-Arica) for not sending 
a mission remained, when newspapers in Lima began reporting the U.S. Congressional 
action, Secretary of State Frank Kellogg instructed Ambassador Poindexter to simply dodge 
the issue should Leguía continue to push.  “Please endeavor if possible to avoid the subject at 
the present time,” he advised, adding that “should President Leguia again bring up the 
question you may express appreciation and readiness to inquire again regarding the 
Department’s attitude.”
47
  Washington continued to defer, neither sending Leguia a military 
mission nor clearly denying him one, until, in May 1927, the Peruvian president called the 
American bluff and appointed a German officer, William Faupel, as Chief of Staff of the 
Peruvian Army.
48
  The move demonstrated yet again that, while he had strong pro-American 
leanings, Leguía was willing to act independently of Washington when it suited his needs.  
And while the move reawakened some U.S. worries about European influence in Peru
49
, they 
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did not outweigh concerns about possibly enflaming tensions between Peru and Chile over 
their still-disputed border.  Moreover, U.S. officials were not overly concerned in the 1920s 
with German military influence in Peru.
50
  Managing Leguía’s ambitions while the delicate 
negotiations over Tacna-Arica progressed was a higher priority into 1927 than trying to 
counteract German influence over Peru’s Army.  In the end, only when the Tacna-Arica 
question was settled, in 1929, did Washington seriously entertain sending Leguia the U.S. 
Army advisers he had desperately wanted for most of the decade. 
 As Leguía’s push for a military mission in the early 1920s demonstrates, even as he 
sought closer ties with the United States, the dictator grew quite adept at challenging 
Washington when he believed it would help him achieve his goals.  The U.S. naval mission’s 
presence was a source of strength that helped make this growing assertiveness possible.  
First, by 1925 it was clear that the mission had developed into a source of secure, predictable 
support for Leguía and that the United States had no interest in removing it.  Despite the 
diplomatic headaches caused by Admiral Woodward’s recommendations, and despite the fact 
that they had to constantly parry Leguía’s numerous attempts to secure a military mission, 
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American foreign policymakers continued to perceive enough value in the naval mission to 
render its withdrawal highly unlikely.  Throughout 1924, 1925, and 1926, even as they 
recognized the nature of Leguía’s strengthening dictatorship, U.S. diplomats continued to 
advocate closer relations in light of growing American interests in Peru and throughout the 
region.  At the same time, they wrote to Washington with nothing but consistent praise for the 
mission’s work, calling it a source of prestige for the United States and a vehicle for 
developing closer, more cooperative relations with Peru.
51
  Second, even though Washington 
developed concerns about its officers’ dual status, and came to insist on amending their 
contracts to protect them from involvement in potential Peruvian wars, by the contracts they 
signed with Leguía’s government the mission’s officers did become integral parts of the 
Peruvian Navy and incurred certain obligations to Leguía as commander-in-chief.  As Chief 
of the General Staff, for example, the U.S. mission chief attended weekly meetings 
(recuerdos) with the president on naval affairs to which the civilian Minister of Marine was 
not privy.
52
  And from very early on, seldom did Leguía attend high-profile public events 
without a member of the naval mission close by.
53
  As historian Lawrence Clayton notes, by 
virtue of Leguía’s interest in naval affairs and their placement at the top of the Peruvian 
Navy, U.S. naval mission members enjoyed “extraordinary access to power.”
54
 
 By ensuring close, continuing contact between Leguía and the officers of the 
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American mission, these meetings gave weight to the Peruvian half of mission members’ 
dual status and, over time, helped the dictator draw the mission into his inner circle and give 
it an importance out of proportion to its mandated functions of ensuring the “proper 
organization of the Peruvian Navy” and the instructing and training its personnel.
55
  Evidence 
of this closeness appeared as early as 1923, when, at Leguía’s personal request, the first chief 
of the mission, Frank B. Freyer (Captain, U.S. Navy), embarked on a tour of southern Peru 
with the purely propagandistic mission of drumming up public support for the government’s 
naval plans.  As reported by La Prensa, the Lima daily taken over by the Leguía government 
in 1921, Freyer traveled to the mountain cities of Cuzco, Puno, and Arequipa – inland from 
Peru’s lengthy coastline and high in the Andes mountains – to “awaken the interest of the 
youths of the mountainous regions in affairs of the sea and of the Navy.”  The idea driving 
the trip, Freyer argued to the assembled crowds, was that “the Navy should not be considered 
as a luxury belonging only to rich countries,” but rather should be recognized as an 
indispensible contributor to the whole nation’s security.  The subtext of Freyer’s public 
remarks was that all Peruvians, whether they lived near the coast, high in the Andes, or in 
Peru’s eastern rainforest region, had a stake in the development of strengthened naval 
defenses.  In each city he spoke to crowds on Leguía’s rationale for a strong Navy, and 
supplemented his presentations with (as La Prensa reported) “the portentous invention of 
moving pictures” depicting U.S. Navy vessels at sea – a stroke that was no doubt intended to 
wow the locals while presenting “vividly to the men of the great Andean altitudes the 
problem of national defense” as Leguía saw it.
56
  For his mission Freyer garnered the praise 
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of his own government (U.S. Chargé Sterling noted he showed “both ability and tact” and 
“added to the prestige of our country”) and the thanks of his Peruvian commander-in-chief.  
Upon completing his stint as naval mission chief later that year, Leguía bestowed upon 




CHALLENGES: HAROLD GROW 
 
 The officer who did the most to strengthen Leguía’s ties to the naval mission – and 
whose relationship with the dictator did the most to complicate U.S. foreign policy – was 
Harold B. Grow (Commander, U.S. Navy), who arrived in Lima in January of 1924 in 
response to Leguía’s request for an officer to lead Peru’s nascent naval aviation service.  As 
he embarked on his duties, beginning with the establishment of the naval aviation school at 
Ancón, Grow very quickly developed a strong rapport with Leguía and became one of the 
dictator’s most trusted advisers.  A contributing factor to their personal and professional 
closeness was the fact that the two men had similar visions of aviation’s place both in Peru’s 
national defense and its economic development.  Within the realm of national defense, 
Grow’s vision for aviation aligned with Leguía’s plans to rebuild Peru’s Navy around 
submarines and aircraft, the latter of which the president deemed “necessary for the national 
defense” in an address to the Peruvian Congress in October of 1924.
58
  Shortly after arriving 
in Lima, Grow, who had helped establish the U.S. Navy’s new Bureau of Aeronautics 
immediately prior to his assignment to the naval mission in Peru, went on record arguing that 
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aircraft had an “integral” role to play in the nation’s future naval defenses.
59
  In 1925 he 
amplified his argument in the pages of the Revista de Marina, calling airpower “uniquely and 
exceptionally applicable” to Peru’s peculiar national defense challenges because aircraft 
could “most rapidly help to overcome the existing deficiency in the [nation’s] naval defense 
forces, with a minimum expenditure of money.”  Moreover, he argued in terms wholly 
consistent with Leguía’s view of Peruvian national defense, superiority in aircraft “might 
mean the saving of the country” in war while the lack of a naval aviation capability “would 
most surely spell defeat to a country inferior in other branches” of armed power.
60
   
 Grow’s views comported with Leguía’s in the realm of civil aviation as well.  Leguía 
had made overcoming Peru’s difficult geography and uniting its distinct regions (the costa, 
sierra, and selva) into a coherent, traversable whole a priority of his Patria Nueva program of 
economic development.  Throughout his Oncenio, for example, he directed a near-doubling 
of the national road system (from 10,643 kilometers in 1926 to 19,465 in 1930), which 
historian Peter Klarén notes improved communications, helped the government “expand its 
reach into remote areas and extend its authority as never before,” and significantly increased 
the flow of trade and commerce to the nation’s remote interior.
61
  Grow saw the naval 
aviation service as a complement to Leguía’s effort to knit the country together.  Eventually, 
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he imagined, it would be a seedbed from which a broader national aviation program could 
grow – one that would forge permanent links across Peru’s geographical barriers and permit 
free flows of trade, commerce, and communication throughout the nation.  From his earliest 
days in Peru, Grow hung a map of the country in his office at the naval aviation school in 
Ancón which labeled much of its interior as “unknown” or “unexplored,” something he later 
said hung “like a burden” over his head.
62
  Early on he resolved to address the problem by 
proposing the establishment of a network of air routes that would carry mail, trade, and 
passengers from Lima over the high peaks of the Andes into the nation’s interior.  The city he 
identified as the air route’s eastern terminus, the city of Iquitos, was an important Amazon 
River port that, once fully integrated into the nation’s economy, could significantly enhance 
Peru’s international trade prospects.  It was an idea that met with Leguía’s immediate 
approval.  Concerned about Peru’s unsettled borders and anxious to break the bonds of 
commercial and cultural interaction that bound many of eastern Peru’s peoples to populations 
in neighboring countries, the dictator shared Grow’s optimism about the potential of air 
routes to enhance Peru’s security and economic prospects, and authorized funds so 
preliminary work could begin. 
With the president’s backing, in September 1926 Grow set out with a small party on 
an overland roundtrip to survey the terrain and climatic conditions with which future air 
linkages would have to contend, as well as to identify possible locations for air stations and 
landing fields between Lima and Iquitos.  The journey followed the same treacherous path 
that intra-Peruvian trade and mail delivery routinely had to confront.  The group started out 
from Lima on the Central Railroad of Peru for the interior city of Oroya, then proceeded the 
next day via automobile to La Merced before hiring a mule train and spending eight long 
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days traversing trails only wide enough for single-file passage while contending with 
torrential rains, abundant mosquitoes and “insects of all shapes and sizes.”  Upon arriving at 
the head of the Pichis River, Grow’s group then hired canoes piloted by indigenous guides 
for a three-day journey to Puerto Bermudas, where they boarded the naval gunboat Napo, 
which carried them the rest of the way to Iquitos.  The return trip to Lima took longer – thirty 
days – due to difficulty crossing rivers that ran high with the Peruvian spring.  In total, the 
difficult journey to Iquitos and back took fifty-four days to complete.  Along the way, Grow 
selected sites for the three air stations (San Ramon in the Chanchamayo Valley, Masisea on 
the Ucayali River, and Iquitos) that would anchor the air link.  He also selected the aircraft he 
believed best suited to takeoffs and landings on the kinds of short runways that would be 
built both in the mountains and in the thickly-vegetated Amazon basin, and settled on a 
preliminary four-stage transportation plan on which the project could proceed.  Grow’s 
design envisioned that when the route between Lima and Iquitos was fully operational, 
passengers, mail, and commerce would travel from Lima to Oroyo by rail, from Oroya to San 
Ramon via automobile, and would fly from San Ramon to Masisea before continuing by air 
to Iquitos.  The total journey, which had ranged on average between twenty and thirty days 
over land in each direction, would be cut to three days.
63
  By 1928 the groundwork had been 
laid and flights between San Ramon and Iquitos were beginning to occur with increasing 
regularity.  In January of that year, with Leguía’s backing, Grow established a government-
supported airline, La Linea Aérea Nacional al Oriente, and by 1929 the air link between the 
costa and the selva ran routinely enough that the government considered expanding similar 
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routes to other cities in Peru’s eastern interior. 
Grow’s achievements in building the Lima-Iquitos air link impressed Leguía and 
distinguished the officer as someone with strong organizational and administrative skills who 
could quickly deliver positive results.  Those results, on top of the success he had had in 
building the naval aviation school at Ancón (discussed in Chapter 2), strengthened Grow’s 
influence over Peruvian aviation matters and helped deepen his personal and professional 
relationship with the president.
64
  In December of 1926 this growing closeness took on an 
official flavor when Grow signed a five-year contract with the Peruvian government and 
accepted de facto supervision of all aviation in Peru – civil as well as military and naval.
65
  
By design it was a longer contract than the typical two- to three-year agreements signed by 
other members of the naval mission.  As Sharon Pope notes, Leguía did not want his aviation 
priorities to fall victim to turnovers in personnel.
66
  Consequently, along with the position 
came direct access to power and an extraordinarily high profile.   
Expecting that supervision of Peru’s fledgling aviation establishment would require 
his undivided attention, and cognizant of the fact that U.S. Navy authorities were unlikely to 
permit him to extend his tour in Peru beyond early 1927, Grow chose to accepted Leguía’s 
offer to remain.  He resigned his commission in the active duty U.S. Navy and opted for a 
                                                          
64
 Clayton, Peru and the United States: The Condor and the Eagle, 129.  Sharon Pope notes that in his first two 
years in Peru, Grow had established “a viable, continuous aviation program” and had succeeded in large part by 
“cultivating rapport with President Leguía.”  She further notes that by late 1926 Grow had “obtained complete 
authority and control over every aspect of the naval aviation program including the budget.”  See Pope, "Harold 
B. Grow and the Establishment of Aviation in Peru, 1924-1930," 20. 
65
 Sharon Pope notes that “Until 1928 three official commands for aviation existed [in Peru]: army aviation 
under the Ministry of War with its center at Jorge Chávez, directed by the German mission; naval aviation under 
the Ministry of the Navy at Ancón, San Ramon, and Iquitos, guided by the United States naval mission; and 
commercial and civil aviation directed by an officer of the army.”  As a practical matter, however, she notes that 
“Grow’s position in Peru and rapport with President Leguía became of greater value to the United States” by the 
mid-1920s because “he could act as an intermediator [sic.]” between Leguía and U.S. interests in Peru.  Ibid, 36, 
39. 
66
 Ibid, 41. 
145 
 
commission in the U.S. Naval Reserve.  While regular naval mission members drew salaries 
from the U.S. Navy as well as the Peruvian treasury, Grow’s new reserve status came with no 
American pay.  The practical effect was that in both institutional and financial terms, he 
would have the freedom to remain in Peru and serve Leguía indefinitely.
67
  In making this 
choice, Grow stepped beyond the difficult balance that other members of the naval mission 
had struck between carrying out their obligations as Peruvian officers while taking care not to 
entangle themselves too deeply in Peru’s sovereign affairs.  His contract ensured that he 
would be working directly for Leguía and, although he would remain a member of the naval 
mission in name, it also virtually guaranteed that his work would proceed outside established 
channels.
68
  Comfortable with Leguía and accustomed to unfettered access, it was a modus 
operandi that Grow immediately embraced.  In 1927 he urged Leguía to create a single 
bureaucracy that would consolidate his control over all aviation within Peru.  Such an 
agency, he argued, would make management of money, equipment and personnel more 
efficient.  Moreover, it would permit the purchase of standardized equipment, and would 
enable better coordination of training efforts.  Quickly persuaded, Leguía presented a bill 
drafted by Grow to the Peruvian congress, which approved it in February of 1928.  Grow’s 




As Director General of Aviation, Grow’s proximity to power enabled him to directly 
advance American interests while laboring for Leguía’s priorities.  He was sensitive, for 
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example, to the interests of American airplane manufacturers and keen to prevent non-U.S. 
firms from making significant inroads into the Peruvian market, stipulating that the 
government-backed airline he had established would fly only American-made planes.
70
  He 
continued to push for acquisitions of U.S. planes even after Peru began suffering severe 
effects of the Great Depression, signing a contract with the United Aircraft Corporation for 
twenty-six naval aircraft in January 1930.
71
  More significant than his commitment to 
acquiring American-built aircraft, however, were his efforts to preserve an advantage for U.S. 
airlines seeking entry into the Peruvian market.  As discussed in Chapter 2, in early 1928 
Grow paved the way for Pan American Airways to win the Leguía administration’s 
concession to establish an air mail, cargo, and passenger service between the United States 
and Peru.  When that line began operating in May of 1929, it reduced transit time for 
communications between the two countries from weeks to a matter of days.
72
  The speed with 
which Pan-American’s work on the U.S. air mail route progressed convinced Grow that the 
airline would soon be poised to expand its operations from Peru to other South American 
nations.  Accordingly, in late 1928 he prevailed upon Leguía (who had been poised to 
approve it) to deny a concession to the French firm Aeropostale for the creation of an air link 
                                                          
70
 Pope, "Harold B. Grow and the Establishment of Aviation in Peru, 1924-1930," 43. 
71
 Leguía had sought to purchase “new airplanes of American manufacture” in September of 1929, before the 
October stock market crash sent the international financial system into a panic.  But, concerned about Peru’s 
high levels of indebtedness, a number of New York banks declined to finance the purchase.  This caused Leguía 
to approach the British firm Vickers, a move that Grow vigorously opposed.  In the end, largely because of 
Grow’s efforts to secure financing from an American firm, Leguía signed a contract with the United Aircraft 
Corporation.  See Head of Naval Mission to Peru to Director of Naval Intelligence, September 30, 1929; Head 
of Naval Mission to Peru to Director of Naval Intelligence, October 31, 1929; and Head of Naval Mission to 
Peru to Director of Naval Intelligence, January 31, 1929 – all filed in RG 38, Entry E-194, Box 1, National 
Archives. 
72
 U.S. Ambassador to Peru Harold Moore sent a letter (dated May 3, 1929) to President Herbert Hoover aboard 
the first air mail flight from Peru to New York.  Hoover’s reply, dated May 17th, noted that “I have your letter 
of May 3rd which arrived here on the 16th – a matter of thirteen days.  I have no doubt that in time this service 
will be speeded up.”  See U.S. Ambassador to Peru (Moore) to Herbert Hoover, May 3, 1929 and Herbert 
Hoover to U.S. Ambassador to Peru (Moore), May 17, 1929, both in President’s Personal File, Box 996, Herbert 
Hoover Presidential Library, West Branch, IA. 
147 
 
between Iquitos and the northern Brazilian state of Pará.
73
  And in early 1929 Grow’s 
continued lobbying against allowing non-American airlines into Peru caused Leguía to 
disapprove a proposal by the Colombian-German airline SCADTA (Sociedad Colombo-





 While it cleared the way for American supremacy in Peruvian aviation, Grow’s work 
also complemented ever-increasing levels of U.S. investment in Peru, advanced Leguía’s 
Patria Nueva agenda, and contributed to growth in the Peruvian economy.
75
  At the same 
time, it undeniably facilitated more intimate U.S. ties with Leguía, and, by extension, helped 
strengthen the dictator’s hold on power.  Their close relationship portended a broader pattern 
developing in U.S.-Latin American relations.  As Grow intensified his relationship with 
Leguía, U.S. hemispheric policy began undergoing something of a sea change.  In the face of 
increasingly vocal opposition throughout the hemisphere, Washington began in the late 
1920s to back away from its longstanding dependence on armed interventionism as a tool of 
its relations Latin American nations.
76
  Little more than a month after assuming the American 
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presidency, Herbert Hoover, who had held the chairmanship of the Inter-American High 
Commission while serving as President Calvin Coolidge’s Secretary of Commerce, made his 
opposition to U.S. interventionism in Latin America clear.  In an April 1929 address to the 
Gridiron Club of Washington, the new U.S. president declared that it “ought not be the policy 
of the United States to intervene by force to secure or maintain contracts between our citizens 
and foreign states or their citizens.”
77
  Later that year he stressed in an address to the U.S. 
Congress that, although U.S. Marines remained on long-term occupation duty in Nicaragua 
and Haiti, in the future the United States did “not wish to be represented abroad in such 
manner.”
78
  To end those interventions, and to render similar actions unnecessary in the 
future, Washington would need to find other means of maintaining stability in the region.  
The formula that eventually came to characterize the non-interventionist “good neighbor” 
approach consisted principally of lending political, material, and monetary support to Latin 
American leaders that Washington saw as capable of maintaining that much-desired 
stability.
79
  It was precisely the kind of relationship the United States had been developing 
with Leguía since 1919, a relationship to which the naval mission had been indispensable.  
By the time Hoover’s Latin America policy began to take shape, the U.S. State Department 
had spent nearly a decade recognizing the dictatorial nature of Leguía’s regime.  However, 
because the dictator favored U.S. interests and demonstrated an ability to shield them from 
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harm with an iron-handed political stability, it offered him increasing levels of U.S. support.  
In this way, the American relationship with Leguía represents a trial run for good 
neighborism. 
When Hoover made his landmark seven-week “goodwill tour” of Latin America as 
president-elect between November of 1928 and January of 1929, the State Department 
adviser assigned to brief him on Peru prior to his arrival there, G. Butler Sherwell, gave this 
emerging reality clear expression.  In a background memorandum for Hoover he noted that 
Leguía exercised “practically autocratic power” within Peru, and acknowledged that 
elections there were “free only in theory.”  He further wrote that the Peruvian Supreme Court 
was “nothing more than an instrument for his [Leguía’s] wishes” while Peru’s prisons were 
“known to be filled with political prisoners” who had opposed Leguía.  Only token 
opposition to Leguía could be said to exist within the Peruvian political establishment.  
Peru’s national Congress was packed with pro-Leguía deputies who made it their business to 
“pass any measure upon which he insists,” Sherwell continued, while locally, the prefects of 
Peru’s provinces were “personally appointed by the President and are responsible to him.”  
These transgressions were acceptable, he wrote, because it was clear to the State Department 
– as it had been to American diplomats very early on
80
 – that Leguía was “a man of great 
energy, ability and vision” whose close economic and political ties to the United States were 
“one of his main points of support.”  In pointing out Leguía’s simultaneous dependency on 
repressive rule and American friendship, the State Department acknowledged that embedded 
within his rule were the seeds of its own possible demise.  Moreover, the State Department 
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perceived that the United States had a stake in keeping those seeds from germinating and 
growing:  Leguía could not afford to have “the existence or efficiency of that friendship [with 
the United States] called into question,” Sherwell concluded.  As long as his relationship with 
Washington and New York bankers remained strong, Sherwell cautioned Hoover, Peru could 
continue to finance its massive program of public works improvements and achieve the 
economic gains the dictator needed to continue diverting Peruvians’ attention away from the 
state of their nation’s internal politics and “the lamentable state” of their government’s 




 As Leguía’s Director General of Aviation, Grow’s proximity to the center of power 
made him an important asset in lending Leguía the strong measure of U.S. support he needed.  
At the same time, however, this access, and the wide-ranging powers he wielded over the 
aviation establishment, blurred the established lines of authority that had governed the naval 
mission’s activities since its earliest days.  Upon Grow’s appointment as head of all aviation 
in Peru, naval mission chief A.G. Howe stressed to Washington that “it was distinctly 
understood that it [Grow’s appointment] should not in any way interfere with the fact” that 
Grow remained a member of the Naval Mission and, as such, subject to the orders and 
jurisdiction of the Head of the Mission.
82
  As Grow accumulated more power and influence 
with Leguía, Howe sensed that his own position of influence with the president was 
beginning to wane.  He subsequently sought clarification from ONI that, even though Grow 
occupied a new position with broad national responsibilities within Peru, the Inspector 
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General of Aviation was still “a member of the Naval Mission and, as such, one of my 
subordinates.”
83
  But there was little that Washington could say or do to alter the reality on 
the ground.  Having resigned his active duty commission in the U.S. Navy and signed a 
contract directly with Leguía, Grow was an independent operator, come what may. 
THE END OF THE ONCENIO 
 
 Developments throughout 1929 and 1930 exposed just how serious a challenge 
Grow’s close relationship with Leguía – and his deep involvement in Peru’s sovereign affairs 
– posed for U.S. foreign policy.  The crash of the U.S. stock market in October 1929, and the 
precipitous decline of the world economy in the months that followed, wreaked havoc in 
Peru and strained Leguía’s close relationship with the United States.  It directly threatened 
the foundation of his political strength.
84
  For more than ten years Leguía had courted favor 
with politicians in Washington and bankers in New York, efforts which paid off handsomely 
as American firms injected tens of millions of dollars in American capital into Peruvian 
industry and infrastructure projects.  That massive, sustained infusion of U.S. capital had 
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fueled impressive rates of economic growth in Peru for most of the 1920s.
85
  Although it was 
founded on high levels of indebtedness, Leguía’s stewardship of the Peruvian economy and 
emphasis on public works improvements had, in turn, caused many Peruvians to overlook or 
at least stomach his dictatorial methods.  By 1929, however, what had previously been 
disparate threads of opposition to his rule began to coalesce following his rigged reelection to 
a third five-year term, a move which historian Daniel Masterson notes “led his opponents to 
believe his regime would go on indefinitely.”
86
  When the global economic crisis froze the 
long-reliable flow of loans into Peru from the United States, the foreign capital-dependent 
Peruvian economy ground to a halt.  There was little left to divert the public’s attention from 
Leguía’s repressive rule and his intimate association with the United States.
87
  Twin 
backlashes against Leguía and his benefactor ensued.  American embassy personnel reported 
growing public unrest and political instability throughout late 1929 and 1930.  Worse for 
Leguía, there was growing unrest within the Peruvian Army, whose political influence he had 
long feared.
88
  In July 1930 the extent of the problem became clear to U.S. naval mission 
chief William S. Pye during a public presentation by the French ambassador to Peru of a 
motion picture celebrating the French Revolution on Bastille Day.  With Leguía in 
attendance, Pye reported, the Peruvian crowd “stamped and cheered at each scene depicting 
the success of the revolutionists.”  The crowd’s demonstrated approval “of the ideas of the 
French revolutionists,” Pye noted, was remarkable both for its intensity and for the fact that it 
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took place in the president’s presence.  Its effect was clear and jarring, he concluded: “the 
Head of Mission was conscious from that date of a decrease in the feeling of security usually 
manifested by the President.”
89
 
 By August of 1930, as policymakers in Washington were just beginning to realize it, 
members of the U.S. naval mission saw that the writing for Leguía’s dictatorship was on the 
wall.  In the new political environment, the naval mission, long seen by Washington as a 
stabilizing force in Peru, had become a diplomatic liability.  It had become too closely 
associated with a single man.  In mid-August Pye reported that the political situation “had 
become so bad that the Head of Mission decided that a change from the executive to the 
advisory status was essential,” meaning that American personnel should relinquish command 
of the Peruvian Navy at the earliest possible moment.  He made the decision believing that 
the naval mission’s executive control of the Peruvian Navy “was recognized as a Leguía 
Policy” and could become a lightning rod for public opposition.  A substantial weakening of 
the president’s power could subject the mission to political attack “even under the best 
possible circumstances.”
90
  On August 20th Pye sent urgent follow-up to both the State 
Department and Navy Department imploring them to approve a change in the naval 
mission’s status, while U.S. Chargé d’Affaires Ferdinand Mayer cabled Secretary of State 
Henry Stimson to the same effect.  In his note to Stimson, Mayer noted that opposition to the 
naval mission’s continued executive control of Peru’s Navy was becoming widespread, and 
that, in addition to the potential difficulties that could flow from having U.S. officers in 
control of the Navy in the event of a coup against Leguía (which would no doubt invite 
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attacks on the United States in the Peruvian congress), there was among Peruvian naval 
officers “a growing feeling that after ten years of administrative control and training 
received, they should now have administrative control.”
91
  In a later assessment Pye 
concurred with the Chargé and expressed “sympathy” with the Peruvian officers’ position, 
noting that a belief existed “among the higher ranking officers” that “after ten years training 
by the Mission, they are capable of self administration.”  Moreover, Pye added, senior 
members of Peru’s naval officer corps recognized, as did the Americans, that “a revolution 




 The revolution came four days later, led by a politically-minded Army officer, 
Lieutenant Colonel Luis M. Sánchez Cerro, who led an uprising from his command in the 
southern city of Arequipa.  Within twenty-four hours three of Peru’s five military districts 
had abandoned Leguía and joined the revolution.  Public discontent, so widespread since the 
Peruvian economy had begun its Depression-induced tailspin, gave the revolution critical 
nourishment.  Harold Grow’s closeness to Leguía placed him at the center of the emerging 
turmoil, and complicated Washington’s efforts to manage and protect American interests 
amid the growing chaos.  It worked at cross-purposes with the naval mission’s efforts to 
assume an advisory status because, from the time the revolution broke out, Grow dedicated 
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himself to preserving the dictator’s hold on power.  It was Grow, for example, who first 
notified the officers of the naval mission on the afternoon of August 22nd that a revolution 
seemed afoot in the south of Peru.  And it was Grow who huddled with Leguía through the 
night of August 22nd plotting strategy to quell the uprising.  At Leguía’s insistence and over 
Admiral Pye’s strenuous objections, Grow then accepted the lead role in a flight operation 
intended to report to Leguía on conditions in the south and to “drop proclamations over 
Arequipa denying false charges against the Government which had been used to incite the 
revolution.”  Pye voiced his opposition to Grow’s participation, stressing that it was 
dangerously “inconsistent with his status as an officer of the Naval Mission.”  While 
dropping leaflets could hardly be considered an act of war, Pye admitted, carrying out the 
mission would require planes to land and refuel in areas of southern Peru where government 
control was not assured, meaning they could be subject to capture by elements of Sánchez 
Cerro’s revolutionary movement.  But there was little the naval mission chief could do to 
stop it, and Grow’s proximity to power again carried the day.  Following direct orders from 
President Leguía, airplanes flew south on August 23rd.  At the dictator’s personal insistence, 
Grow had gone as their leader.
93
  His involvement in the operation, although not technically a 
violation of the letter of his contract (which merely stated that Grow was “not obliged to take 
part in any foreign or civil war in which Peru is engaged”), certainly violated the spirit in 
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which it was written.
94
  A U.S. naval officer had become a partisan in an armed revolt within 
Peru. 
 Grow was captured by Sánchez Cerro’s forces the morning of August 24th in 
Camaná, approximately 430 miles south of Lima on the Peruvian coast, following an 
overnight refueling stop.  As the revolution gained momentum and neared Lima that 
afternoon, Leguía sensed that the end of his rule was near.  Within twenty-four hours of 
Grow’s capture, Leguía submitted his resignation to the Peruvian congress and sought refuge 
on the naval ship Almirante Grau, whose crew he hoped to persuade to take him to Panama.  
However, Sánchez Cerro, who had quickly consolidated his hold on Peru’s military 
establishment, ordered the ship attacked if it attempted to leave Callao with Leguía aboard.  
In short order the former president was handed over to the governing Junta for trial and 
judgment.
95
  Intent on trying Leguía and making examples out of those who had helped 
prolong his dictatorship, Sánchez Cerro quickly zeroed in on the highly visible Grow, going 
before the international press corps to call him “a mercenary who has been violating the rules 
of public right.”
96
  The former aviation chief remained in custody for more than four months 
in the wake of the revolution, facing charges that he had flown toward Arequipa in an armed 
aircraft with the intent to bomb revolutionists’ positions.   
 Securing Grow’s release from captivity became a significant ongoing concern for the 
Herbert Hoover administration throughout the latter months of 1930.  In defending himself, 
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the former Director General of Aviation – who for several years had held the naval mission at 
arm’s length while directly serving Leguía – employed a surprising line or argument.  Grow 
wrote to new U.S. Ambassador Fred M. Dearing that “the idea that may have occurred to you 
that I was independent of the Mission or had separated myself from it is probably due to the 
more or less independant [sic.] nature of my work in the country.  My present contract clearly 
states that I am a member of the above mentioned Mission.”
97
  He further stated that he had 
never taken an oath of allegiance to the Peruvian government and that, because he remained 
attached to the U.S. naval mission, the only person authorized in his contract to interpret his 
actions and administer discipline was that mission’s lead officer.
98
  At the same time, Grow 
felt the need to explain why he had gone much further than any other naval mission member 
in supporting Leguía during the revolution.  “The second clause of my contract,” he argued in 
a separate letter to Dearing, “is very specific in obliging me to submit myself to ‘obey’ all 
orders of the President of the Republic and the Minister of Marine.”
99
   
 Caught in the middle of an international diplomatic spat, Grow clearly tried to walk 
back from the modus operandi that had governed his activities as Leguía’s Director General 
of Aviation.  His release on January 1, 1931 came only after several months of diplomatic 
negotiation helped convince a Peruvian court of inquiry that Grow had not flown to Arequipa 
with hostile intent.
100
  In the end, though, the energy with which he served Leguía made him 
a polarizing figure in the highly-charged political environment that developed in Peru in 1929 
and 1930.  His deep involvement in Peru’s sovereign affairs had caused considerable 
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difficulty for U.S. foreign policy.  And perhaps more clearly than any previous episode, the 
Grow affair exposed with devastating clarity the problems that could flow from allowing 
American military personnel to serve as integral parts of another nation’s defense 
establishment. 
POST-LEGUÍA TURMOIL IN PERU 
 
 What followed Leguía’s overthrow was one of the most turbulent periods in Peru’s 
political history, one that required the United States to retreat from the intimate ties it forged 
with Peru throughout the Oncenio.  The challenge for U.S. policy in the month and years 
following the dictator’s downfall was finding a more cautious approach to relations that 
acknowledged the disfavor with which a majority of Peruvians, suffering through a 
devastating economic depression and alienated by years of U.S.-backed dictatorship, had 
come to view the United States.
101
  Peru’s political turmoil during these years was driven in 
large measure by the economic chaos that continued to wreak havoc in the Peruvian economy 
throughout 1931 and 1932.  The prices of Peru’s three most valuable agricultural exports – 
sugar, cotton, and wool – plummeted by 22-percent, 42-percent, and 52-percent, respectively, 
during the period.  The nation’s extractive industries (principally copper and oil production), 
which had eclipsed agriculture to produce the largest share of Peru’s exports under Leguía, 
experienced similarly precipitous price declines in the face of a collapse in international 
demand.  Imports of finished goods, on which the raw material export-oriented Peruvian 
economy depended, dropped by half as Peruvians’ purchasing power fell victim to a 
depreciating currency, tightening credit markets, and a demand-killing combination of wage 
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cuts and growing unemployment.
102
  Anti-U.S. sentiment, which had built up considerably 
while Leguía was still in power, continued to grow even after he was gone.  It reached a 
breaking point in late 1931 when laborers of the American-owned Cerro de Pasco mining 
company, protesting layoffs and wage cuts occasioned by falling export prices, clashed 
violently with police at the company’s Mal Paso hydroelectric station.  Thirteen miners died 
in the confrontation, as did three American employees of the company when the 
demonstrators, outraged at the conduct of the police, proceeded to ransack the station.
103
   
 U.S. efforts to reframe policy toward Peru were further complicated by the anti-
Leguía and anti-American political leanings of Peru’s new political leadership.  While met 
initially with broad public approbation, the anti-Leguía coup’s success could not by itself 
begin to solve the nation’s underlying economic problems or the fiscal crisis they had 
produced.  Serving as the head of the provisional junta that took control following Leguía’s 
ouster, Sánchez Cerro enjoyed several months of relative popularity.  His political standing 
had begun to erode, however, by late 1930 amid seemingly intractable economic difficulties 
and growing opposition from political foes, chiefly the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria 
Americana (APRA, a leftist political party founded in opposition to the kind foreign political 
and economic penetration on which Leguía had built his Oncenio) as well as from individuals 
within Peru’s military establishment who resented Sánchez Cerro’s dogged pursuit of the 
presidency.
104
  Sánchez Cerro’s political maneuvering angered a number of his fellow 
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military officers, who believed the architect of the anti-Leguía coup should resign his 
position with the junta before making a play to carve out a long-term political future.  He 
refused, however, and scheduled elections for late March of 1931.  As Daniel Masterson 
notes, within weeks of Sánchez Cerro’s February announcement of elections, Peru descended 
into “open rebellion” and was “on the verge of civil war.”  Sánchez Cerro sought to defuse 
the potentially explosive situation in the only way he could, by agreeing to leave the scene 
through temporary exile in France.  It was a short-term political calculation.  Although his 
political enemies tried to prevent it, Sánchez Cerro returned to Peru in early July to contest 
the election that, in his absence, had been scheduled for October. 
 Sánchez Cerro’s subsequent electoral triumph helped escalate what up to that point 
had been mainly a political competition into a violent confrontation between APRA, which 
saw his victory as illegitimate, and conservative political forces aligned with the new 
president.  Fearful that Sánchez Cerro would mobilize the power of the state in a campaign to 
destroy their movement after his inauguration, APRA members turned to violence to effect 
change they believed (unjustifiably, according to the Peruvian historian Jorge Basadre) they 
had been cheated out of at the ballot box.
105
  Violent clashes between APRA activists and the 
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armed forces ensued.  Vowing to meet violence with force, Sánchez Cerro moved almost 
immediately to crush APRA once and for all, thus validating the Apristas’ fears of the state’s 
hostility.
106
  Within weeks, in late December 1931, the president ordered a police raid on 
APRA headquarters in the city of Trujillo, in northwestern Peru, that wounded several party 
leaders.  Less than two months later, armed with near-dictatorial powers after the Peruvian 
Congress had declared martial law, Sánchez Cerro ordered the arrest and exile of all twenty-
three Aprista lawmakers that had been elected to Congress during the same October elections 
that had delivered him the presidency.  The president intensified his efforts yet again 
following a failed attempt on his life in early March by a young Aprista gunman inside a 
church in the Miraflores section of Lima.  The assassination attempt not only hardened 
Sánchez Cerro’s resolve to destroy APRA, but heightened his determination to capture its 
leader, Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, who he believed was directly responsible.   
 Haya’s capture by government forces on May 6, 1932 should have marked the 
crowning success of Sánchez Cerro’s anti-Aprista efforts.  However, it was followed quickly 
by events that proved that the conflict with APRA was only growing more intense.  The very 
next day, around 9:00pm on May 7th, enlisted sailors onboard the Peruvian naval cruiser 
Coronel Bolegnesi in Callao harbor (ten miles from central Lima) overpowered the guards on 
board their ship, captured and locked up its officers, and ignited a rebellion they hoped would 
spread throughout the Navy.  The mutinous sailors could perhaps have been forgiven if their 
grievances centered entirely on pay, which had been irregular because of the crisis 
confronting the national treasury, or living conditions.  But the demands they announced 
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once the rebellion was underway ranged beyond narrowly naval concerns.  The sailors, who 
Robert Scheina notes came from the “lowest grades”
107
 of the naval service, presented a 
proclamation calling for a number of the things that Peruvians suffering through economic 
depression might have expected (and perhaps even sympathized with) from disgruntled 
sailors: better treatment of enlisted personnel, greater regulation of the promotion process, 
better quality food, and limits on the length of naval cruises.  Their fifth demand, however, 
that power be transferred from the military government of Sánchez Cerro to a new civilian 
administration, had a distinctly political tone and raised red flags within the president’s inner 
circle.   
 Sánchez Cerro, who was suspicious of the Navy because of its close relations with 
Leguía, believed the hand of APRA was behind the Callao naval rebellion.  His suspicion 
was later proven to have some foundation in fact.  As Peruvian scholar Jorge Ortiz Sotelo 
notes, during the Bolognesi’s 1932 summer cruise stopover at a U.S. naval base in Panama, a 
number of the ship’s junior enlisted personnel had met with exiled APRA representatives, 
who shared with them the hope that, with the Navy’s help, “there would be an uprising 
[against Sánchez Cerro] across several departments of the government.”
108
  Amid the tense 
political environment of 1932, though, mere suspicion of APRA involvement was basis 
enough in Sánchez Cerro’s view to take action.  He ordered the mutinous crews be attacked 
if they did not surrender by 5:00am the next morning.  An hour before that deadline, the 
president issued a communiqué calling the rebellion as “part of a revolutionary social plan” 
that had as its goal not just the overthrow of the Peruvian government, but the sparking of a 
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broader revolution of “Communist character” throughout South America.
109
  When the 
leaders of the rebellion failed to heed the government’s demands to surrender, the Navy’s 
loyal elements, which were able to coalesce only because of the efforts of a few key 
personnel who escaped from the Bolognesi as the mutiny first got underway, opened fire in 
the early morning hours using three naval aircraft and the deck gun of the submarine R-4 
(one of four submarines purchased from the Electric Boat Company during Leguía’s reign).  
Within minutes the mutineers hoisted a white flag above the Bolognesi, whose hull had been 
pierced by a government volley that set its oil tank ablaze. 
 Although APRA leaders subsequently disclaimed any operational involvement in the 
Callao naval mutiny of 1932, the party did see the rebellious sailors as making common 
cause.  In turn, they took the uprising’s failure as an opportunity to launch an even broader 
offensive against the Sánchez Cerro government.  APRA’s commitment to violent, 
revolutionary action hardened.  Its leaders began preparing to stage a major civil-military 
revolt they hoped would capture the city of Trujillo (APRA’s power base) and expand 
throughout the country.  The plan’s success depended on the quick defeat of the 
undermanned Peruvian Army garrison stationed there, which had more arms and ammunition 
than its skeletal crew could effectively protect.  Moving well before their planned stepping-
off date, Aprista rebels, many of whom were irate sugar workers, attacked the undermanned 
garrison on July 7th and captured it in four hours with relative ease.  The city of Trujillo fell 
under APRA control shortly thereafter.  However, this rapid success, coming early as it did, 
could not be duplicated in other regions of the country where APRA activists were not nearly 
as prepared to move as were their counterparts in Trujillo.  As a result, the revolt failed to 
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expand much beyond Trujillo.  The Sánchez Cerro government, facing an isolated local 
revolt rather than the broad-based uprising APRA leaders had anticipated, responded by 
unleashing a furious military response against the Aprista rebels there.  On July 10th and 
11th, government forces would pour into Trujillo and crush the revolt.   
 APRA’s de facto leader, Agustín Haya de la Torre (brother of the party’s jailed 
founder), and his inner circle managed to flee the city ahead of government forces’ arrival.  
Those who remained, though, would face the full wrath of Sánchez Cerro’s anti-APRA fury.  
Not content to stand idly by and wait for an onslaught from government forces, the Apristas 
lashed out, executing the thirty-five Army and Guardia Civil personnel they had been 
holding since taking the garrison on the 7th.  Five of the bodies were disfigured beyond 
recognition.  These executions enraged Sánchez Cerro, whose government forces unleashed a 
terrible response after wresting the city from APRA control.  Moving house to house through 
the city, Peruvian troops rounded up all male residents, young and old, whose shoulders and 
index fingers showed bruises or skin irritations that could be attributed to recent use of a 
firearm.
110
  Whether one was a bona fide Aprista or not was irrelevant to Sánchez Cerro, who 
intended to destroy the party once and for all.  The suspected rebels were brought to the 
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 The violent struggle roiling Peru’s political establishment reached its apex just as a 
border crisis with Colombia threatened to engulf Peru in an international war.   On August 
31, 1932, a band of Peruvian filibusters, angry about Peru’s cession of territory to Colombia 
during the Leguía years, stormed the Amazon River port of Leticia in an attempt to recover 
it.
112
  The move gave Peru’s domestic political crisis a complicated international dimension.  
Sánchez Cerro, whose anti-Aprista campaign had helped buoy his popularity despite the 
nation’s declining economic fortunes, initially condemned the filibusters’ action as the 
isolated work of a few rogue communists, and pledged to work toward a settlement that 
would preserve Colombia’s claim to the city.  He did not count, however, on APRA 
exploiting the crisis to try and undermine his government.  Almost immediately the party 
began producing propaganda hailing the filibusters as patriotic heroes, and criticizing 
Sánchez Cerro for failing to back their brave action.  The efforts paid off, as public opinion 
quickly trended in the filibusters’ favor and against the president’s position.  In an attempt to 
forestall an erosion in his popularity, which he saw as vital to waging an effective fight 
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against APRA, Sánchez Cerro reversed course and publicly threw his support behind the 
filibusters.  In doing so he accepted the risk that his action might lead, as in fact it did, to an 
outbreak of hostilities with Colombia.  Historian Frederick Pike calls Sánchez Cerro’s 
decision reluctant, and argues that it was made not only to preserve the popularity he felt he 
needed to maintain in order to successfully pursue his overriding objective of destroying 
APRA, but because to the lowly Lieutenant Colonel, who had experienced a meteoric rise 
from a mid-level Army command to the Peruvian presidency in little more than a year, public 
approbation was a “supreme good in itself.”
113
  As Peter Klarén notes, it was certainly a 
decision Sánchez Cerro made with the politics of Peru’s deteriorating economy in mind.  By 
mid-1932 the former soldier had had little success combating the effects of the depression, 
and had resorted to heightened deficit spending in an effort to mollify government and 
military personnel who, he feared, could pose a threat if irregularities in their pay were not 
resolved.
114
  But the end result was that, whether he did so reluctantly or not, Sánchez Cerro 
had moved Peru toward war with Colombia in order to enhance his domestic political 
standing and advance his campaign against APRA.  Shortly after coming out publicly in 
favor of the Leticia filibusters, Sánchez Cerro appointed General Oscar Benavides, Peru’s 
most widely-respected military figure and a former provisional president of the nation, to 
command of operations in the Leticia region.  In short order, Benavides ordered the 
conscription of all males between the ages of twenty-one and twenty-five.
115
  With Peru and 
Colombia were on the verge of war, the position of the U.S. naval mission in Lima grew 
quite tenuous. 
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THE END OF THE U.S. NAVAL MISSION 
 
 The more cautious orientation of U.S. policy after Leguía left the naval mission, a 
product of Washington’s closeness with the dictator and a tangible investment in his rule, 
somewhat in limbo.  In the immediate weeks and months following the revolution, the key 
question confronting the mission was what its continuing functions should be amid the new, 
highly uncertain political conditions.  Very quickly its chief, Pye, decided on the least 
controversial option.  The mission’s principal focus, he decided, would be to build on what 
Peruvians and Americans alike had long recognized as the biggest success of the mission’s 
tenure to date: enhancing Peru’s system of naval education.  In the new, post-Leguía political 
environment, in which Peruvian officers exercised executive control of their own Navy 
(including the Escuela Naval), this meant the creation and development of a Naval War 
College to prepare mid-level officers for senior leadership positions.  Establishment of such 
an institution had been on the U.S. mission’s agenda at least since mid-1929, when Admiral 
Pye first endorsed the idea as a way of enhancing the professionalism of the Navy’s officer 
corps.  It was such a popular idea that even a noted opponent of the naval mission, a retired 
Rear Admiral and Senator from Peru’s northwestern Lambayeque province, called in early 
1930 for mission members to devote their efforts to “the creation of a School for Advanced 
Naval Study.”  Such an institution, he explained, could educate officers on “the experiences 
of the last war” and to “explain the evolution which has occurred in strategic and technical 
principles” as a result.
116
 
 But efforts to translate those plans into reality gained momentum only after the 
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mission relinquished executive control and assumed an advisory status.  In mid-September, 
little more than two weeks after Leguía’s ouster, Pye wrote to the Director of Naval 
Intelligence noting that the prevailing attitude in the Peruvian Navy had become “completely 
demoralized” since the change in government, and that, given the difficult political 
environment and the “impossibility of extensive operations due to the financial depression,” 
the mission would endeavor “to emphasize naval education, in order to keep the minds of the 
personnel occupied.”
117
  Naval mission members threw themselves into the task.  In October, 
on Peru’s “Navy Day,” the mission marked the inauguration of the Escuela Superior de 
Guerra Naval (Naval War College) with an initial class of six officers, including two naval 
aviators, and the opening of an abbreviated initial academic year of five months.
118
  In late 
November, Pye reported that mission members’ lectures at the College were progressing 
“satisfactorily,” and that students reported their course of study to be “the most complete 
discussion of the subject of naval warfare in the Spanish language.”  As the War College was 
in its infancy, Pye noted, instructors could do little more than expose students to “the great 
field of knowledge of naval operations” and “begin the compilation of material for future 
instruction.”
119
  Still, by early 1931 the U.S. officers’ efforts on the War College made 
enough of a positive impression on the Sánchez-Cerro government that, instead of seeking its 
recall to Washington, the president sought renewal of the naval mission’s contracts.  It was an 
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unlikely turn of events, considering how Sánchez Cerro’s had viewed the mission (calling 
Harold Grow a “mercenary”) immediately after toppling Leguía.   Although Peru’s financial 
difficulties would require a reduction in the number of officers assigned to the mission, the 
Peruvian government expressed a desire to renew two members’ contracts for the sole 
purpose of “conducting” the Naval War College.
120
 
 Yet even in an advisory capacity the mission’s work at the Naval War College posed 
challenges for U.S. foreign policy, as mission members soon found themselves in the midst 
of the turmoil over Leticia.  As a routine part of his advisory duties at the Naval War College, 
William O. Spears (Captain, U.S. Navy), who took over as chief of the naval mission in late 
1931, regularly delivered lectures (in Spanish) on a variety of topics on everything from 
international relations to naval strategy and tactics, as his predecessor, Pye, and fellow naval 
mission members had done.  In July 1932, the month before the Peruvian filibusters’ move 
on Leticia, he delivered a series of lectures that featured a scenario closely resembling the 
developing imbroglio with Colombia.
121
  The purpose of this scenario, as others he and his 
colleagues developed in their lectures, was to provide students with a set of strategic and 
operational problems for which they would have to develop and recommend solutions.  In 
this case, Spears presented a situation in which a state of war existed between Peru and 
Colombia, and in which the Peruvian Navy planned to dispatch a number of gunboats on an 
expedition from the Peruvian port of Iquitos (on the Amazon River) to Colombian territory 
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on the north bank of the Putumayo River.
122
  Because of the geographic orientation of both 
rivers, which flowed west-to-east within Peru and converged at a point inside Brazilian 
territory, the expedition would require the Peruvian vessels to travel “several hundred miles” 
through Brazilian waters before reaching the portion of the Putumayo comprising the 
Peruvian-Colombian border.  Although the Peruvian students’ findings and recommendations 
in response to the scenario are not known, available evidence indicates that, in closing out 
discussion of the issue, Spears lectured that under the circumstances such an expedition could 
proceed because existing treaty arrangements between Peru and Brazil permitted it.  
Specifically, he noted, a 1909 commercial treaty between the two nations conferred on 
Peruvian vessels – including, Spears concluded, vessels of war – the right to pass through 
“such Brazilian rivers as head wholly or partly in Peru.”  Moreover, he concluded, that right 
was confirmed by the protocols of the Barcelona Convention and Statute on Freedom of 
Transit (1921), which guaranteed that Peru could “legally transport land forces and armed 
vessels across the territory and waters of the Amazon to the Putumayo zone.”
123
 
 Informed of Spears’s July remarks in early September, only after Peruvians’ seizure 
of Leticia, State Department reaction was swift and forceful.  Upon receiving the dispatch 
summarizing the lecture’s content, Selden Chapin, a staffer within the State Department’s 
Division of Latin American Affairs, argued to that division’s chief, Edwin C. Wilson, that 
even though the naval mission was laboring in an advisory capacity in Peru, “Spears is still 
skating over extremely thin ice in lecturing on such subjects as this.”  “His discussion,” 
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Chapin concluded, “might easily be construed as ‘advice’ by the ignorant Peruvian 
military.”
124
  The concerns Chapin raised in this situation were not unlike those the 
Department had expressed in late 1923 when naval mission chief Clark Woodward had made 
his recommendation to dramatically expand the size of the Peruvian Navy’s operating fleet: if 
strategic decisions affecting the stability of Peru’s fragile relations with a neighboring 
country appeared to emanate from the United States, American interests and policy in the 
region could be jeopardized.  The State Department was especially sensitive to implications 
of U.S. meddling in this case because, since coming into office in 1929, the Herbert Hoover 
administration had pursued a broad new policy that renounced interventionism in Latin 
American nations’ internal affairs.
125
  Moreover, following Leguía’s August 1930 overthrow, 
the U.S. naval mission was supposed to be working in a strictly advisory capacity vis-á-vis 
the Peruvian Navy.  Peruvians were supposed to be making the decisions and devising the 
plans that affected their own national defense.  Secretary of State Henry Stimson made that 
point abundantly clear in a September 30, 1932 directive to the American Embassy in Lima, 
ordering that “it is essential that members of the [naval] Mission refrain from participating in 
any way whatsoever in formulation of war plans directed against Colombia.”
126
 
 Meddling was certainly not how Spears or the U.S. Ambassador to Peru, Fred 
Dearing, interpreted the officer’s activities at the Peruvian Naval War College.  In their view, 
Spears was merely fulfilling his contractual obligations to the Peruvian government.  At issue 
was whether American instruction at the War College should be regarded as a purely 
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academic exercise, in which scenarios presented to Peruvian students for their use were 
merely theoretical, or whether it constituted a form of strategic advice and, as such, a direct 
U.S. contribution to Peru’s war planning efforts.
127
  It was a very fine line, and as subsequent 
correspondence between Dearing and the State Department demonstrates, it was entirely too 
difficult a line for the United States to walk given the political conditions then prevalent 
within Peru.  In a “strictly confidential” telegram to Secretary Stimson on September 28th 
(two days before receiving Stimson’s directive to refrain from such activity), Dearing made it 
clear that, in practical terms, he believed that Spears’s work did represent a direct 
contribution to Peru’s preparations for war with Colombia.  However, he argued, it did not 
constitute U.S. interference because, by the contracts Spears and his fellow officers had 
signed, they had to “perforce take part in preparing war plans since their contracts only 
relieve them from duty in case of a declaration of war.”
128
  It was an argument that had merit, 
and it pointed to a very real problem with maintaining a naval mission with even advisory 
status in Peru after Leguía’s fall.  The State Department had gone to great lengths since the 
first renewal of the naval mission’s contracts with Leguía in 1922 to protect U.S. personnel 
from becoming involved in Peru’s armed conflicts, both domestic and international, by 
insisting that clauses be inserted into each contract expressly forbidding mission members’ 
participation.  But in this case, sporadic fighting between Colombian forces and the Peruvian 
filibusters at Leticia (who enjoyed some support from the Peruvian Army) had not risen to 
the level of all-out war.  Neither Colombia nor Peru had actually made a declaration.  And no 
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member of the U.S. naval mission occupied an official position that had anything at all to do 
with devising or implementing war plans.  The mission’s activities were confined to 
instruction of mid-level officers at the Naval War College, while the General Staffs of Peru’s 
Navy and Army managed the nation’s operating forces and plans for their employment in 
war.  In Dearing’s view, such instruction as Spears provided was well within the limits set in 
his contract with the Peruvian government. 
 Yet somehow the naval mission was at the center of another diplomatic high-wire act.  
In the State Department’s view, the crux of the problem was that, in the course of his work, 
Spears had offered his students an interpretation of international law that could easily have 
had more than theoretical applicability: he may have intended the scenario portraying 
Peruvian-Colombian hostilities to be purely academic, but there was no way of keeping the 
Peruvian Navy from interpreting it otherwise.  Because of this, despite the advisory and 
academic nature of Spears’s work, it became clear to the State Department that his lecture 
could have directly influenced matters of war and peace between Peru and Colombia.  In the 
State Department’s view it marked the reemergence of the problem that had plagued the U.S. 
naval mission since the Woodward incident years before – namely, did U.S. officers make 
recommendations and offer their interpretations in their capacities as Peruvian naval officers, 
or on behalf of the United States?  Were they purely Peruvian assets, or did they act as 
emissaries of U.S. policy?  Under Leguía, when the naval mission exercised executive 
control over the Peruvian Navy, the lines of authority were clear even if these questions could 
not always be answered in a manner satisfactory to U.S. foreign policy makers in 
Washington.  But in the unsettled post-Leguía political environment, it became even more 
difficult to understand, let alone categorize, the impact of the naval mission’s activities. 
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 The message embedded in Secretary Stimson’s solution to the problem, conveyed to 
Ambassador Dearing both on September 30th and again on October 12th (when he instructed 
that the mission “refrain absolutely from participation in any Peruvian operations preparatory 
to war” or face recall to the United States
129
), was clear.  Diplomacy in such delicate 
situations must be left to the diplomats.  Dearing responded appropriately, cabling that “the 
Naval Mission’s duties are now strictly routine and have nothing to do with any South 
American country.”
130
  It was a terse follow-up to a more lengthy dispatch in which Dearing, 
who was close to Spears personally and who saw great value in the work the officer had done 
at the Peruvian Naval War College, had retreated from his earlier assertion that Spears had 
made direct contributions to Peruvian war planning.  Directly addressing his earlier 
statement, the Ambassador wrote that, as an advisory body, the naval mission’s “primary 
endeavor is to counsel and train the officers of the Peruvian Navy,” work that entailed 
instructing them “in the methods of preparation of war plans,” but which never required U.S. 
personnel to “take part in making these plans either as a Mission or as individuals.”  War 
plans were devised and implemented by the General Staffs of the Peruvian Navy and Army, 
Dearing further noted, and those staffs “may or may not use material collected by the student 
officers of the Naval War College in their regular studies of theoretical situations and war 
games.”  This was the heart of the problem to Secretary Stimson and the State Department as 
a whole: given the volatility that had characterized Peru’s internal politics since Leguía’s 
overthrow, and given the murky situation between Peru and Colombia over Leticia, the naval 
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mission’s work at the War College left far too much of U.S. policy to chance.
131
 
 Dearing disagreed but carried out the Secretary’s instructions.  In accordance with 
Stimson’s directives, the Ambassador reported that the U.S. naval mission was “abstaining 
from taking part in the studies relating to the Colombian situation,” while Spears had taken 
care to remove himself from “even passive participation” in the study of possible Peruvian 
naval action against Colombia.
132
  However, as the Ambassador noted in a separate dispatch 
a few days later, this did not change the fact that, in his view, “a naval mission must, as all 
military missions must, concern itself with theoretical war problems.”  It was quite natural, 
he wrote, that in countries such as Peru where “there is no experience or developed ability in 
making of plans,” American missions should be willing to provide such instruction “within 
the proper limits,” as, in his view, Spears had done in Peru.  “In peace there would be no 
criticism of such activity,” he concluded.  Dearing’s fear was that the difficult circumstances 
surrounding the naval mission’s work at Peru’s Naval War College might scare the United 
States away from providing such valuable services to Latin American nations in the future.
133
  
A retreat from this sort of engagement, his October 6th dispatch to Stimson concluded, would 
be unfortunate, despite the periodic diplomatic complications the U.S. naval mission’s 
activities in Peru had caused.  Throughout the mission’s tenure but especially since assuming 
its advisory role in August of 1930, its officers had done much to facilitate closer embassy 
contacts with Peruvian government officials.  Moreover, Dearing stressed, the mission had 
directly supported U.S. commercial interests in the country.  But perhaps most importantly, it 
had helped sustain the “pro-American” orientation of Peru’s Navy and aviation services “at a 
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 With little left to do, the U.S. naval mission’s days in Peru were numbered.  In his 
October 1932 monthly summary of the mission’s activities, Spears pinpointed the problem 
the mission then confronted.  To comply with Washington’s new orders “to do nothing 
unneutral” while also meeting its contractual obligation to the Peruvian government “to do 
everything possible to increase their [the Peruvian Navy’s] efficiency,” he wrote, was an 
impossibility.  Ever since making the transition from executive control to advisory status, the 
naval mission had been devoted entirely to Peru’s Naval War College, and absent carrying 
out meaningful instruction there, he reported, there was little of substance that U.S. personnel 
could provide to the Peruvian Navy.  Under the circumstances, he concluded, it appeared that 
the “first aim of the Mission now is to keep the Mission going as long as possible hoping that 
the present situation [with Colombia] will be amicably adjusted” – the implication being that, 
with peace between Peru and Colombia restored, new officers might be sent and the naval 
mission could resume normal advisory duties.
135
  As it turned out, however, time was not on 
the naval mission’s side.  By late 1932 and early 1933, several developments – the worsening 
fiscal crisis confronting the Peruvian government, seemingly chronic political instability, the 
intensification of Peruvian-Colombian hostilities over Leticia, and a rising tide of anti-
Americanism fed by Peruvians’ lingering anger over U.S. support for Leguía and the 
deepening economic depression – ensured that the naval mission members’ current contracts 
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would be their last.  In January of 1933 Sánchez-Cerro declined to extend the mission’s 
contracts further, and in early March its members departed Callao on a Grace Line vessel 
bound for New York.
136
  The naval mission’s nearly thirteen-year tenure in Peru was over.  
Even so, the U.S. Navy would remain a key player in the conduct of U.S. diplomacy toward 
Peru.  
                                                          
136
 Chief of Naval Operations to All Bureaus and Offices, “U.S. Naval Mission to Peru; discontinuing of,” 
March 28, 1933, RG 38, Entry 48-A, Box 4, National Archives. 
178 
 
CHAPTER 4: A NEW NAVAL DIPLOMACY, 1928-37 
 
 As the Great Depression deepened and Peruvians expressed growing anger with the 
United States, American policy toward that nation entered a period of adjustment.  For eleven 
years, from 1919 to 1930, Washington had maintained intimate ties with Peru, offering close, 
continuing support to a Leguía dictatorship that, although it fostered remarkable economic 
growth, repressed the will of its people and alienated a substantial share of the Peruvian 
population.  From the time of President Augusto Leguía’s ouster in August of 1930 through 
1932, U.S. foreign policy makers witnessed the after effects of that support as political 
turmoil, violence, and anti-American sentiment within Peru accelerated while economic 
conditions steadily deteriorated.  Similar dynamics played out simultaneously across much of 
Latin America, as governments in a majority of Latin American countries experienced coups 
or revolutions between 1930 and 1933.
1
  Increasingly sensitive to criticisms of American 
imperialism that were emanating from the nations to its south, Washington began working to 
fashion a more cautious, hands-off policy appropriate to the increasingly delicate situation.
2
  
President Herbert Hoover turned U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America away from armed 
interventionism and his successor, Franklin D. Roosevelt, embraced the policy and gave it its 
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enduring moniker, the Good Neighbor Policy.
3
  Both realized that for the policy to ultimately 
be successful, the United States would have to make attempts to alter negative popular 
attitudes of Latin Americans toward the United States.  As this chapter will discuss, both also 
saw the U.S. Navy playing a central role in that effort.  Accordingly, throughout Latin 
America, under the banner of good neighborism U.S. naval vessels and personnel engaged in 
public diplomacy aimed, among other things, at demonstrating neighborly respect for the 
sovereignty of Latin American nations.  This meant that, just as it had during Leguía’s 
Oncenio, the U.S. Navy would play an integral part in shaping U.S. policy toward Peru.  
WASHINGTON’S SEARCH FOR A POLICY 
 
 The escalation of political violence within Peru and the unfolding crisis over Leticia 
made settling on a new policy an urgent matter for U.S. foreign policymakers in Washington.  
The United States had already perceived a need to craft a new framework for relations with 
Peru at the time of Leguía’s fall, but throughout the nearly two years between his overthrow 
and mid-1932, American policy was characterized by drift.  The fundamental problem, U.S. 
Ambassador Fred Dearing wrote in September of 1931, was that throughout Leguía’s eleven 
years in power Washington had cast its diplomacy toward Peru in far too personal terms, 
carrying out relations more with Leguía personally than with the nation as a whole.  The 
dictator’s friendship and affection for the United States had been “so intense and profuse,” he 
wrote, “that it amounted to favoritism” and constituted an “addiction” that the majority of 
Peruvians came to resent.  Washington had erred in catering to the dictator’s “unlimited 
                                                          
3
 Throughout this work, when referring to the formal, non-interventionist policy pursued by the Hoover and 
Roosevelt Administrations, I will use the phrase “Good Neighbor Policy,” complete with capitalization.  Often, 
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appetite for flattery,” he continued, and had unwisely heaped “fulsome praise” on him “with 
no sense apparently of how ridiculous...and how inevitably the unwarranted praise and 
fulsomeness would bedevil our future relations.”  As a result, he wrote, in the post-Leguía era 
Peruvian public opinion was characterized by “suspicion and dislike” of the United States – a 
situation made worse by the fact that “it had to be suppressed during Leguía’s time” and 
because Peruvians believed that the United States had aided the dictator in doing so.  
Speaking to the enormity of the challenge confronting Washington, Dearing noted that 
although it was animated by an “intense nationalism,” by anti-Americanism, and by a 
revulsion to all things Leguísta, the Sánchez Cerro government came “nearer to expressing 
the real feelings of the Peruvian people” than any government in recent Peruvian history.
4
 
 The problem facing the United States, then, was how to undo the damage wrought by 
more than a decade of invited meddling in Peru’s internal affairs while still protecting the 
economic and strategic interests that had caused cozy relations with Leguía to make sense in 
the first place.  The delicate situation in Peru was part and parcel of the broader challenge the 
United States faced in recasting its foreign policy approach to Latin America in the late 
1920s and early 1930s.  By the time Franklin D. Roosevelt assumed the U.S. presidency in 
early 1933, the costs (both financial and political) of U.S. intervention in Latin America had 
become unacceptably high.  Even though American foreign policymakers like Henry L. 
Stimson, Hoover’s Secretary of State, believed interventions had been well-intentioned and 
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in the “best interests” of the countries where they took place, the repeated use of force to 
protect U.S. interests in Central America and the Caribbean had “instead of promoting 
feelings of friendship...initiated feelings of hate and hostility” throughout Latin America 
towards the United States.
5
  As Stimson noted, the challenge facing the United States in Latin 
America was developing policies so that “less and less pressure would be necessary on the 
part of the United States to keep matters straight.”
6
 
 Amid the intense unrest of early 1933 in Peru, when Sánchez Cerro was trying to 
mobilize the nation for war with Colombia even as its economy slumped to new depths, 
Ambassador Dearing proposed a policy he believed would do just that.  A veteran diplomat, 
Dearing saw problems with the longstanding U.S. policy of dispatching warships to Latin 
American countries in times of crisis.  He wrote to Secretary Stimson that, fundamentally, 
because United States had long adhered to a broad policy of armed interventionism in Latin 
America, when U.S. naval vessels arrived in Latin ports for any purpose, they were more 
often than not “interpreted as having ulterior purposes and being in a sense admonitory.”  
Moreover, he continued, U.S. interventionism had stoked broad resentment in South America 
despite the fact that, in practice, all interventions carried out under the “Roosevelt Corollary” 
had been confined to the Caribbean and Central America.  The solution, Dearing argued, was 
not to reduce the U.S. Navy’s visibility in Latin America, but to increase it.  The United 
States should begin sending its naval vessels into ports throughout Latin America on a 
regular basis, he urged, in order to help the peoples of those countries “become accustomed 
to the sight of our war vessels engaged in friendly missions.”  The idea behind Dearing’s 
proposal was that if American naval visits were regular occurrences, individual visits would 
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not “stir up resentment and excitement” as had become the norm.  Higher visibility would 
have a calming effect in countries such as Peru that were suffering through serious bouts of 
depression-induced economic and political instability, would give confidence to U.S. citizens 
conducting business there, and would, in general, render American interests throughout Latin 
America more secure.  It was “only common sense to take preventive measures and to take 
them in time,” he concluded.  Doing so would ensure the creation of an atmosphere 




 Coming as it did at a peak moment in Peru’s political and international crises, and 
during a month when the U.S. economy sunk to alarming new lows, Dearing’s 
recommendation landed in the State Department with a thud.
8
  The Assistant Chief of the 
Department’s Division of Latin American Affairs, H. Freeman Matthews, strongly disagreed 
with the Ambassador’s prescription, writing in response that visits by U.S. warships to Latin 
American ports were “usually misunderstood and cause[d] friction” – a conclusion with 
which the Department’s most senior Latin America hand, Edwin C. Wilson, and Assistant 
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Secretary of State Francis White both concurred.
9
  But their shared opposition to naval 
cruises for goodwill purposes would prove to be short-lived.  Relative calm would fall over 
Peru’s domestic and international crises by mid-1933, following the ascent of General Oscar 
Benavides to the presidency after Sánchez Cerro’s assassination by a lone Aprista gunman.  
Benavides quickly negotiated a settlement of the Leticia problem with Colombia and, at 
home, retreated from Sánchez Cerro’s hard line position on APRA by lifting martial law and 
allowing the party to resume limited political operations.
10
   
 While calmer conditions began to prevail in Peru, the State Department started 
warming up to the idea of using U.S. naval vessels for goodwill diplomacy throughout Latin 
America.  That is because in his first months in office the new President of the United States, 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, had proclaimed a “Good Neighbor Policy” renouncing armed 
intervention in Latin America and committing the United States to the shaping of “an 
atmosphere of close understanding and cooperation” in the Americas.
11
  It was not a policy 
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born, as some scholars have suggested, entirely of U.S. altruism.
12
  Although backing away 
from the tactic of armed intervention, U.S. foreign policymakers were intent on maintaining 
the decisive sway the United States had spent more than a century painstakingly developing 
throughout Latin America.
13
  Washington’s embrace of non-intervention under the banner of 
good neighborism was calculated to maintain that hard-won influence, but to do so in a less 
obtrusive way.
14
  It was a clear departure from decades of heavy-handed intervention, and the 
United States would have to back it with substantial action.  As Washington began searching 
for tangible ways to demonstrate its good neighbor bonafides to Latin America, public 
exhibitions of goodwill assumed great importance.  To Roosevelt, who had served as 
Assistant Secretary of the Navy under President Woodrow Wilson and who had maintained a 




GOODWILL NAVAL DIPLOMACY BEFORE THE GOOD NEIGHBOR 
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 In order to understand the systematic implementation of goodwill naval cruising in 
Latin America under the Good Neighbor Policy, it is necessary to briefly examine the 
bureaucratic tug-of-war between the Navy and State Departments going back to the First 
World War.  Beginning with American involvement in that war, Navy and State Department 
officials alike began to recognize that naval power was becoming more integral to the 
conduct of U.S. policy toward Latin America.  Underlying that conviction was a shared sense 
that naval activity outside of combat operations was inherently diplomatic activity.  A useful 
tool for understanding the emergence of this consensus is the work of naval theorist Ken 
Booth, who defines “naval diplomacy” as the use of naval power to “affect the thinking and 
behaviour of other governments with little or no intention or expectation of using brute 
force.”
16
  Booth’s definition proceeds from the understanding that the versatility, mobility, 
range, and symbolic power of naval vessels make them more useful instruments of a nation’s 
diplomacy than other varieties of military power (such as ground armies or air forces).  That 
is because, as he argues, wherever a nation’s navy ventures in the world, its vessels are 
“small mobile pieces of national sovereignty” and carry with them the full weight of a 
nation’s intentions and commitments.
17
  This applies, he suggests, whether naval assets are 
engaged in a more coercive style of naval diplomacy, of the sort that often occupied the U.S. 
Navy in the Caribbean during the early 20th century, or whether they are carrying out actions 
aimed at fostering goodwill and enhancing the sponsor nation’s international “prestige” – 
actions of the type that became important as the United States abandoned interventionism in 
Latin America and began pursuing the good neighbor approach. 
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 The U.S. Navy had embraced a central role in carrying out the nation’s Latin America 
policy during the First World War, when it detached four armored cruisers from its Pacific 
Fleet for diplomatic duty in South America.  Under the command of William Banks Caperton 
(Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy), the ships’ objective was to cultivate friendly, pro-Allied 
sentiments among South America’s leading powers.  It was a mission that Caperton, who had 
spent several years leading “gunboat diplomacy” interventions in the Caribbean before the 
war, pursued with great enthusiasm.  From mid-1917 through the end of the war in late 1918, 
his squadron staged highly publicized goodwill visits to South American ports including Rio 
de Janeiro, Montevideo, Buenos Aires, and Valparaiso.  Sensing the need to connect with 
populations as well as leaders in those countries, in each port he orchestrated and financed 
activities designed to maximize locals’ contact with U.S. vessels and personnel, including 
concerts, parades, balls, and a variety of social gatherings.  It was a “wonderful chance,” to 
serve the American war effort, Caperton told his men – “a little different perhaps than we 
would do in battle, but nevertheless a means to an end.”
18
  His effectiveness as a wartime 
sailor-diplomat impressed the State Department.  In every country he visited, American 
diplomatic representatives sent glowing reports of his efforts back to Washington, the 
consensus being, as David Healy notes, that “no man...could have done better as a 
propagandist and advocate” of American interests.
19
 
 Encouraged by his successes and by the favor with which U.S. diplomats had greeted 
his efforts, the following year, just before retiring from naval service, Caperton urged the 
Navy Department to maintain an active role in the forefront of the nation’s diplomacy.  
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While the Navy’s primary mission was always to prepare for war, he wrote to Chief of Naval 
Operations William S. Benson, its important secondary mission was to maintain a presence 
in “all the important seacoast countries of the world” as a “visible and active manifestation of 
the friendships, and when necessary, the power of the United States.”  Such a presence was, 
“in the best sense of the word, national advertising,” he argued, that served to heighten U.S. 
prestige and yield great benefits “out of proportion with the cost” such operations entailed.  
Such an investment was, in his view, especially necessary in Latin America, where a 
permanent, friendly naval presence would “render enormous aid” not only to U.S. efforts to 
forge productive inter-American cooperation, but to nascent U.S. efforts to expand trade and 
roll back European commercial and strategic influence in South America.
20
  Coming as it did 
at a moment when State Department leaders were eager to expand U.S. strategic and 
commercial influence beyond the Caribbean to all of South America, Caperton’s 
recommendation met with “unhesitating” agreement when it arrived at Foggy Bottom.  
Policymakers in the U.S. Navy, on the other hand, swiftly rejected it.  Officers of the Navy’s 
Planning Committee did not want to detach any significant amount of the service’s overall 
force for permanent diplomatic duty.  Instead, they decided, it was better to maintain the bulk 
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 Although wary of making a broad, global commitment to diplomatic duty of the sort 
envisaged by Caperton, Navy leaders did come to recognize the special demands placed on 
their institution by the nation’s policy toward Latin America.  For years the Navy had made a 
practice of responding individually to U.S. diplomats’ frequent calls for vessels to assist in 
crises in Caribbean and Central American countries.  By 1920 those calls had become so 
numerous that they made the old case-by-case method of coordination unworkable.  As one 
officer in the Office of Naval Operations characterized it, the State Department’s seemingly 
constant demands for naval assets in the Caribbean rose to the level of “abuse” with 
diplomats and consular agents seeming to demand ships “simply on the basis of alarmist 
rumors.”
22
  Accordingly, in May of 1920 the Navy relented and agreed to establish a small 
squadron with the diplomatic role of patrolling and keeping order within the American 
empire in the Caribbean.
23
  The unit was designated the Special Service Squadron to reflect 
both its unique role outside the Navy’s preferred line of business (preparing for war), as well 
as the close association it would have with the State Department.  As Charles Freeman 
(Captain, U.S. Navy), a staff officer intimately involved in its establishment, later noted, the 
Squadron’s creation was something of a defensive bureaucratic move by Navy leaders: they 
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hoped that having a dedicated unit in the Caribbean would give the Navy an independent 
means of “evaluating the relative necessities in disturbed areas” while 1) eliminating the need 
to detach vessels from other units for tours of unspecified duration and, 2) limiting the total 
number of ships engaged in diplomatic activity.
24
  Nevertheless, it was a unit established for 
the sole purpose of helping to carry out U.S. foreign policy.  Its creation signaled that, 
however haltingly, the Navy was moving away from the kind of outright opposition its 
leaders had expressed to Admiral Caperton’s proposal for permanent diplomatic naval 
stations abroad. 
 The Special Service Squadron’s official charge at its creation was to “promote 
friendly relations and contribute to the growth of a better understanding between the United 
States and the other republics of the Western Hemisphere.”
25
  Not surprisingly given the 
conditions that spawned it, however, the Squadron was most often called upon in subsequent 
years not to show the flag or foster goodwill, but to protect American citizens and interests in 
the Caribbean region.  Indeed, this gunboat diplomacy mission eclipsed that of goodwill 
cruising for most of the Squadron’s existence, even though its commanders at different times 
sought to emphasize the goodwill diplomatic function.  According to historian Donald Yerxa, 
from its creation in 1920 until 1934, vessels of the Squadron responded to State Department 
calls for crisis assistance some fifty-one different times.  On several occasions, such in 
Nicaragua between 1926 and 1933, and in Cuba from 1933 to 1935, the assistance it 
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provided was both large-scale and long-term in nature.  When commanders of the Special 
Service Squadron found time to engage in goodwill cruising in the Caribbean, they often met 
with stiff resistance from diplomats who did not want the Squadron straying from what they 
viewed as its interventionist raison d’être.  In their view the Squadron should remain firmly 
under State Department supervision because the Caribbean was too delicate a region to 
permit naval officers to freelance as diplomats.  While the State Department saw merit in 
conducting goodwill naval diplomacy further south, in South American waters, and had 
supported Admiral Caperton’s proposal for a permanent goodwill naval presence there, in the 
Caribbean U.S. foreign policymakers wanted naval power was to play a narrower, more 
remedial role.
26
  Indeed it seemed throughout most of the 1920s that, although they agreed 
that naval power had an important role to play in carrying out U.S. policy in Latin America, 
Navy and State Department leaders could not see eye to eye on the specific roles naval assets 
should play and where. 
HERBERT HOOVER’S GOODWILL TOUR 
 
 The gulf between U.S. foreign policymakers and naval leaders on the utility of 
goodwill cruising narrowed considerably after President-Elect Herbert Hoover made a seven-
week swing through Central and South America in late 1928, and it began to disappear 
altogether when, after assuming power, he moved the United States away from its 
longstanding policy of armed interventionism in Latin American nations.  Sailing aboard 
several U.S. Navy vessels, Hoover’s seven-week visit – deemed his “goodwill tour” – was a 
catalyst for this major shift in American foreign policy.  It represented a meeting of the 
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minds between Hoover and Leo S. Rowe, Director General of the Pan American Union, who, 
confident of Hoover’s victory, had proposed it to the then-Republican nominee more than a 
week before the 1928 presidential election.
27
  Latin America was the only region of the world 
that the well-traveled president-elect had never visited, and before leaving, he remarked that 
the trip represented an opportunity to pay “friendly calls upon our neighbors to the south” 
and get acquainted with them.
28
  Six of the ten nations Hoover visited on his tour were on the 
South American continent, marking the first time a U.S. president (although he had yet to 
take office) had set foot on that continent; in total, the trip marked only the third time a U.S. 
president had visited a Latin American country.
29
  In that sense it was a grand gesture, one 
that American foreign policymakers hoped in and of itself would demonstrate the credibility 
of U.S. desires for more positive, productive inter-American relations.
30
  For his part, Hoover 
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 At each of its eleven stops throughout Central and South America, events on the 
goodwill tour were carefully orchestrated to reinforce the president-elect’s public message.
32
  
Civilian personnel accompanying Hoover were reminded en route, for example, that all 
individuals in the party – whether trained as diplomats or not – had “more power than they 
realize[d]” to affect Latin American perceptions of the United States because of the 
“psychological moment” at which the visit was occurring.  Hoover’s designs for Latin 
America policy were already well-known, and, the traveling party’s instructions said, the 
moment was ripe for Latin Americans who held unfavorable views of the United States to 
begin to change their attitudes.  As a tour intended to shift public perceptions about the 
United States, the mission was to communicate Washington’s good intentions.  Accordingly, 
members of the traveling party were further encouraged to “forget your reticence when 
handing out complements” to the Latin American peoples they encountered; to “leave out of 
your conversation all...mention or suggestion of the relative importance, degree of progress 
or even scenic value” of the United States; to either forget or “at least have the decency to 
hide” any “nigger-white man attitude of superiority” toward darker-skinned Latin American 
peoples; and to take care to refer to themselves as “norte-Americano” rather than as 
“Americans.”  (Latin Americans were “also Americans and proud of it,” members of 
Hoover’s party were reminded.)  Displays of “courtesy and tact” by each member of the 
party would go a long way toward demonstrating respect for Latin America at the individual 
level, it was hoped, and would help reinforce Hoover’s broader point that the United States 
desired to be thought of as a good neighbor to Latin America.  Moreover, good conduct 
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would help underscore that North, Central, and South America shared “identical interests 
along many lines.”
33
  This awareness that each person in the traveling party had a critical role 
to play in helping to carry Hoover’s (and by extension, the United States’) message to Latin 
American peoples at an individual level foreshadowed a central premise of U.S. goodwill 
cruising in Latin America throughout the “good neighbor” years: individuals outside the 
traditionally narrow realm of “diplomacy” could and would assume roles critical to the 
success of foreign relations. 
 As highly visible symbols of American power, U.S. naval vessels and personnel were 
also expected to do more on the tour than merely offer the president-elect a safe and reliable 
form of transportation.  Naval assets – both vessels and personnel – were to play an active 
role in communicating his good neighbor message, just as civilian personnel were.  It was a 
remarkable turnabout for the Navy, considering that over the years, in Latin American eyes, 
American ships had become symbols of U.S. heavy-handedness.  Nevertheless it was a role 
that Navy leaders, responsive to the direction of national policy, quickly embraced.  Just as 
Hoover was preparing to leave California, Navy Secretary Curtis D. Wilbur issued a change 
in departmental policy that for the first time recognized the “cultivation of friendly relations 
with foreign peoples” among the major objectives of U.S. naval operating forces.
34
  It was a 
recognition that while Hoover and his civilian entourage would seek to foster goodwill and 
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change Latin American attitudes at the individual level, the Navy would reinforce the “good 
neighbor” message at the macro level.  Its large, grey ships were among the most modern and 
powerful in the world, and, U.S. foreign policymakers believed, in delivering Hoover rather 
than landing parties of U.S. Marines, they would do much to help change Latin American 
attitudes conditioned by years of heavy-handed U.S. armed interventionism.  Similarly, the 
ships’ uniformed crews were well-positioned to play a symbolic part.  Unlike the menagerie 
of civilian individuals who accompanied the president-elect, U.S. sailors were, quite literally, 
uniformly clothed in the garb of American power.  Naval vessels and personnel would both, 
therefore, form a nice complement to the president-elect by visibly reinforcing his good 
neighbor message. 
 The Navy’s unique diplomatic attributes made it well-suited to the task of boosting 
what U.S. foreign policymakers repeatedly referred to as American “prestige” in the 
hemisphere.  To understand the symbolism of naval power, and its linkage to national 
prestige, it is again useful to turn to the work of naval theorist Ken Booth.  “Prestige,” Booth 
argues, is “the sex appeal of politics among nations.”  Booth’s conception is apt because it 
recognizes that prestige is a difficult thing to quantify or discuss in absolute terms.  The only 
evidence of its existence is, as he suggests, the behavior of nations under its sway.  A nation 
possessing prestige, he argues, is “listened to [by other nations] with more than diplomatic 
courtesy,” and its words are “invested with a special credibility and authority.”  Respect of 
this sort cannot be demanded or accrued under threat of force, Booth cautions.  Rather, it 
must be painstakingly cultivated by repetition of friendly activities that build confidence.
35
  
Hoover’s goodwill tour depended on the U.S. Navy to do exactly that: to be seen by large 
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numbers of Latin American peoples in port after port as a symbol of U.S. goodwill as it 
delivered the chief spokesman, Hoover, for Washington’s new approach to Latin America.  
As the tour’s planners recognized, the Navy’s role would be to help the United States gain 




 As Hoover’s tour progressed from early stops in Central America to the west and east 
coasts of South America, observers including the president-elect himself spoke glowingly of 
the benefits of having the Navy engage in such goodwill visits.  For example, having 
witnessed the enthusiastic receptions given Hoover by large crowds in port after port, 
Chicago journalist Edward Bell Price (who accompanied Hoover on the entire journey) asked 
a rather straightforward question in a column published the U.S.S. Utah’s ship newspaper, 
The Big U:  “Why not consciously make the United States Navy an arm of American 
diplomacy?”  Allowing that the Navy existed first and foremost “for the purposes of war,” 
Price argued that naval vessels and personnel had nonetheless rendered valuable assistance to 
the changing U.S. policy in South America, and had helped “reinforce the influences of 
peace.”  The Navy had, so far, borne Hoover through Latin American waters “with dignity” 
and had provided “invaluable” assistance in making the “great enterprise” of the goodwill 
tour a success.  Its personnel were, in Price’s view, perfect candidates for diplomatic duty.  
The Utah’s officers were “splendid,” he wrote – both educated and refined – and they 
commanded “magnificent” vessels.  “Is this not sea power – war power – active beneficently 
in the spheres of diplomacy and peace?” he asked.  It was just the kind of activity that the 
Navy should be conducting “systematically and regularly,” Price believed.  Were it up to 
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him, he concluded, U.S. naval vessels and personnel would be seen “carrying the Stars and 
Stripes frequently into the harbors of sister nations, big and little, and using all their 
disciplinary efficiency and culture in spreading acquaintance with the United States of North 
America and its ideals of democracy in politics, social equality, and that doctrine...which sets 
a common value upon the prosperity of every country on the globe.”
37
 
 Price’s sentiments about the promise of goodwill naval diplomacy echoed those 
expressed by another American reporter, Harry W. Frantz, in the Christmas Day 1928 issue 
of The Catapult, the ship newspaper of the U.S.S. Maryland, which had borne Hoover from 
San Francisco to Central America and then down the South American west coast.  The 
president-elect and his party had left the Maryland for the overland trip from Chile to 
Argentina with “a keen realization that the Navy’s handclasp of friendship had been as warm 
and genuine as Latin America’s ‘abrazo’ of affection,” Frantz wrote.  Although Hoover’s 
goodwill tour had taken place “in the shadow of sixteen-inch guns and other amazing 
contrivances of modern warfare,” he wrote to all on board, the Maryland “seemed essentially 
a ‘peace ship’, a meeting place of men capable of fighting their country’s battles with big-
hearted hospitality and friendly words as well as, when necessary, with gunpowder and 
steel.”  To the proud history of the Maryland’s exploits in battle must be added, Frantz , 
accounts of its quarterdeck “as the scene of friendly international luncheons, as a center for 
[the] amicable conversations of diplomats, and as a peaceful haven for newspaper 
correspondents.”
38
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 It was a conclusion shared by the Maryland’s crew.  Goodwill cruising was indeed a 
fruitful endeavor for the Navy, the Catapult editorialized in the same issue.  It cost the Navy 
“only the trouble of expressing it,” and returned benefits for the nation that had “a value 
beyond conversion to material terms.”  It helped foster respect and “national prestige” – both 
diplomatic necessities that “each country must earn for itself.”  The respect and prestige of 
the United States throughout Latin America could only be earned, the editorial continued, by 
a “genuine friendliness of outlook coupled with fairness toward other nations.”  Such work, it 
concluded, was “not a matter for the State Department alone” but was a shared responsibility.  
Goodwill diplomacy was the work of “every citizen,” the idea being that individuals owed it 
to their country “to represent it well” in contacts with foreigners by demonstrating courtesy, 
tact, and respect.  To this end, the editorial urged, the U.S. Navy had a vital, ongoing role to 
play.  In the new age of good neighbor diplomacy, the work of the Navy must range far 
beyond its traditional vocation of preparing for war.  Each sailor was “something...of an 
unofficial diplomat” who, when abroad, garnered “somewhat closer observation” than 
civilians or diplomatic personnel.  Unlike traditional diplomats, Navy personnel were 
“labeled” by their uniforms and mode of transport as representatives of American national 
power, the Catapult concluded.  In practice this meant that naval personnel were routinely 
“seen seen more by foreigners than the average [American] citizen.”
39
 
 Just as the journey alerted the U.S. Navy to the productive role it could play in the 
nation’s policy toward Latin America, so too did it open Hoover’s eyes to the utility of 
goodwill naval diplomacy.  According to reports filed by newspaper reporters traveling with 
him, the president-elect’s choice to make the trip on board naval ships rather than 
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commercial vessels was a strategic one intended, in part, to boost the Navy’s peacetime 
diplomatic mission.
40
  From early in his voyage, Hoover often expressed satisfaction that, 
through greater engagement in goodwill cruising, the Navy could help the United States 
foster closer, more cooperative relations with foreign countries.  On numerous occasions, the 
New York Herald Tribune reported, the president-elect expressed the hope that, with this goal 
in mind, goodwill naval cruises abroad would be “more heavily emphasized in the future.”  
Hoover’s enthusiasm reached its peak as his tour wound down and began its homeward 
voyage to Hampton Roads, Virginia.  At a banquet with the captain and crew of the U.S.S. 
Utah on Christmas night, 1928, Hoover told his hosts that his goodwill tour had been “a 
revelation in many ways of the versatility and skill of naval men in a thousand things not 
pertaining to war.”  Such goodwill diplomatic activity had far-reaching benefits that were 
difficult to overestimate, he continued.  In his view, goodwill cruising of the sort that had 
occupied the Navy during his tour was the “highest peace-time function of the fleet.”  They 
were the types of activities in which the Navy should “always will be engaged.”
41
  In more 
specific terms, Hoover acknowledged the diplomatic value of having naval personnel carry 
out such duty.  The role played by “naval men” ashore was one of the “main factors” in the 
goodwill tour’s success, the New York Times quoted Hoover as saying.
42
  During his stop in 
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, the president-elect trumpeted the importance of personal contacts 
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between peoples of different nationalities as the key to achieving a “better understanding” 
among nations.  Only through such one-to-one contacts, he urged, could one country “gain a 
real insight into the character of the people of the other.”
43
  Edwin McIntosh, the Herald 
Tribune reporter who publicized Hoover’s remarks, wrote further that Hoover’s vision met 
with the approval of naval officers who were “eager to have their field of service to the 
nation broadened.”  “Perhaps no body of men represents a fairer cross-section of North 
American intelligence, education and integrity,” McIntosh concluded, “than the officers and 
men of the United States Navy.”
44
 
 Hoover’s pre-inaugural embrace of the concept laid the groundwork for the active 
goodwill cruising regimen the U.S. would pursue in the 1930s.  After expending years of 
effort trying to impose order in Latin America through gunboat diplomacy interventions, in 
the late 1920s and early 1930s under Hoover and his successor, Franklin D. Roosevelt, 
Washington sought instead to cultivate order through conciliatory actions.  As the Christian 
Science Monitor concluded near the end of Hoover’s goodwill tour, the task for U.S. policy 
during these transitional years became one of turning the page on the interventionist past and 
“selling” the United States anew to Latin America.  For years, the Catapult noted, Latin 
Americans had come to the conclusion – not unjustifiably – that their norteamericano 
neighbors were “materialistic” and “imperialistic,” while, for their part, Americans were all 
too content to let those perceptions develop unchallenged.  What Hoover’s trip demonstrated, 
the paper argued, was that there were dividends to be earned by disseminating what it called 
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a “truer conception” of the United States throughout the hemisphere – one that minimized 
economic factors and instead sought to shine the spotlight on U.S. values and cultural 
achievements while at the same time demonstrating a sincere American interest in those 
emanating from Latin America.  It was “vital” that the work begun by Hoover be expanded 




UNDER FDR: THE U.S. NAVY AS A GOOD NEIGHBOR 
 
 The economic calamity of the Great Depression hijacked Hoover’s presidency and 
relegated foreign policy to the periphery of his overall policy agenda.  By extension, it 
dashed any hopes for an active program of goodwill naval cruising in support of changing 
U.S. policy toward Latin America.  The election of Franklin D. Roosevelt to the presidency 
in 1932 breathed new life into U.S.-Latin American relations, as the new president embraced 
the idea of selling U.S. good neighbor intentions to Latin America.  To Roosevelt, a former 
Assistant Secretary of the Navy, it was only natural to employ the Navy in this capacity.  In 
May 1933 Roosevelt’s new Navy Secretary, Claude Swanson, approved a change to U.S. 
naval policy more sweeping than the one put into effect by his predecessor, Wilbur, before 
Hoover’s goodwill tour.  Where the policy under Hoover had made “cultivation of friendly 
relations with foreign peoples” an objective of the U.S. Navy’s operating forces, Swanson’s 
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change made an explicit commitment “to make foreign cruises to cultivate friendly 
international relations” (emphasis added).
46
 
 Under Roosevelt the U.S. Navy quickly became a fixture in Latin American waters, 
engaging in numerous cruises aimed specifically at bolstering a “good neighbor” image of 
the United States.  The pattern began to emerge clearly in 1934, when, in response to the 
administration’s new emphasis on Latin America and in recognition of the Navy’s own 
peacetime mission of “showing the flag” in foreign ports, Navy leaders began routinely 
sending newly constructed ships on their trial voyages (known in Navy parlance as 
“shakedown cruises”) to Latin American ports.  The seminal event in this regard was the 
launch of the U.S.S. Ranger, the first U.S. naval ship designed and built from the keel-up as 
an aircraft carrier.
47
  When the Ranger departed Hampton Roads, Virginia for a lengthy 
shakedown to Rio de Janeiro (Brazil), Buenos Aires (Argentina), and Montevideo (Uruguay) 
in August 1934, its itinerary was packed not only with the full battery of on-board equipment 
trials and qualifying tests that were routine for such journeys, but with a full complement of 
public diplomacy activities as well.  Navy leaders had initially expressed concern at sending 
the Ranger on such a long proving voyage, preferring instead to have the vessel remain closer 
to home in the Gulf of Mexico.
48
  But the ship’s newly appointed commanding officer, 
Arthur L. Bristol (Captain, U.S. Navy), who had served in the U.S. naval mission to Brazil 
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earlier in his career and was familiar with Latin American affairs, prevailed upon the Navy’s 
Bureau of Aeronautics to let the vessel venture further south.  A shakedown cruise down the 
east coast of South America, he argued, would allow the ship to undergo more extensive tests 
of its mechanical systems while at the same time affording the ship’s crew a valuable 
opportunity to visit “a large foreign port south of the Equator.”  As Robert Cressman has 
argued, the Bureau’s approval of the more ambitious itinerary, including stops in Argentina 
and Uruguay as well as Brazil, signaled that the Navy had a desire to help the State 
Department promote the president’s Good Neighbor Policy.
49
 
 Upon its completion, leaders in both the Navy and State Departments applauded the 
Ranger’s shakedown cruise as an unqualified success.  Not only had ship and crew been 
successfully put through their technical and training paces, officials in the two departments 
noted approvingly, the cruise’s three stops had also “created a favorable impression and [had] 
been of benefit to American prestige.”
50
  So impressed were State and Navy Department 
leaders that they sought to replicate the Ranger’s success.  In three key ways its itinerary 
became a blueprint for future goodwill cruises in Latin American waters.  First, as they had 
done during President Hoover’s goodwill tour, during the Ranger’s shakedown cruise naval 
personnel engaged in highly public demonstrations of respect for the sovereignty of the 
visited nations.  For example, at Rio de Janeiro, Captain Bristol sent a small detachment of 
sailors and Marines ashore, including a marching band, to participate in a parade honoring 
Brazil’s Independence Day – a move that, after the fact, occasioned a formal note of thanks 
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from the Brazilian Foreign Office.
51
  During the ship’s stop in Buenos Aires, Bristol laid 
wreaths at a monument to José de San Martin, a hero of Argentina’s war for independence 
from Spain, and at a monument to the nation’s foremost naval hero, Almirante William 
“Guillermo” Brown, whose naval victories during Argentina’s war for independence won 
him acclaim as a founding father of the Argentine Navy.
52
  And in Montevideo, Bristol again 
paid public homage to a Latin American national hero by laying a wreath at the tomb of 
General José Gervasio Artigas, a key figure in the history of Uruguayan independence.  The 
wreath he laid at the Artigas monument featured a ribbon consisting of the intertwined colors 
of the U.S. and Uruguayan flags, and bore an inscription reading “Homage of the Navy of the 
United States of America.”  It was just the kind of good neighbor message Roosevelt’s larger 
policy was designed to send, and it was no doubt reinforced by the salute Bristol and six of 
his officers rendered at the tomb “for an appreciable period of time” in the presence of “a 
large number” of Uruguayan military personnel and civilian observers.
53
 
 Also foreshadowing the standard practice of future goodwill cruises, at each stop U.S. 
authorities sought to maximize the Ranger’s visibility and that of her crew before the public.  
By the early 1930s, after more than three decades of active U.S. intervention in Central 
America and the Caribbean, U.S. naval vessels had become symbols of a gunboat diplomacy 
reviled throughout Latin America.  Thus changing Latin American perceptions of U.S. naval 
power would be central to cultivating warmer feelings in Latin America toward the United 
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States.  From the itinerary the Navy and State Departments drew up for the Ranger’s 
shakedown cruise, it was clear that leaders in both agencies believed it necessary to expose as 
many people as possible in each port to U.S. naval vessels and personnel engaged in friendly 
missions.  The executive officer of the Ranger, for one, recognized the nature of the task.  
“We now have before us another job, a harder and more exacting one than those which have 
gone before,” Commander Charles Pownall wrote to his crew in the first edition of the ship’s 
newspaper: “The job is a diplomatic one in which we meet people of other lands and 
tongues.”  Demonstrating a firm grasp of the performance aspect of the Ranger’s business, he 
beseeched his men to remember that “we are on parade before their [Latin Americans’] eyes 
and are required to inculcate confidence and respect not only to us but as representatives of 
American citizenship at its best.”
54
  It was a message almost identical in spirit to the one that 
had guided the Hoover goodwill tour in late 1928: each individual was an emissary of the 
United States as a whole, and had to act accordingly. 
 While exposing locals to the Ranger’s crew on an individual level would be important 
to the goodwill mission, planners recognized, it was also essential to maximize locals’ 
contact with the ship itself.  Accordingly, in all three ports the Ranger’s crew made 
arrangements to permit the general public to come aboard.  To manage the crowds they 
distributed a large but limited number of visitor passes, as American ships had long done on 
visits to large U.S. ports such as New York, where naval vessels were often objects of great 
public curiosity.  In Rio de Janeiro, the first port visited, the crowds were small.  Out of an 
abundance of caution, Captain Bristol had ordered the Ranger to anchor more than a mile 
from shore – out in the middle of the city’s deep natural harbor.  While this minimized the 
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risk of damage from moving in shallow water closer to shore, it also made public access to 
the ship – and hence, public diplomacy – a difficult proposition.  In practice this meant that 
throughout the Ranger’s eleven-day stay in Rio, the only locals who got to visit the ship were 
invited VIP’s and those few general visitors who either owned their own boats or could catch 
a ride in one of the small boats ferried back and forth by the ship’s crew from ship to shore.
55
  
It was a situation that raised the ire of U.S. Ambassador Hugh Gibson, who decried Captain 
Bristol’s decision to decline an urban, pier-side mooring.  It was an unfortunate decision, he 
wrote to Secretary of Cordell Hull, one that ensured that the Ranger’s visit was “little 
noticed” by the Brazilian press and public.
56
   
 It was an error that the State Department, eager for the Ranger to make a positive 
impact in South America, would not allow to be repeated.  To have a shot at moving public 
opinion in favor of the United States, the ship would have to be close and accessible to the 
local populations.  At the State Department’s insistence, in approaching its next port, Buenos 
Aires, the Ranger would traverse the narrow, shallow Indio Channel in order to reach a berth 
close to one of the city’s open plazas where thousands had gathered to witness its arrival.
57
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An estimated twenty-five thousand visitor cards were issued in Buenos Aires and another 
twenty-thousand during the Ranger’s subsequent visit to the nearby Uruguayan capital of 
Montevideo, where the Ranger also sidled up to an urban pier in full view of large crowds.  
In each case, Bristol wrote in his after-action report, bringing the ship so near the crowds 
presented an “extremely difficult” situation in which crowd control was “difficult to 
exercise.”  Not all who wanted to visit the ship could be accommodated, and in both cities 
high demand led to the appearance of counterfeit visitor passes as well as the emergence of  
shadow market in which passes (which were originally distributed free of charge) were 
bought and sold in the streets.  In both ports the ship’s proximity to the public made the 
Ranger’s crew’s job more difficult.  Yet from a policy point of view, the State Department 
judged the rewards of the added effort to be worth the trouble.  American diplomats in all 
three countries praised the conduct of the Ranger’s crew in port and underscored the 
diplomatic value of the ship’s visit.  The U.S. Chargé d’Affaires in Uruguay, Leon 
Dominian, wrote to Washington that the Ranger’s visit marked the first occasion in which 
such a large contingent of American sailors (numbering more than nine-hundred) spent six 
successive days in port in the heavily-touristed city of Montevideo “without giving rise to a 
single case of disorderliness.”  And Captain Bristol, despite misgivings about the wisdom of 
forcing the Ranger to enter the port of Buenos Aires through the Indio Channel, concluded 
that its visits to all three cities had “created a favorable impression and have been of benefit 
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to American prestige and indirectly to American business.”
58
  Had he tried, Bristol could 
scarcely have written a clearer statement of Roosevelt’s goals for the Good Neighbor Policy. 
 While they emphasized public displays of respect and sought to maximize the 
Ranger’s visibility and that of her crew, American foreign policymakers had a third purpose 
in mind in routing the Ranger’s shakedown cruise to South America:  they wanted the 
Ranger – the newest, most complex, most modern ship in the U.S. inventory (and the 
technological marvel of its day) – to serve as a shining example of the ingenuity, 
development, and strength of the United States.  Ultimately, it was this line of thinking, as 
well as the availability of a steady stream new American ships in need of testing (courtesy of 
President Franklin Roosevelt’s new naval building program), that led U.S. policymakers to 
expand the use of shakedown cruises for diplomatic purposes throughout the “Good 
Neighbor” era.
59
  Routinely sending its newest, most advanced ships to Latin America to 
foster goodwill, they believed, could do much to help the United States put its best foot 
forward there.  In 1934, the hope was that as the Ranger and her crew advertised 




 Very early in his first term, Roosevelt supported a naval building campaign that would both contribute to the 
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Washington’s “good neighbor” bonafides, it would also showcase the vitality of the 
Depression-ridden United States and garner all-important “prestige.”  A cutting-edge tool of 
the still relatively new field of naval aviation, the Ranger was particularly well-suited for this 
purpose.  Before the Ranger even left the United States, the State Department had expressed 
the hope that its commander would put the ship’s raison d’etre on public display by staging 
regular aviation demonstrations at each point along its journey.  Showcasing its aviation 
capabilities would be such an important part of the Ranger’s public diplomacy mission in 
South America, U.S. Ambassador to Brazil Hugh Gibson thought, that he asked Secretary of 
State Cordell Hull to press the Navy Department to permit the vessel to sail with a “full 
complement” of airplanes for just that purpose.  However, as they had been more generally, 
Gibson’s hopes for this particular aspect of the Ranger’s visit to Rio were dashed.  The Navy 
dispatched the ship with only seven planes on board, and those planes saw very little flight 
time in Rio owing to “almost continuous fog or haze with low ceiling.”  It was a stark 
contrast to the recent visit of a British aircraft carrier to Rio, during which its airplanes 
“carried out flying operations which made a deep impression and are still talked about.”  
Gibson characterized the Ranger’s lack of planes as a missed opportunity.
60
   
 Although aviation operations were impossible in the close, urban confines where the 
Ranger moored in Buenos Aires and Montevideo, U.S. diplomats still believed the ship 
succeeded in sending a message of American ingenuity, development, and strength.  In 
Montevideo, U.S. chargé Dominian wrote, the “novel aspect” of the Ranger created “unusual 
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interest” among the crowds who gathered nearby.  The pier to which the carrier was moored 
was “constantly lined with thousands of spectators who stood for hours looking at the ship.”  
Particularly gratifying was the fact that the British cruiser docked nearby, a smaller, non-
aircraft carrying vessel, “created no such display of interest” among the locals.  The crowds 
that gathered and gravitated to the Ranger provided evidence, he concluded, that “an 
admirable impression of American technical progress was left in this city.”  Importantly for 
the fostering of good neighborism, Dominian noted that the public impression seemed 
entirely “unconnected with the thought that the ship was a man-of-war.”  Rather, he wrote, 
the public interest was attributable to “admiration for the marvellous (sic.) technical progress 
exhibited by the aircraft carrier.”
61
  It was the kind of message that the State Department’s 
Latin America hands no doubt welcomed. 
 The Ranger’s shakedown cruise was a turning point in U.S. policy in that it confirmed 
to both State Department and Navy leaders the wisdom of using naval vessels and personnel 
to cultivate goodwill in Latin American waters.  Their upbeat analysis was amplified by the 
autumn of 1934 by evidence that the Roosevelt administration’s efforts to sell its “good 
neighbor” intentions in Latin America had begun to pay dividends.  Delegates to the Seventh 
International Conference of American States in Montevideo, Uruguay (December 1933) had 
welcomed, for example, Secretary of State Cordell Hull’s surprising declaration that the 
United States would adhere to the assembly’s agreement that “no state has the right to 
intervene in the internal or external affairs of another.”
62
  Latin Americans also welcomed 
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Washington’s abrogation of the 1903 Platt Amendment that had long given the United States 
the right to intervene on the island and which, together with the 1904 Roosevelt Corollary to 
the Monroe Doctrine, had long been a flash point for anti-U.S. resentment throughout the 
hemisphere.  In Peru, U.S. Ambassador Fred Dearing reported hearing “enthusiastic 
commendation” for the Roosevelt administration’s move.  “Even the most distrustful of our 
illwishers,” he noted, “are beginning to believe the Good Neighbor is a reality.”
63
  That same 
year, President Roosevelt accelerated the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Haiti, ending a 
nearly two-decade long occupation, and signaled his intent to find a new basis for 
cooperative relations with Panama, where, like Cuba, the United States had insisted upon a 
right of intervention since 1903.
64
 
BALANCING GUNBOATS AND GOODWILL: THE SPECIAL SERVICE SQUADRON 
 
 The Ranger’s South American cruise also confirmed for U.S. policymakers the 
specific wisdom of using shakedown cruises for goodwill purposes.  Not only were new 
vessels such as the Ranger the best exemplars of American technological progress, they 
believed, but as brand new additions to the fleet they were also untainted by any association 
with the nation’s interventionist past in Central America and the Caribbean.  Therefore, it 
was thought, they could serve more credibly than others as emissaries of good neighborism 
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throughout Latin America.  This emerging partiality toward shakedown cruises was in part a 
response to efforts by two commanders of the Special Service Squadron, Clark H. Woodward 
(Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy – formerly head of the U.S. Naval Mission to Peru) and Charles S. 
Freeman (Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy), to expand the geographical and substantive scope of 
that unit’s operational responsibility.  Upon assuming command of the Squadron in early 
1933, Woodward appealed to the State Department to approve an ambitious schedule of 
goodwill cruising that would take its vessels far beyond their traditional Caribbean confines, 
to ports not only in nearby Colombia and Venezuela, but “down the west coast of South 
America” as well.
65
  Coming as it did during some of the deepest, darkest days of the Great 
Depression, and more than two months before Franklin Roosevelt proclaimed the “policy of 
the good neighbor” during his inaugural address, Woodward’s proposal met with the same 
swift rejection that Ambassador Dearing’s similar recommendation would the very next 
month.  For the remainder of his brief tenure as its commander, the Special Service 
Squadron’s ships would only venture from their base at Balboa, in the Panama Canal Zone, 
on brief excursions to other Panamanian ports.
66
 
 Weighing against any growth in the Squadron’s mission throughout 1933 and 1934 
was the fact that it was heavily committed in gunboat diplomacy pursuits as the United States 
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moved to contain revolutionary unrest on the island of Cuba.
67
  During those two years the 
Special Service Squadron was expanded to more than thirty vessels (up from an average of 
between four and six) and engaged in patrol duty around Cuba.  This duty represented the 
operational peak of the Squadron’s gunboat diplomacy mission even though the United 
States never had to use its ships to land troops or engage in hostilities at sea.  As stability 
returned to Cuba following the emergence of strongman Fulgencio Batista, permitting the 
United States to conclude the treaty abrogating the onerous Platt Amendment, it became clear 
to Navy leaders that, with interventionism in decline and good neighborism on the rise, the 
most active days of the Special Service Squadron’s gunboat diplomacy were behind it.  Still, 
a small movement emerged within the Navy dedicated to maintaining the Squadron’s new 
high profile in U.S.-Latin American affairs. 
 As Washington’s embrace of good neighborism grew, Woodward’s successor, 
Freeman, who had played an active role in the Special Service Squadron’s creation in 1920, 
began arguing that it should be given a broader role in the nation’s diplomacy in Latin 
America beyond the Caribbean.
68
  In March 1934, well before the Cuban operation began to 
wind down and five months before the Ranger’s shakedown cruise to South America helped 
crystallize the nation’s new policy on goodwill naval diplomacy in Latin America, Freeman 
urged that the Squadron be used to conduct goodwill cruises in South American waters.  It 
was important, he argued, that the U.S. Navy make efforts to counteract the British warships 
that routinely cruised there, and that the United States secure the long-term commercial 
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advantages that were rightly the province of the United States.
69
  In January 1935, in the final 
days of operations around Cuba, Freeman pressed the Chief of Naval operations to give the 
Squadron a broader mission.  Its role was “intimately tied up with our national policy,” he 
wrote, and the question of its future was a basic one: should its assets continue to be confined 
to “such operations as emphasize their minatory function,” as had been its “general practice” 
since its establishment?  Rather than draw the unit down to pre-Cuba levels (four to six 
ships), as the Navy Department was contemplating doing, Freeman argued, Navy leaders 
should further boost its size and broaden its mission.  The “single function” he had in mind 
was “showing the flag in Latin-America” and “improving prospects for U.S. commerce.”  
Again he pointed to British efforts to make his case.  The “American Squadron” of the Royal 
Navy was routinely engaged in Latin American cruises aimed at fostering goodwill, he 
cautioned.  With its unique founding charge and the Roosevelt administration’s emphasis on 
good neighborism, Freeman concluded, the Special Service Squadron was uniquely 
positioned to “parallel and neutralize” British efforts by taking on an ambitious schedule of 
goodwill visits throughout the Americas.
70
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 For the most part, Freeman’s appeals for a much broader role for the Special Service 
Squadron went nowhere.  Throughout 1935 and 1936 he made numerous requests for 
permission to expand the Squadron’s goodwill cruising beyond the Caribbean into South 
American waters.  With only a few exceptions, the State Department denied each one.  In 
1935 Freeman received approval to take his flagship, the U.S.S. Trenton, on one cruise to the 
Colombian port of Cartagena, on the Caribbean, as well as a limited number of ports on the 
Pacific side of the isthmus of Panama: Buenaventura, Colombia, Guayaquil, Ecuador, and the 
Galapagos Islands.  In each, the Admiral reported engaging his crew in goodwill activities 
such as public musical expositions, sporting competitions ashore, and a host of social 
functions.
71
  But that would be the extent of the Squadron’s South American cruising on 
Freeman’s watch.
72
  This is not to say that, under the Good Neighbor policy, the State 
Department was opposed in principle to the kind of broader goodwill cruising Freeman and 
his predecessor, Woodward, had proposed to undertake beyond the Caribbean.  In the wake 
of the USS Ranger’s highly successful shakedown cruise to Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay, 
the State Department had clearly started getting on board with the idea.  What diplomats 
objected to was using a unit so closely associated with past U.S. interventionism to do the job 
of cultivating goodwill in the hemisphere.  As historian Donald Yerxa has argued, the Special 
Service Squadron suffered from an acute perception problem: its effectiveness as an 
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instrument of gunboat diplomacy undermined its usefulness in doing goodwill naval 
diplomacy.  In the end, the State Department judged, the Squadron could not easily shed its 
image and remake itself as an agent of good neighborism.
73
  The Navy had an important role 
to play in promoting the Good Neighbor Policy, but that role would be better filled by new 
vessels. 
 Following the Ranger’s successful cruise in South American waters, the use of 
shakedown cruises for goodwill diplomatic purposes accelerated in South American waters.  
Almost immediately after the Ranger’s return to the United States, the State Department 
approved the shakedown voyage of a new cruiser, the U.S.S. Tuscaloosa, with the same basic 
itinerary the aircraft carrier had followed.
74
  And in the wake of that cruise, officials from the 
State Department and Navy collaborated to send nine new ships on shakedowns to seventeen 
South American ports over the next three years.
75
  In each instance, the ships’ itineraries 
were packed with activities of a highly public nature, and uniformly, U.S. foreign 
policymakers deemed the cruises successful in spreading the good neighbor message.  All the 
while, the Special Service Squadron remained confined to the Caribbean. 
GOODWILL CRUISING IN PERU 
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 By 1936 goodwill naval cruising had become a central feature of the Roosevelt 
administration’s Good Neighbor Policy, and the U.S. Navy was becoming the public face of 
the United States in Latin America.  The agenda soon expanded beyond shakedowns and ad 
hoc visits to include regular cruises by active elements of the U.S. Fleet.  To policymakers in 
the Roosevelt administration, the growth of goodwill naval diplomacy was particularly good 
news for U.S. relations with Peru, which had been strained since Leguía’s 1930 overthrow.  
In an effort to boost ties with Peru and other nations on the South American west coast, in 
early 1936 Roosevelt proposed sending elements of the Scouting Force (a component of the 
U.S. Pacific Fleet) to visit ports on the west coast of South America following that year’s 
annual training maneuvers off the Pacific coast of Panama.  Navy Secretary Claude Swanson 
quickly signaled his agreement, informing the president that the Navy was prepared to send 
two divisions of heavy cruisers to Valparaiso, Chile, and two cruiser divisions and one 
destroyer squadron visit Callao, Peru in late May.  As if to forestall the possibility of 
interagency disagreement, Roosevelt then forwarded Secretary Swanson’s reply to Secretary 
of State Cordell Hull along with the somewhat loaded note asking “What do you and Sumner 
Welles think of this suggestion?  It seems satisfactory to me.  F.D.R.”
76
  In terms of total 
numbers of vessels and personnel, the visits that were taking shape at Roosevelt’s initiative 
were part of the largest goodwill cruise yet undertaken in Latin American waters under the 
Good Neighbor:  four ships of Cruiser Divisions Four and Five would visit Chile, while 
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fourteen vessels of Cruiser Divisions Six and Seven, along with Destroyer Squadron Twenty, 
would visit Peru.
77
   
 Upon learning of the makeup of the naval contingent set to visit Chile, the U.S. 
Ambassador to that country, Hoffman Philip, expressed concern to the State Department that 
the visit could enflame Chilean sensitivities stemming from a violent altercation in 1891 
between American sailors of the cruise U.S.S. Baltimore and locals in Valparaiso.  The 
dispute had quickly ignited a diplomatic crisis that nearly led to war.
78
  But there was no 
stopping the planned visit, which was being made at President Roosevelt’s personal 
insistence: the ships’ visits to Valparaiso, and especially to Callao-Lima, were designed to 
publicly showcase the Navy as a shining messenger of good neighborism.  As it had during 
Hoover’s goodwill tour and in numerous cruises since, in both cases Washington relied on 
sailors to serve as de facto diplomats.  The crews’ agendas were packed with activities 
intended to show respect for the host countries’ national sovereignty, and to maximize the 
visibility of the American ships and personnel.
79
  The visit to Valparaiso was the smaller and 
more modest of the two visits.  Its focal point came when, before a large crowd of Chilean 
naval personnel and civilians, the two ranking U.S. officers, Thomas Hart and Harry Brinser 
                                                          
77
 Chief of Naval Operations (Acting) to Secretary of State, March 3, 1936, RG 59, File 811.3310/626, National 
Archives. 
78
 The U.S. Navy’s reputation in Chile had suffered considerably since the “Baltimore Affair” of 1891, and, 
Philip believed, it was of the utmost importance this time around that the Navy impose “the most rigorous 
discipline” on its sailors in order to soothe Chilean nerves that were still somewhat raw more than four decades 
after the Baltimore affair.  See Acting Secretary of the Navy to Secretary of State, March 23, 1936, RG 59, File 
811.3310/638, National Archives.  For more on the Baltimore crisis, see Joyce S. Goldberg, "Consent to Ascent: 
The Baltimore Affair and the U.S. Rise to World Power Status," The Americas 41, no. 1 (1984): 21-35.  See also 
Hagan, This People's Navy: The Making of American Sea Power, 198-200. 
79
 Showcasing the technological advancement of the visiting ships does not appear to have been a major 
objective during these visits to Valparaiso and Callao-Lima, likely because none of the visiting ships were as 
highly symbolic of American ingenuity as the aircraft carrier Ranger.  Rather, it is clear both from the agendas 
the State Department drew up for these visits and from the after-action reports that U.S. diplomats in both 




(both Rear Admirals, U.S. Navy), laid a wreath at a monument to Captain Arturo Prat, a 
Chilean naval hero who died in battle with the Peruvian fleet during the War of the Pacific.
80
  
By design, enlisted sailors from the four American vessels spent considerable time with the 
local population, touring Valparaiso and the capital, Santiago, while also participating in a 
recreational “field day of sports” organized by the local American expatriate community at 
the local Sporting Club.  All four ships were open to visitors for two of their three full days in 
port.  And one evening, at Admiral Hart’s instruction, the Cruiser Divisions’ combined band 
also staged a public concert ashore.
81
  Chilean press coverage of the visit was positive, but 
not effusively so.  Santiago’s largest daily, La Nacion, saw the U.S. Navy as an appropriate 
emissary of norteamericano good neighborism, given Chile’s longstanding status as one of 
South America’s preeminent naval powers.  “A country of sailors, such as ours, which has in 
its history distinctive acts and deeds of extraordinary heroism,” it concluded, “has always 
found in the American Navy Men special motives for admiration.”  It was a sentiment echoed 
by another Santiago daily, El Diario Ilustrado, which on the American ships’ last full day in 
port commended American personnel for  rendering homage to the nation’s naval hero, Prat, 
and concluded that such displays would help “guarantee the good neighbor relations which 
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 The concurrent visit to Callao-Lima was considerably larger and more diplomatically 
significant for the United States because the stakes were higher in Peru than they were in 
Chile.  Although the Depression had put a damper on trade between the two countries, the 
United States still carried on more extensive trade with Peru than with Chile throughout the 
1930s, while American companies had invested in Peru at a far greater clip than they did in 
Chile.
83
  But, as noted earlier in this chapter, since the demise of Leguía, relations had 
become considerably more difficult.  Anti-American sentiment ran high in Peru during the 
depression’s early years.  And since Sánchez Cerro’s April 1933 assassination, Peru had been 
ruled by a military man, General Oscar Benavides, with fascist leanings who held the United 
States at arm’s length while seeking ever-closer ties with Germany and Italy.  Clearly, the 
timing of the U.S. Navy’s visit to Callao-Lima was significant.  To U.S. foreign 
policymakers, it was important that the fourteen ships and the more than six thousand crew 
that arrived on May 28th perform their diplomatic roles ably and serve as emissaries of good 
neighborism.  The Roosevelt administration, including the president himself, was counting 
on the Navy to score victory for its good neighbor diplomacy.
84
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 During the Navy’s four-day stay in Callao, American naval personnel engaged in 
public demonstrations of respect for Peruvian sovereignty that were larger than those the 
Navy conducted on any other goodwill visit to date.  The “biggest single event of public 
interest” during the Navy’s visit, the U.S. embassy reported afterward, was the parade on 
Saturday, May 30th of more than eleven-hundred American sailors and Marines through the 
streets of historic central Lima.  It was a spectacle witnessed by thousands of Peruvians along 
the narrow, crowd-lined streets of the old city, culminating in the historic Plaza de Armas 
with a pass-in-review (complete with military salute) before President Benavides and his 
cabinet, who were assembled with U.S. dignitaries on a balcony with a commanding view 
high above the procession.
85
  The review in front of the presidential palace was the 
exclamation point on a several hours-long demonstration choreographed to publicly unite, in 
true good neighbor fashion, the American Navy men’s observation of their own nation’s 
“Decoration Day” (later known as Memorial Day) holiday with shows of respect for Peru’s 
national history and institutions.  The parade was preceded by a public ceremony at the tomb 
of Admiral Miguel Grau Seminario, Peru’s naval hero from the War of the Pacific, with all 
eleven-hundred of the U.S. personnel who would later march in the parade participating (see 
Appendix 1, Photo 4).  During the ceremony Charles Snyder (Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy), 
commander of Cruiser Division Six, laid an arrangement of white roses in the shape of a 
ship’s anchor at the foot of the Grau sarcophagus and, addressing the assembled crowd, 
pronounced himself proud, as a sailor and as an American, to pay respects to Admiral Grau, 
the Peruvian Navy, and the Peruvian nation.  Snyder’s remarks were followed immediately 
by a smart salute, in unison, from the assembled ranks of American sailors and Marines, and 
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then by remarks from the Chief of the General Staff of the Peruvian Navy, José M. Olivera.  
Olivera expressed the appreciation of all Peruvians for the honors their visitors had rendered.  
The country had welcomed periodic U.S. naval visits with “true joy” in the past, he 
continued, but “never until today have American sailors disembarked and presented honors 
in such irreproachable form to our national warriors.”
86
 
 An ambitious schedule of sporting competitions between American and Peruvian 
teams complemented the formal, ceremonial displays of respect.  Held “practically every 
day” during the American ships’ visit, they were organized to be larger and more diverse 
than those held during other goodwill naval visits to Latin American countries 
(encompassing baseball, basketball, target shooting, boxing, and tennis), on the idea that 
displays of good sportsmanship would reinforce the visit’s broader goodwill message.
87
  The 
games and matches pitted American athletes against teams composed of Peruvian naval and 
military men, university students, and even foreigners from Lima’s vibrant international 
community.  Unlike those held during the Navy’s concurrent visit to Chile, which were held 
at a sporting-country club, the events were held in public venues throughout the Callao-Lima 
area.  This public visibility ensured that the competitions were covered heavily by Lima’s 
newspapers.  The city’s most influential daily, El Comercio, for one, devoted a special 
section of its June 1st issue to coverage of the games, and reported that high spirits prevailed 
throughout the competitions.  It noted with satisfaction the triumph of the Peruvian pistol 
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team from the local Club Internacional Revólver Lima over “los marinos yanquis” (the 
Yankee sailors), a victory it called “a new and resounding success” and an “unequivocal 
demonstration” of the Club’s (and the sport’s) development in Peru.  Although Peruvian 
baseball teams were not so fortunate against more experienced U.S. teams in several games 
at Lima’s National Stadium, El Comercio reported, the Peruvian players played “determined” 
baseball in defeat.  The American basketball team from the cruiser San Francisco lost a 
spirited contest to a team from the local Circolo Sportivo Italiano (Italian Sports Club) by a 
score of 44 to 28, while sailors from the Minneapolis narrowly defeated a local university 
team in a follow-on match before an enthusiastic crowd that erupted in generous applause for 
both teams.  Dozens of photographs of the action were published alongside the game 
synopses, action shots depicting athletes in the flow of competition as well as posed shots of 
the American and local teams, smiling, arm in arm.  They were the kind of images that might 
have permeated the dreams of the Good Neighbor’s architects back in Washington.  In total, 
hundreds of U.S. sailors participated, and were lauded by American and Peruvian officials 
for their good sportsmanship.
88
  From the large number of clippings embassy staff sent to 
Washington, it is clear that the events were intended to be far more than recreational 
diversions for the American sailors who took part.  They were an integral part of the visit’s 
diplomatic agenda. 
 The Navy’s warm reception by the Peruvian public and press represented a marked 
change from the early post-Leguía years, and suggested to U.S. foreign policymakers an 
acceptance of the Roosevelt administration’s efforts to turn the page on the United States’ 
                                                          
88
 See “Los equipos de tiradores del Club Internacional Revólver ‘Lima’ No. 4, se anotaron un nuevo éxito ayer 
en los matchs sostenidos con los marinos norteamericanos,” “Baseballistas del “New Orleans” Ganaron a la liga 
Chalaca,” and “‘Circolo Sportivo Italiano’, en lucid a competencia de basket ball, venció al cuadro 
representativo del ‘San Francisco’,”  El Comercio, June 1, 1936 – contained as attachments to Secretary of U.S. 
Embassy (Lima, Peru) to Secretary of State, June 3, 1936, RG 80, File FF3/A4-3, Box 2167, National Archives. 
223 
 
interventionist past in Latin America.  On the day the American vessels arrived, an editorial 
in the newspaper El Universal welcomed the “Yankee sailors” as “ambassadors of the 
country which is a leading representative of human progress,” and concluded that old fears of 
American imperialism were unfounded in the face of “new tendencies of North American 
policy” shaped by President Franklin D. Roosevelt.  La Noche echoed the sentiment, also 
referring to the visiting U.S. naval personnel as “Ambassadors of a nation which constitutes 
the exponent of human progress” and predicting that the visit would “strengthen even more 
the bonds which unite Peru with the powerful Republic of the North.”  El Comercio lauded 
Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor Policy as “a diplomatic principle worthy of frank stimulation,” 
and called the Navy’s visit a “fruitful opportunity of Americanist cooperation” and a chance 
to start realizing “the wishes of the continent and solve the material and moral problems of 
humanity.”
89
  The generally positive outlook of the Lima press was quickly noticed by staff 
in the U.S. embassy.  In a report to Washington, the embassy noted that during its stay the 
fleet “evoked a more cordial and friendly press comment toward the United States than has 
been evident here for many years.”  That was especially true of El Comercio, which had been 
at best “non-committal” toward Washington in years past, and “unfriendly” generally.  
During the Navy’s visit, however, the paper “led all of the other newspapers” in the city in 
the amount of space it devoted to covering the American sailors’ activities.  Its pages were 
filled with photographs of the American sailors’ activities, official and unofficial.  The May 
30th issue, for example, featured a collage of images depicting U.S. sailors and Marines on 
the streets of Lima – one of marine talking with a group of local businessmen; another of a 
marine and sailor politely examining a book, perhaps in response to a sales pitch delivered by 
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the expectant-looking children next to them; and one of a sailor, smiling broadly, walking 
down a sidewalk hand in hand with a Peruvian child.
90
  To the delight of U.S. diplomats, the 
Navy’s visit enjoyed such “unanimously” cordial coverage across all the city’s major dailies. 
 One reason, it appears, that local coverage was so positive was that both press and 
public expected the presence of six-thousand U.S. naval personnel to be a boon to the local 
economy.  During the four-day visit, advertisements trumpeting diversions for U.S. sailors 
filled the local papers.  On the day the ships pulled into port, May 28th, El Comercio ran an 
ad (in English) for “Cock Fights – with Steel Spurs – In honour of the American Fleet,” 
announcing seven fights “to the death” that night and the next, as well as the availability of a 
“bar and lunch counter on the premises.”
91
  Another, also in English, announced a “Maritime 
Bar and Cabaret” (claiming to be the “Best Place in Callao”) just one block from the naval 
docks, complete with an in-house money exchange and English-speaking staff.
92
  American 
sailors did their part to oblige, evidently spending liberally during their stay.  On the 
Americans’ second day in port, La Prensa noted a considerable uptick in commercial activity 
in Callao and Lima, driven by U.S. sailors and Marines buying everything from shoes to 
clothing to blankets and toys, and frequenting cafes, restaurants, and engaging in “significant 
drinking” in local bars.
93
  (Interestingly, there appeared to be no major incidents of 
unruliness, as the embassy reported approvingly of the “excellent behavior of the men while 
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on shore” and noted that it was “highly commented upon” by Peruvian officials and 
newspapers throughout the Navy’s stay.)  And on the day the ships departed, El Universal 




 As the three divisions pulled out of Callao and headed for their home port of San 
Diego, California, U.S. diplomats in Lima declared their visit a resounding success.  
American personnel had demonstrated Washington’s respect for Peruvian institutions, and 
had carried themselves in a manner befitting a good neighbor.  The early returns seemed to 
indicate that the visit had “inspired conspicuous goodwill and cordiality amongst all classes 
of Peruvians.”  The largest U.S. Navy goodwill cruise to date had achieved exactly what 
Roosevelt intended: the Navy had demonstrated, in a highly public way, the good neighbor 
bonafides of the United States.  And importantly, that victory had been scored in Peru, where 
relations had been difficult for a number of years. 
 The success of the 1936 goodwill visit to Peru was important for several reasons in 
the years that immediately followed.  First, it further validated naval cruising as an 
instrument of good neighbor diplomacy, and set the stage for the Navy to undertake an even 
more ambitious schedule of goodwill visits throughout Latin America.  In 1937, 1938, and 
1939, by mutual agreement the State Department and the Navy dispatched even more cruises 
to Latin American countries for the purposes of generating goodwill.  Second, it gave the 
Roosevelt administration a considerable boost in its efforts to rebuild U.S. influence in Peru, 
which had been in tatters since the end of Leguía’s Oncenio.  And third, it underscored that 
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while conveying messages of good neighborliness, American naval ships could also clearly 
communicate the strength of the United States. 
This last factor grew in importance as Roosevelt administration became increasingly 
concerned throughout 1936 about German and Italian aggression in Europe and the 
possibility that another devastating war could engulf the European continent.  In 1935, 
Benito Mussolini’s Italy had invaded the East African nation of Ethiopia in an attempt to 
establish a new Italian empire.  In March 1936 German Chancellor Adolf Hitler had ordered 
his powerful army, the Wehrmacht, to occupy the Rhineland, a demilitarized zone on the 
German-French frontier that had been established in 1919 by the Treaty of Versailles.
95
  
Fearing that war in Europe would invariably threaten the Western Hemisphere, in early 1936 
Roosevelt pressed the other nations of the Americas to gather in the near future “to determine 
how the maintenance of peace among the American Republics may best be safeguarded” 
amid the growing danger.
96
  Out of that initiative came the Inter-American Conference for 
the Maintenance of Peace, which convened in Buenos Aires in December of 1936.  
Determined to forge an inter-American consensus to confront the growing threat, Roosevelt 
decided to lead the U.S. delegation to the conference himself.  Making the twelve-thousand 
mile roundtrip journey aboard the cruiser U.S.S. Indianapolis, along the way he used stops in 
Rio de Janeiro and Montevideo to conduct some goodwill naval diplomacy of his own.  As 
Robert Dallek notes, in Rio “huge throngs gathered” to greet Roosevelt at the city’s pier, 
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shouting “Viva la democracia!  Viva Roosevelt!”  And in Buenos Aires, crowds estimated at 
more than two million people “packed in every conceivable point of vantage” greeted 
Roosevelt “with wild acclaim and showered him with flowers as he passed.”
97
  By now 
accustomed to seeing naval ships as emissaries of U.S. good neighborism, Latin Americans 
for the first time since Hoover’s goodwill tour saw an American president personally 
engaged in good neighbor diplomacy on their soil.  That Roosevelt, ever the naval man, was 
doing it from the deck of a modern cruiser only seemed natural.  Moreover, his efforts at 
Buenos Aires bore fruit: as he had hoped at the outset, delegates to the conference agreed to 
consult one another should a clear threat to peace emerge in the Western Hemisphere.
98
   
GROWING CONCERNS OVER HEMISPHERIC SECURITY 
 
 With a guarantee of some measure of inter-American cooperation in the event of 
extra-hemispheric aggression, the Roosevelt administration turned its attention in the late 
1930s to combating what it saw as the growing influence of Germany and Italy in Latin 
America.
99
  Not surprisingly, heightened concern about European encroachment in Latin 
America drove another clear shift in the tenor of the goodwill naval diplomacy Washington 
practiced there.  Although public displays of U.S. respect for Latin American sovereignty 
remained important, they were increasingly complemented by efforts to publicly showcase 
the strength and technological prowess of the United States.  In the late 1930s the emerging 
goal of American naval visits to Latin American ports was to send the clear message that not 
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only was the United States a good neighbor, but was capable of leading an effective defense 
of the hemisphere.  This transformation is most clearly visible in U.S. participation in the 
Inter-American Technical Aviation Conference held in Lima in September 1937.  Convened 
with the goal of promoting and standardizing commercial aviation as a means of expanding 
commercial and communications exchanges among nations of the Americas, the Conference 
was an outgrowth of aviation discussions that had been held on the periphery of earlier inter-
American conferences.
100
  As an active participant in past inter-American conferences and as 
a key player in the development of commercial aviation in South America (most notably in 
Peru during the 1920s), the United States quite naturally wanted a clear voice in deliberations 
over future inter-American aviation links.   
 But the issue took on new urgency when word began to filter through Washington 
that, at the invitation of the Peruvian government, Italy would be sending a large delegation 
to participate in the conference as well.  That the Italians would be the only participants from 
outside the Americas gave Washington pause.  As early as April 1936 the State Department 
had expressed concern about the “disadvantage” that U.S. aviation interests (manufacturers 
of planes and equipment as well as builders of landing fields and airport facilities) would 
face should Latin American nations standardize their commercial aviation establishments 
along European lines.
101
  Those fears were only amplified by the word filtering into 
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Washington in early 1937 that the Peruvian President Oscar Benavides (who had studied in 
European military schools earlier in his career, and whose fondness for Italian-style fascism 
was well-known) was considering asking the Mussolini government for an Italian aviation 
mission, as well as a group of mining experts from Italy to help develop his nation’s iron 
reserves.  Such experts, Benavides was reported to have told Rome, would release Peru from 
its “mining vassalage to the United States.”
102
  It was part and parcel of the growing volume 
of intelligence flowing into Washington in 1937 that seemed to confirm that European 
powers were increasingly intent on expanding their strategic and commercial influence in the 
Americas. 
 Italy’s participation in the conference set the stage for a public diplomacy showdown, 
as the Italian delegation planned a series of high-profile public events during the proceedings 
aimed at expanding the appeal of Italian aviation in Latin America.  In late May 1937, little 
more than three months before the conference was to begin in Lima, the U.S. naval attaché 
there relayed word to Washington that during the conference the Italian government would 
present the host nation with a monument to Peruvian aviation pioneer Jorge Chávez, who had 
died in Italy in 1910 in an attempt to become the first aviator to traverse the Alps.  The 
unveiling of the monument on Peru’s national dia de aviación (aviation day) would be one of 
the conference’s main events, one celebrated by aerial demonstrations put on by flyers 
invited from all participant nations.  Along with the monument, the report noted, Italy 
planned to send “a mass flight of military planes” to Lima to participate in the unveiling 
ceremony.  To offset the effects of that public demonstration of Italy’s aviation prowess, the 
attaché concluded, it was “highly essential” that the United States send “as large a group of 
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planes” as possible to make an aerial demonstration during the conference as well.
103
  When 
a formal invitation to send a delegation of planes arrived from the Peruvian government, 
Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles, the Roosevelt administration’s point man on Latin 
America and a believer in the efficacy of naval power for goodwill purposes, agreed.  In 
early June he wrote to Navy Secretary Claude Swanson that “as a matter of policy” it would 
be “highly desirable” to not only send American aircraft to participate in the unveiling 
ceremony, but aircraft “of the latest type.”  Sensing the opportunity to gain an upper hand in 
the public eye over the Italian contingent, Welles further recommended that a modern aircraft 
carrier be sent to Lima “to cooperate with the planes” and to serve as a visible indication of 
American naval prowess.
104
  Navy officials concurred, designating the U.S.S. Ranger – the 
darling of the State Department since its 1934 shakedown cruise to South America – for the 
job.  “The presence of aviation representatives of many South American countries” at the 
conference, Ernest J. King (Admiral, Commander of Aircraft, Base Force, U.S. Fleet) noted 
in agreement, “appears to present an excellent opportunity to advance the prestige of 




 By the time the Ranger arrived in Callao on September 15, 1937, the conference had 
developed into the competition for influence that U.S. diplomats had expected.  The Ranger’s 
commander, John S. McCain (Captain, U.S. Navy), called it “a contest for supremacy [in 
South America] between American methods and equipment, and European, of which those of 
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Italy were strongly supported.”  But upon arriving in Lima, American officials discovered 
that the detachment of Italian aircraft at the conference totaled only twelve stunt planes, a far 
cry from the “mass flight” of planes that prior intelligence had anticipated.
106
  But the Ranger 
arrived ready for a public diplomacy showdown on a grand scale nonetheless, with a full 
complement of seventy-eight planes: eighteen bombers, eighteen fighters, thirty-seven 
scouting aircraft, and five utility planes.
107
  Wasting no time, McCain ordered the Ranger’s 
planes to make their first demonstration flights almost immediately, on September 17th, six 
days before the larger exhibition that would accompany the unveiling of the Chavez 
monument.  Flying at low altitude due to “mediocre” weather conditions, sixty-six of the 
Ranger’s seventy-eight planes carried out a practice flight in which four large open 
formations passed over the Limatambo airfield (in the San Isidro section of Lima) before 
dividing into what the influential Lima newspaper El Comercio called “eight large and 
perfect” V-shaped formations, which then “paraded in magnificent form” back over the 
airfield before returning to the Ranger.  It was a “brilliant demonstration of capacity, power, 
efficiency, and safety,” El Comercio reported, an impressive spectacle attended by “a large 
number of people” who “applauded the North American pilots’ precision enthusiastically 
from start to finish.”
108
  As the paper noted, this warm-up performance was far more 
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successful than the first sortie of the smaller-than-expected twelve-plane Italian contingent, 
in which two of its craft “cracked up in a cross-wind” before they could make it into the air. 
 On the day the Italian delegation unveiled and dedicated the Jorge Chávez monument, 
as Welles had hoped, the Ranger’s planes stole the show.  As the largest and most heavily 
publicized contingent participating in the event, the American aircraft were the first to parade 
overhead following the formal speeches of the dedication ceremony.  El Comercio reported 
that, flying in four “perfectly formed” formations as they had days earlier, the American 
planes “offered a unique and impressive spectacle” to the thousands of spectators assembled 
near the new Chavez monument.  Flying from the Ranger’s position in the waters just off 
Callao, the planes proceeded in a north-to-southeasterly direction, passing directly over top 
of the dignitaries assembled near the monument and, upon completing their initial pass, 
executed a broad left turn along Lima’s seacoast before dividing (as they had on the 17th) 
into eight “large and perfect” V-shaped formations.  In tight new formations they passed a 
second time over the assembled crowd “in magnificent form,” the paper noted, with the apex 
of each formation pointed forward and with the aircraft arrayed so tightly that, to some 
observers on the ground, it “appeared as if the wings were touching.”  The precision with 
which American pilots carried out their maneuvers sent the clear visual message that the U.S. 
State Department no doubt intended: in the realm of aviation, the United States was a world 
leader.  Amplifying that message quite literally was the sound of the demonstration.  “The 
engine noise of the American planes was powerful and isochronous,” El Comercio noted, and 





  It was precisely the kind of display that Sumner Welles and the State 
Department had envisioned: outnumbering those of every other nation in attendance, 
American planes assumed a central, high-profile place in the festivities, were warmly 
received by the locals, and garnered favorable coverage in the local press. 
 To U.S. foreign policymakers, the Ranger’s visit was a resounding success.  It had 
been a rousing demonstration of the capabilities of American aviation, Captain McCain 
concluded while sailing back to California.  The flights had given U.S. goodwill cruising, 
which up to that time had centered around ships and sailors, a dynamic new dimension.  
Echoing the local reporting by El Comercio, McCain noted that the “mass flights” launched 
from the Ranger’s flight deck had been “cheered enthusiastically by the populace,” and that 
“the disciplined precision of the Squadrons’ maneuvers” had been “complemented highly” 
by officers of the other military establishments in attendance.  The chief of the U.S. 
delegation to the conference, Dr. Harry Block, expressed his approval as well, noting that the 
Ranger’s presence and the displays put on by its airplanes had “measurably strengthened” the 
American position in the conference deliberations and “materially furthered” the cause of 
U.S. civil aviation throughout South America.
110
  U.S. Ambassador to Peru Laurence 
Steinhardt agreed, reporting to the State Department in Washington that the “coordination, 
perfect discipline and fine formations evoked the loudest praise among Peruvian Government 
officials” as well as the gathered public.
111
  The most satisfying assessment of the visit’s 
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effectiveness, however, came from President Benavides himself, who had lunched aboard the 
Ranger during its visit and who, in the days after the ship’s departure, wrote to Roosevelt 
expressing gratitude “for the cordial attitude of the good neighbor, with which the Navy and 
Aviation corps of the United States of America have associated themselves in glorifying the 
Peruvian Aviator, Jorge Chavez.”
112
   
 Proof of the demonstration’s effectiveness, however, came only after the initial 
exchange of niceties.  In the weeks that followed, the Peruvian Government began to signal a 
growing sensitivity to the Roosevelt administration’s concerns about Italian influence in 
Peru.  On November 22, the Peruvian Ambassador in Washington, Manuel de Freyre y 
Santander, wrote to Secretary of State Cordell Hull conveying his government’s special 
thanks for the participation of U.S. planes in the dedication of the Chavez monument, and 
announcing that President Benavides had awarded La Orden El Sol del Peru (the Order of 
the Sun), the highest award the nation could bestow, on Dr. Block, Captain McCain, and the 
commanders of the two naval vessels that had accompanied the Ranger to Peru.  Employing 
the language of hemispheric solidarity that was coming increasingly into vogue with a 
Roosevelt administration concerned about European threats to Latin America, Freyre wrote 
that the actions of these men, and of the American pilots who participated in the unveiling, 
were evidence of “a solid continental unity” and of “a true American solidarity” that existed 
among the nations of the Americas.
113
  It was the first time that the Benavides government 
spoke in such terms. 
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 Yet the success of the Ranger’s aerial public diplomacy did not extinguish 
Washington’s fears of growing European encroachment in Peru and throughout Latin 
America.  Rather, the United States emerged from the Inter-American Technical Aviation 
Conference with a heightened sense of concern about Italian and German ambitions in South 
America.  Although the performance of the Italian aviation contingent had been marred 
mechanical failures, U.S. Ambassador Laurence Steinhardt reported to Washington that the 
Italian representatives to the conference itself “attempted – and were partly successful – in 
dominating the whole picture” of the gathering.  From the opening to the closing day of the 
conference, he noted, the Italian delegation had held high-profile events (in addition to the 
dedication of the Chavez monument) that were intended to highlight the Italy’s and Peru’s 
shared interests in aviation, including an exhibition of works by the designer of the Chavez 
monument at a local Italian-owned gallery in Lima, a wreath-laying ceremony 
commemorating Peruvian aviators lost in service, a gala honoring President Benavides held 
at Lima’s country club, and a private dinner for the president and his wife held at the Italian 
legation – the last being an event to which “no foreign diplomats or representatives of any of 
the visiting delegations were invited.”
114
  Acts of public diplomacy in their own right, these 
events were well-covered by the Lima press.  At the gala, for example, El Comercio reported 
that the country club’s main hall was elegantly decorated with gold ornamentation and a host 
of Peruvian and Italian flags, and that, upon Benavides’ arrival, a band played the Peruvian 
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 All signs pointed, Steinhardt warned, to the possible establishment of an Italian 
aviation mission in Peru – a development that, if it came to pass, could open the door for the 
creation of Italian naval and military missions in Peru as well.  The Benavides government 
had “unquestionably been much impressed” by the Italian public relations offensive during 
the recent conference, he cautioned.  Because of this, the time was right to consider sending 
another U.S. naval mission to Peru.
116
  The Peruvian Navy had made a number of overtures 
about a new U.S. naval mission in the years since the old mission’s withdrawal.  With 
memories of the complications that had attended that earlier naval mission still fresh in its 
collective mind, Washington had rebuffed each attempt.
117
  Steinhardt argued that the time 
had come for the United States to reconsider.  A majority of the mid-level officers on duty in 
the Peruvian Navy in the later 1930s had been trained during the previous U.S. naval 
mission’s tenure, Steinhardt noted, and regretted its departure.  This meant that Peruvian 
Navy’s favorable disposition toward the United States presented Washington with an 
opportunity to arrest the expansion of Italian influence in Peru.
118
  The “net result” of the 
Ranger’s visit during the aviation conference, he stressed, had been to make the Peruvian 
government even more determined to secure a new naval mission from the United States.  
However, he cautioned, Peruvian enthusiasm for a U.S. naval mission was not inexhaustible.  
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Any “unreasonable delay” in reciprocating the Peruvian Navy’s interest in a new U.S. 
mission now could well “result in the Italians making such favorable proposals as to induce 
the Peruvian Government to turn over to them” the Navy as well as its aviation 
establishment.
119
  Time was of the essence. 
CONCLUSION 
   
 The 1930s was a transformational decade in U.S. policy toward Latin American 
nations, and in U.S. relations with Peru.  Beginning under Herbert Hoover and gaining 
momentum under Franklin D. Roosevelt, it was a time when a “good neighborism” founded 
on non-interference and cooperation eclipsed armed intervention as the basis for relations.  
U.S. credibility and prestige in the Hemisphere began to rebound after reaching an all-time 
low in the late 1920s and early 1930s.  Central to that process was Washington’s recognition 
that its policy had to shift from its emphasis on trying to impose order in Latin America, an 
approach that bred intense resentment, to a more hands-off approach aimed at fostering or 
cultivating order.  To cultivate order effectively and bury the interventionist past once and for 
all, U.S. foreign policymakers recognized, Washington would have to systematically 
demonstrate conciliation – and in a highly public, highly visible manner.  Popular attitudes 
would be the focus.  From Herbert Hoover’s pre-inaugural goodwill tour onward, the United 
States Navy proved indispensible in this pursuit.  Time and time again, American naval 
vessels and personnel served as emissaries of good neighborism, communicating U.S. respect 
for Latin American nations’ sovereignty and institutions, discharging the duties of uniformed 
“diplomats,” and showcasing American technological progress.  Those contributions would 
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become all the more important as the objectives of U.S. policy changed yet again in the late 
1930s, and focused on securing the Western Hemisphere from external threat.  Just as it had 
helped prove the nation’s bonafides as a good neighbor, the Navy would again prove pivotal 





CHAPTER 5: NAVAL DIPLOMACY IN HEMISPHERIC DEFENSE, 1937-1942 
 
 By the late 1930s, as the threat of war in Europe and the Pacific grew, United States 
relations with the nations of Latin America became dominated by concerns over hemispheric 
security.  Long preoccupied with European commercial and strategic influence in the 
hemisphere, American officials during these years grew especially worried that the growing 
military might of Nazi Germany might embolden that nation’s leader, Adolf Hitler, to make 
aggressive moves in the Western Hemisphere.  In particular, they feared possible threats to 
the strategically vital Panama Canal and possible subversion of Central and South American 
governments.  President Franklin D. Roosevelt had sounded the warning bell as early as 
December 1936, when he led the U.S. delegation to the Inter-American Conference for the 
Maintenance of Peace in Buenos Aires, Argentina.  U.S. concerns grew steadily through 
1937 and 1938, and intensified further in 1939, when European efforts to appease Hitler 
collapsed and Germany resorted to open warfare to achieve its expansionist goals.  As the 
full force of the Nazi threat to Europe came into focus, intelligence flowing into Washington 
seemed to confirm Roosevelt’s fears of Nazi aggression in Latin America. 
 The Roosevelt administration responded by accelerating its efforts to unify the 
hemisphere and bring Latin America firmly under the umbrella of Washington’s strategic 
reach.  Key to these efforts was convincing Latin American nations that the United States 
was capable of leading an effective defense against extra-hemispheric threats.  As it had 
earlier, naval power played a central role in this new incarnation of good neighbor 
diplomacy.  After having backed away from utilizing naval missions earlier in the decade, in 
the late 1930s the United States again began dispatching teams of naval advisers for the 
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stated purpose of helping Latin American governments build the capacity to both defend 
themselves and contribute to an effective hemispheric defense.  Although in 1937-1938 there 
was some division within the U.S. government as to what the exact relationship between the 
U.S. advisors and their Latin American counterparts should be, as American officials’ fears 
of outside threats to the security of the Western Hemisphere grew, a consensus emerged that 
the U.S. had to send such missions.  At the same time that such missions sought to strengthen 
Latin American defense establishments from within, Washington continued to send naval 
vessels on cruises and port visits throughout Latin America to publicly demonstrate U.S. 
strength and resolve to defend the hemisphere.  These two threads of U.S. naval diplomacy, 
conceived to meet different needs at different times, became braided during the years of 
World War II.  Both were integral components of a single, intensive U.S. effort to build and 
maintain inter-American solidarity in the face of a global war that, at several points, seemed 
poised to engulf the Western Hemisphere. 
REESTABLISHING THE U.S. NAVAL MISSION TO PERU 
 
 Peru would prove to be a fertile test-bed for the new, more urgent good neighbor 
naval diplomacy the United States practiced in the late 1930s and early 1940s.  First, 
Peruvians had a long history with U.S. naval advising, having been the first recipients of a 
U.S. naval mission following the First World War.  Many of the Peruvian Navy’s mid- and 
junior-level officers, who had come of age under the tutelage of U.S. officers during the 
1920s, lamented the fact that it had been withdrawn.  They lobbied through the mid-1930s 
for its reestablishment.  Moreover, Peru had played host to a number of American naval 
visits in the 1930s that had emphasized the importance of naval ties, convincing U.S. 
policymakers that continued engagement in the naval realm would pay diplomatic dividends.  
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Add to that the fact that by the late 1930s Peru was beginning to occupy an important place 
in emerging U.S. designs for hemispheric defense, and its importance to American naval 
diplomacy begins to come more clearly into focus.  Geographically, Peru was not as vital a 
U.S. ally as Colombia, whose shores guarded both the northern and southern flanks of the 
Panama Canal, or Brazil, whose protrusion into the South Atlantic represented the 
easternmost point in the Americas.  But Peru’s geographic proximity to the Canal’s southern 
end made its cooperation essential in U.S. eyes, as did its significant populations of Germans, 
Japanese, and Italians, as well as its large stores of militarily useful raw materials such as 
rubber, vanadium, copper, and oil.
1
  Finally, in the late 1930s, Peru was beginning to prove 
itself a willing U.S. partner.  The United states had enjoyed a closer, more cooperative 
relationship with Peru throughout the first three and a half decades of the twentieth century 
than it had with many other Latin American nations, and the record of meaningful naval 
cooperation between the two was longer than the United States enjoyed with any other Latin 
American nation.  Although tensions had run high between Washington and Lima for a time 
in the early 1930s following the overthrow of former Peruvian President Augusto Leguía, the 
relationship improved by the decade’s closing years. 
 When Peruvian officials stepped up efforts in 1937 to obtain a new U.S. naval 
mission “to ensure the progressive development of the Peruvian Navy,” though, American 
officials at first responded cautiously.
2
  Willard Beaulac of the State Department’s Division 
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of Latin American Affairs expressed concern that another mission could get dangerously 
entangled in Peru’s domestic affairs, and could replay the unfortunate saga of Commander 
Harold Grow, whose intimate association with President Leguía while a member of the U.S. 
naval mission to Peru had given Washington headaches in the late 1920s.  Citing the “Grow 
case” as evidence, Beaulac advised, the United States “should defer action in the matter [of a 
new naval mission] as long as possible” while offering “no encouragement” on the Peruvian 
government’s request.  “From a policy standpoint,” another official argued, the United States 
should send a naval mission to Peru only if “another country would do so in case we did 
not.”  It would be better, he agreed, for the United States not to involve itself again too 
deeply in Peru’s sovereign affairs.  By holding out on a naval mission, the United States 
could not only avoid possibly replaying the embarrassing Grow saga, but could avoid 
becoming too closely identified with “what may be an ambitious naval program of the 
Peruvian Government” – just as it had when naval mission chief Clark Woodward proposed a 
large expansion of the Peruvian fleet in the early 1920s.
3
 
 However, such voices of caution were in the minority.  The main debate within the 
State and Navy Departments in late 1937 and early 1938 was not whether the United States 
should send a mission.  Given the interest Italy had demonstrated in Peru’s aviation and naval 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
1937.  For example, see U.S. Ambassador to Peru to Secretary of State, February 7, 1935, RG 59, File 
823.30/201, National Archives. 
3
 State Department Division of Latin-American Affairs Memorandum to Laurence Duggan, July 22, 1937, RG 
59, File 823.30/212, National Archives.  Also providing insight into the State Department’s reluctance to 
approve a new naval mission to Peru was an October, 1937 memorandum on “The Armaments Situation in the 
Other American Republics.”  It notes that the Grow situation had caused “considerable embarrassment” for the 
United States, and cited the episode as a reason the Department “has been reluctant to look favorably upon the 
informal suggestions made from time to time that the Peruvian Government would welcome another naval 
mission from the United States.”  See “The Armaments Situation in the Other American Republics,” October 
13, 1937, RG 59, File 810.20/53A, National Archives. 
243 
 
establishments, most officials in both departments agreed, that was a settled issue.
4
  At the 
time, the State Department’s Latin America hands were recommending increased naval 
assistance to Latin American nations across the board, a move they believed would 
strengthen relations, generate further goodwill, and, in “times of emergency,” permit those 
nations to lend meaningful assistance to the United States in defense of the Americas.
5
  
Rather, the debate revolved around how a new naval mission should operate once it was in 
place.  The central question quickly became whether U.S. officers should exercise full 
command of the Peruvian naval establishment, as they had in the 1920s, or whether they 
should act in a strictly advisory capacity.  The Peruvian officials most keenly in favor of 
reestablishing the mission, including Roque A. Saldías (Captain, Peruvian Navy), a senior 
naval officer who had worked closely with the Americans during the Leguía years, wanted 
officers of the mission to have “full executive authority” just as they had before.
6
  By the 
time Peru’s formal request made it to Washington, President Oscar Benavides had been 
convinced of the merits of such an arrangement, too, and had weighed in in favor of a 
mission with full command authority.
7
  Although they agreed on the wisdom of sending 
another naval mission to Peru, the consensus in both the State Department and Navy 
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Department was that, in part because of past experience, U.S. personnel should not again 
assume command of Peru’s naval establishment.  In fact, Director of Naval Intelligence R.S. 
Holmes (Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy) informed the U.S. Naval Attaché in Lima, Frank Loftin 
(Commander, U.S. Navy), by then it had been “definitely established as policy not to send 
any more Naval Missions abroad in an executive capacity.”
8
 
 It was more than memories of the Grow and Woodward incidents that weighed on 
U.S. officials.  As Holmes noted to Loftin in his detailed explanation of U.S. policy on the 
matter, allowing a U.S. mission to exercise command over a foreign navy would be “unwise 
from the point of view of American continental solidarity” as well.  Getting involved in the 
“actual command” of the military forces of any one Latin American country was bound to 
“arouse hostility” toward the United States in other countries “that might feel a rivalry 
toward any one of the countries to which our missions were attached.”  Moreover, he 
stressed, by allowing American officers to assume rank in and take command of a foreign 
navy, the United States would run the risk of aligning itself too closely with particular 
political factions within those countries.  The previous U.S. naval mission to Peru had run 
into problems on both counts.  Now, Holmes intimated, given the potential of European 
subversion in Latin America, the stakes were higher than they had been in the 1920s.  In the 
interests of hemispheric security the United States could not run the risk of fanning any 
regional tensions and having them flare up into armed conflict.  As long as a credible 
European threat to the Western Hemisphere existed, no risk to inter-American unity could be 
tolerated.  Beyond such diplomatic considerations, he further stressed, there was the simple 
question of whether allowing U.S. officers to have command authority was the best 
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prescription for the countries receiving assistance.  A naval mission operating in an executive 
capacity would no doubt bring its host navy to “a high state of efficiency more rapidly than 
one operating in an advisory capacity,” Holmes explained.  But whether such a mission could 
effect lasting change was another issue.  The best solution appeared to be a strictly advisory 
naval mission for Peru, he argued, because more permanent results could be obtained only if 
the mission focused its efforts on developing Peruvian officers proficient in the exercise of 
command and technical functions.  “If the Peruvians desire to learn to be competent naval 
officers,” Holmes stressed, “they will cooperate fully with our naval advisors” by accepting 
their instruction and implementing their recommendations.  If, however, they were 




 With regard to Peru, Washington’s desire to keep regional tensions under wraps was 
more than theoretical.  Of the many border disputes Peru had confronted during the Leguía 
years, only the one with Chile, which stemmed from the War of the Pacific, had been 
resolved peacefully.  The dispute with Colombia over the Amazon River port of Leticia had 
escalated into a brief armed conflict, the result of which was a tactical defeat for Peru.
10
  The 
border that remained an open question in the late 1930s was the northern one Peru shared 
with Ecuador, a frontier the two countries had disputed almost since independence on 
account of the inexact colonial boundaries drawn by Spanish authorities.  The first concerted 
efforts to resolve the situation occurred in the 1880s and culminated in the García-Herrera 
Treaty of 1890, an agreement the Peruvian Congress failed to ratify out of a belief that the 
arrangement denied Peru all the land it was due under the old colonial demarcations.  The 




 Masterson, The History of Peru, 135-36. 
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situation remained unresolved for decades, into the late 1930s, despite numerous mediation 
attempts by Brazil, Argentina, Spain, and eventually the United States.  Throughout this 
lengthy period of limbo, Peruvian and Ecuadorian military units skirmished occasionally 
along the disputed frontier.  Out of frustration with the lack of progress on a permanent 
settlement, the Peruvian delegation would pull out of U.S.-brokered negotiations in 
Washington in September 1938, accelerating the longstanding tensions even further.
11
  It was 
in part out of a desire to save these ultimately ill-fated negotiations and achieve a peaceful 
settlement that the United States had been reluctant to grant Peru a new naval mission 
following the withdrawal of the Leguía-era mission in 1933.  In 1937, as the exigencies of 
hemispheric defense tipped the scales in favor of finally sending a new mission, U.S. 
policymakers had to weigh the border situation carefully as they considered whether or not to 
accede to Peruvian desires for a naval mission equipped with command authority.  
Washington had already agreed to send a strictly advisory two-man naval mission to Ecuador 
the year before.
12
  The fear was that if the mission sent to Peru could in any way be construed 
as more than advisory in nature, it could enflame the already very delicate situation. 
 Peruvian officials were persistent in the face of American reluctance.  The Peruvian 
Navy, which was the driving force behind the nation’s renewed push for a U.S. naval 
mission, was insistent on the issue of executive authority.  Captain Saldías, one of the main 
advocates for reestablishing the mission (and a man that U.S. officials expected to be 
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appointed Minister of Marine once a new U.S. mission was in place), gave the previous U.S. 
naval mission “unstinted credit” for all the advances that had been made in the Peruvian 
Navy since 1920, and believed that a new mission would need to be equipped with similarly 
broad powers in order to continue moving the institution forward.
13
  Because of this, word 
that any new U.S. mission would act in a strictly advisory and consultative capacity came as 
a “keen disappointment” to Peruvian naval authorities.  “Unless the definition of what 
constitutes advisory and consultative capacity can be given a liberal interpretation” that 
would ensure it had some supervisory authority, U.S. Naval Attaché Frank Loftin reported in 
August, the Peruvians would rather have no mission at all.  As a practical matter, they feared 
that a number of the roles they wanted U.S. officers to fill, such as a “naval constructor” to 
operate the nation’s dry docks and a supply officer to oversee the Navy’s expenditures, could 
not function properly without the authority to make command decisions.
14
  Beyond this, 
though, was a more deeply-seated problem that had roots in the Leguía era.  As Loftin 
reported in October, a “peculiar situation” existed in the Peruvian Navy whereby a majority 
of the officer corps (junior to mid-level officers) had been “brought up” either under the 
direct tutelage of the previous U.S. mission or under the influence of the practices that that 
mission had left in place.  Among these officers, the “great influence and high standards” of 
the earlier U.S. mission were still felt.  The Navy’s highest ranks, though, were filled with a 
number of officers whose training predated the Leguía-era mission, and some who had seen 
that mission as an unwarranted intrusion.  Peruvian authorities up to and including President 
Benavides feared, Loftin noted, that any “advice” an advisory or consultative naval mission 
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might offer to these senior officers “would not fall on very fertile ground.”  Again, he 
stressed, Peruvian advocates of a new naval mission expressed that they would rather have 
“no mission at all” rather than one ill-prepared to deal with this hard reality.
15
 
 As it appeared unlikely in the waning months of 1937 that they would get a U.S. 
naval mission that conformed to their desires, Peruvian authorities resorted to a negotiating 
tactic that Leguía had often employed to strengthen his hand vis-à-vis the United States in the 
1920s: playing on U.S. fears of growing European influence in Latin America.  The 
difference was that now, in the late 1930s, the Peruvian hand was stronger because 
Washington saw European encroachment in the hemisphere as more than an abstract 
commercial or strategic challenge, as it had in Leguía’s day.  The presence of German or 
Italian naval, military, or aviation missions in Peru or any other South American country 
could imperil inter-American unity and open the hemisphere to the threat European 
aggression.  Given that, Loftin’s mid-October report was especially alarming.  It seemed to 
confirm what U.S. officials had feared coming out of the Inter-American Technical Aviation 
Conference: the Peruvian government had concluded a contract with Italy for a five-member 
aviation mission – a development, he noted, that “naturally bodes no good” for the prospect 
of a U.S. naval mission in Peru.
16
  At the same time, word filtered into Washington from 
Captain Saldías that the British government had recently offered Peru a naval mission.  The 
U.S. Ambassador to Peru, Laurence Steinhardt, saw the timing of this latest information as 
suspicious.  As he wrote Secretary of State Cordell Hull, the fact that the Peruvians revealed 
the British offer at the very time that a “hitch” over executive authority had emerged in the 
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negotiations for a U.S. naval mission “cast grave doubt on the truthfulness” of the report.  
However, he noted, the recent “intense and open” efforts of Italy to penetrate the Peruvian 
aviation establishment, and President Benavides’ well-known affinity for European military 
practices, created a “basis for the remote possibility” that the report of a British offer was 
true.
17
  Despite the apparent transparency of the Peruvian maneuver, the prospect of another 
non-American mission to Peru – even a British one – on top of the newly contracted Italian 
aviation mission amounted to an unacceptable challenge to U.S. leadership in hemispheric 
security.  In that sense, the Peruvian tactic had the effect its architects had desired.  As Under 
Secretary of State Sumner Welles noted while bringing naval mission negotiations with Peru 
to a successful close that December, naval missions were “an increasingly important factor” 
in U.S. inter-American policy, and it would be exceedingly unfortunate should Peru or 




 Finalizing an agreement to send a naval mission to Peru therefore became a high 
priority in Washington by the end of 1937, so much so that officials in the State Department 
reconsidered their reservations about allowing naval mission members to assume some form 
of “executive authority.”  The Peruvian position remained unchanged.  As Peruvian 
Ambassador to the United States Manuel de Freyre y Santander wrote to Welles in mid-
December, officials within Peru’s Navy felt deeply that the overall usefulness of a U.S. 
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mission would be “seriously curtailed” if its officers lacked the authority to ensure that their 
recommendations were followed.  Given the division that existed within the Peruvian Navy’s 
officer corps, the mission needed to be well-positioned to deal with the prospect that its 
suggestions – which could run “counter to the interests or bias of certain interested parties” 
within the institution – would be ignored by more senior leaders if all the U.S. personnel 
could do was “advise.”  In the naval mission agreements concluded during the Leguía years, 
Freyre noted, no formal mention had been made of the terms “advisory” or “executive” even 
though U.S. officers were empowered with command authority.  Would it be possible to find 
a formula to obviate the “current difficulty,” the ambassador wondered?
19
 
 Washington’s concerns about allowing U.S. personnel to assume command of Peru’s 
Navy, as expressed earlier by ONI Director Holmes, had not gone away: such an 
arrangement could still potentially enflame tensions with Ecuador, and could stunt the 
longer-term development of the Peruvian Navy as an institution.  Moreover, memories of the 
complications such an arrangement had wrought during the Leguía years remained.  
Unwilling to accede completely to Peruvian wishes but recognizing that Washington had to 
give ground in order to get the mission underway, Welles proposed a compromise.  To 
ensure that the advice they dispensed had the necessary degree of authority, mission 
members’ contracts with the Peruvian government should be worded so as to make them 
“responsible solely to the Minister of Marine of Peru.”  And unlike the Leguía-era 
arrangement, in which U.S. officers were granted a higher rank in the Peruvian Navy than 
they held in the U.S. Navy and were accorded seniority over all Peruvian officers of equal 
rank, Welles proposed that in the new mission, each American officer’s “precedence with 
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respect to Peruvian officers shall be according to seniority.”  In other words, U.S. personnel 
would have a line of authority that came directly from the Minister of Marine, but would not 
automatically have seniority over their Peruvian counterparts.  The net effect of such an 
arrangement, he believed, was that mission members would be able to exercise “a substantial 
amount” of executive authority “without raising the awkward situation resulting from placing 
a foreign officer in actual ‘command’ of Peruvian units.”  The decisions and 
recommendations made by U.S. personnel would therefore have the weight of executive 
authority, even though the orders carrying those recommendations to fruition would be 
issued through the Navy’s senior Peruvian officer.
20
 
 This arrangement underscores two important realities about U.S. efforts to foster 
inter-American solidarity and ensure a sound hemispheric defense in the late 1930s.  First, it 
demonstrates that while the United States was eager to send missions to Latin American 
nations, it wanted to ensure that those missions would be seen as helping hands rather than as 
intrusions into their internal affairs.  In this way the American approach to sending naval 
missions in the late 1930s had been clearly conditioned by the State and Navy Departments’ 
shared desire to avoid the types of complications posed by the Leguía-era mission to Peru, as 
well as by the Roosevelt administration’s commitment to principles of non-interference in the 
internal affairs of Latin American “good neighbors.”  Among the clearest expressions of this 
is the fact that all naval mission contracts the United States signed with Latin American 
nations in the late 1930s specified that American personnel would retain their rank in the 
U.S. Navy and wear only their own nation’s uniform.  At the same time, the contracts the 
United States and Peru concluded reflect the fact that, in the interests of securing Latin 
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American cooperation, the United States was willing to tailor the security assistance it 
offered to meet the needs identified by partner nations – even if, as in the Peruvian case, that 
meant treading on slightly uncomfortable ground.
21
  Whereas naval mission agreements with 
such nations as Colombia and Brazil clearly identified mission members’ duties as strictly 
advisory in nature, the Peruvian contract was written in a more open-ended manner that 
allowed the “question of exactly how much command may be exercised in an advisory 
capacity” to be, as State Department Latin America chief Laurence Duggan recognized, “left 
for adjustment” when members of the U.S. mission arrived in Peru.
22
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THE NAVAL MISSION AND HEMISPHERIC DEFENSE 
 
 From the point of view of substantive naval reform, the naval mission’s 
accomplishments in Peru during the two year period covered by the initial contract (1938-
1940) disappointed both Americans and Peruvians.  However, from the U.S. perspective, the 
mission’s real value during those years was not the work it did (or did not do) to overhaul the 
Peruvian Navy.  Its real value was political – in terms of building inter-American solidarity, 
the important thing was that the mission was there, serving as a clear indication of U.S. 
resolve.
23
  Cognizant of the successes their predecessors in the first naval mission had had in 
Peru between 1920 and 1930, members of the mission nevertheless had high expectations for 
their work.  Those expectations were dashed by reality.  Early in the mission’s tenure its 
chief, Bruce L. Canaga (Captain, U.S. Navy), wrote to his superiors in ONI that members’ 
lack of fluency in the Spanish language hampered their work.  Only one member of the 
mission, Emory D. Stanley (Captain, U.S. Navy) was proficient in the language, having 
served in the Leguía-era U.S. naval mission.
24
  It was “a darned big handicap,” Canaga 
wrote, and a marked departure from that earlier mission, many of whose officers, if not 
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completely fluent, were sufficiently competent in the language to carry out their work 
effectively.
25
   
 The larger problem confronting the mission, Canaga believed, was the Peruvian 
Navy’s seemingly chronic shortage of funds.  It was the constant theme of Canaga’s 
communications to Washington.  The age and relative disrepair of Peru’s naval ships, which 
limited all-important training at sea, was a source of great frustration to mission members 
and Peruvian personnel, as was the Peruvian Navy’s inability to accept a 1938 invitation 
from Washington to send officers and cadets to study at naval schools in the United States.  
“These people have no money to send students to the U.S.,” Canaga wrote to ONI 
disappointedly, “and they can’t find it so it is just a plain pain in the neck.”  The situation 
was so frustrating that in a moment of exasperation Canaga concluded that “when another 
comes along looking for my job they can have it – 6 hours notice is all I need.”
26
  The Navy’s 
funding problems represented a marked departure from the Leguía years, when, because of 
plentiful foreign loans and the president’s own fondness for the Navy, the institution had 
enjoyed relatively plentiful budgets.  For Canaga and his colleagues, the legacy of that earlier 
mission’s successes, aided substantially as they had been by abundant resources and direct 
presidential support, seemed to obscure any memory of the problems that had often attended 
its work.  The achievements of the Leguía-era mission hung over the new U.S. naval mission 
in 1938, and caused its members to become frustrated with their inability to produce 
similarly impressive results. 
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 The lack of results was frustrating also to Peruvian authorities, who continued to push 
Washington to permit the mission to assume broader authority over their naval establishment.  
When Duggan, the State Department’s Latin America chief, visited Lima for the Eighth 
International Conference of American States in December of 1938, the issue of executive 
authority was the first thing the Peruvian delegation wanted to address with him.  Captain 
Saldías, by then Peru’s Minister of Marine, pushed him on the issue during a face-to-face 
meeting, and shortly afterward addressed a detailed aide-memoire pressing his case even 
further.  There was a consensus among Peru’s president, cabinet ministers, and a majority of 
the Navy’s officers, he stressed, that it was “most necessary” that the U.S. naval mission be 
clothed with executive authority.  For them, as for Canaga and his naval mission colleagues, 
the “past experience” of the Leguía-era mission had set a high standard for success.  “With 
the old equipment we have and with the changes in regime” that were expected with 
Benavides’ decision not to seek reelection in 1939, it was “most necessary” that Peru’s naval 
policy be “fixed so it cannot be altered by a new government.”  This could only be done, he 
insisted, if obstinate senior-level officers were cut out of institutional decision-making and 
replaced by U.S. personnel.   The assumption by U.S. officers of executive authority was 
particularly necessary at the Escuela Naval, the Minister argued, where in years past Captain 
Charles G. Davy’s leadership had effected a far-ranging transformation in Peruvian officer 
education.  Peru wanted to see such innovative work resume, including the importation of 
curriculum, texts, and practices from the U.S. Naval Academy.  Such reforms could only be 
assured of success if an American officer was again placed in charge at La Punta.  Saldías 
augmented his case for executive authority by again demonstrating his government’s 
willingness to play on U.S. fears of growing European influence in Peru.  His government 
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desired greater cooperation with the U.S. Navy in aviation, he noted, both by sending 
Peruvian pilots to train in the United States and by contracting for an American naval 
aviation mission to undertake education and training in Peru.  Saldías wrote that he was 
“most anxious” to conclude agreements with Washington on both fronts, but took care to 
note that the Italian government, which already maintained an aviation mission in the 
country, had recently offered to expand the number of Peruvian pilots invited to train in 
Italian military aviation schools.  It would be most embarrassing, he stressed, for Peru to 
refuse the Italian offer if it did not have a compelling American alternative.  At the same 
time, he concluded, there were no doubt significant efficiencies to be gained by having both 
naval and naval aviation missions from the same country.
27
 
 Peruvian persistence helped carry the day.  In early 1939 the State and Navy 
Departments began to seriously entertain the idea of allowing the naval mission to Peru to 
assume broader authorities over the Peruvian Navy.  But the larger force moving 
Washington’s hand was growing concern over hemispheric security.  As historian Max P. 
Friedman has noted, by late 1938 the Roosevelt administration believed “the most immediate 
security threat” facing the United States was the possibility of German destabilization of 
Latin American governments.
28
  Reports to that effect aroused considerable concern within 
the State Department and the White House.  In November of that year Breckinridge Long, 
Roosevelt’s former ambassador to Italy, reported finding strong evidence of active Nazi 
efforts to foment “political insurrection” in Brazil and Argentina during a regional fact-
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finding mission for the White House.
29
  Among the evidence Long collected was a German 
dispatch that the Brazilian government had intercepted between a retired German General 
living in Brazil and Nazi Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop in Berlin.  The message 
was that “preparation for the armed movement is already well initiated,” and informed Berlin 
that “a good network of resident agents” existed in the southern Brazilian states of Minas 
Gerais, Sao Paulo, and Paraná.  In Sao Paulo alone, the general estimated, the network’s 
“effectives” comprised more than 35-percent of the population and included Germans, 
Japanese, Italians, and Brazilians.  Should those agents be successful in fomenting a civil 
war, he assured, the pro-Nazi presence meant that “everything will take care of itself.”
30
  This 
report was particularly alarming to Roosevelt, who received it on December 15th and brought 
it to the attention of his cabinet the very next day.  Subsequently he had Welles cable 
Secretary of State Cordell Hull, already in Lima for the Eighth International Conference of 
American States, instructing him to pursue a declaration of all states in attendance that they 
“shall not permit any non-American state to assist or abet in the fomenting of internal 
disorder in any American republic.”
31
  U.S. efforts at Lima to secure such a wide-ranging 
inter-American commitment were stymied, as they had been at Buenos Aires two years 
earlier, by Argentine resistance.  The Declaration of Lima produced by the conference 
contained a weaker statement of inter-American solidarity than Roosevelt had hoped.
32
  But 
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in the wake of the disappointment, the alarming reports that continued to emanate from South 
America moved the administration to step up its efforts at military and naval cooperation on 
the continent.  The next month, as 1939 dawned, the inter-agency working group of the State, 
War, and Navy Departments that the administration had formed to coordinate the 
government’s hemispheric defense efforts (an entity known as the Standing Liaison 
Committee, or SLC), discussed the apparent acceleration of Nazi efforts to subvert South 
American governments and began weighing options to combat it.  
 Chaired by Sumner Welles, the committee was especially worried that large German 
populations in South America, especially in Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile, could be pushed 
into cooperating with Nazi military efforts to overthrow established governments on the 
continent.  Welles believed that such prospects were “unfortunately not remote 
possibilities.”
33
  It was against this backdrop that, at the same January meeting, the 
committee weighed options for expanding U.S. naval and military cooperation in South 
America.  The priority in such cooperation went to countries such as Peru that, like the 
countries in question, also had substantial European populations.  Accordingly, the first issue 
the SLC took up after discussing the recent revelations of German subversive efforts in 
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Brazil was the granting of executive control to the U.S. naval mission in Peru.  In their 
deliberations, committee members were impressed by the case made by Minister Saldías in 
his aide-memoire to Laurence Duggan.  Allowing U.S. officers to assume command of the 
Peruvian Navy could certainly put them “in a very difficult position,” Chief of Naval 
Operations William Leahy noted, but the rewards of such an arrangement could be worth the 
risks – especially if it paved the way for the establishment of a U.S. naval aviation mission to 
replace the Italian aviation mission whose contracts would expire later that year.  The other 
SLC principals, Welles and Army Chief of Staff Malin Craig, agreed, provided that such 
expanded authority be accompanied by a broad “escape clause” protecting U.S. personnel 
from the kinds of entanglements that beset the Leguía-era naval mission.  U.S. officials 
remained insistent that American personnel not become involved in any foreign war or civil 
disturbance during their duty in Peru.  Yet given the prevailing threat to the Western 
Hemisphere, they were now open to assuming some risk in that regard.
34
  In retrospect it was 
a bold move because a war between Peru and Ecuador remained a reasonable possibility.  A 
settlement of the two countries’ border dispute remained elusive and tensions still simmered.  
Nevertheless, after two years of near-constant pressure from the Peruvian government, the 
United States seemed poised to accede to the Peruvian desire to grant the naval mission 
executive powers. 
 It was a change supported by mission members themselves, though U.S. Navy leaders 
in Washington viewed it with skepticism.  For naval mission chief Bruce Canaga, executive 
authority held the promise that U.S. personnel could achieve more successful outcomes in 
their work.  In March 1939 he had voiced opposition to the idea, writing to ONI that “it 
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doesn’t make any difference how hard one works” in Peru – “if you turn your back they go 
back to type and there is no money for the Navy.”
35
  But throughout that year his mounting 
frustration with the mission’s lack of results, which he blamed on chronic budget shortfalls 
and the intransigence of resentful senior-level officers, convinced Canaga that having greater 
control could yield better results.  In August he wrote to ONI that the persistence of the 
situation in Peru had “very much changed” his view.  In order to fulfill the mission’s original 
charge of “fending off the European powers,” he wrote, mission personnel needed to be in a 
position “to force our ideas” because, as advisors, mission members’ recommendations often 
did “not get a whole long ways” through Peru’s naval bureaucracy.  The reasons for this, in 
his estimation, were as clear as ever:  a scarcity of money made it impossible to operate with 
more than the “really vital necessities,” he argued, while senior officers consistently failed 
cooperate in carrying out the mission’s recommendations.  Behind Canaga’s frustration, 
though, were doubts that Peruvians could effectively manage their own affairs.  Explaining 
his change of heart on the issue of executive authority, he wrote that “As long as I thought 
that it would be possible to teach these people anything I was against that [assuming 
executive authority].”  But now, after nearly a year and a half on duty in Peru, Canaga 
concluded that Peruvians were incapable of ever improving their Navy on their own.  Having 
Americans assume control of Peru’s Navy was, in his view, “the only way to get real 
efficiency.”
36
  Yet Canaga’s superiors in ONI were not convinced.  By then the State 
Department had already withdrawn its opposition to letting the mission assume executive 
authority.  In the face of the threat of Nazi aggression in the hemisphere, U.S. policy deemed 
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the rewards of closer naval cooperation with Peru to be worth the risks.  But the concerns 
ONI Director R.S. Holmes had raised nearly two years earlier remained valid, ONI leaders 
insisted.  Placing Americans in command of a Peru’s naval establishment could enflame the 
Peru-Ecuador border situation, they cautioned, and could unwittingly align the United States 
too firmly with one or more particular political factions within Peru.  While it was the U.S. 
Navy’s job to help carry out American foreign policy and not to make it, ONI leaders 
believed, it seemed distinctly within the realm of possibility that a grant of executive 




 Yet in the face of a growing threat to hemispheric security, foreign policy 
considerations outweighed the kinds of concerns expressed by ONI.  At the same time that it 
embraced executive authority for the U.S. naval mission in Peru for political reasons, the 
Roosevelt administration was busy expanding the number, size, and scope of its naval and 
military missions throughout Latin America.  For example, in its February 1939 meeting the 
SLC discussed the desirability of expanding the U.S. naval mission to Brazil.  The hope was 
that that mission, established in 1936 mainly to advise the Brazilian Naval War College, 
could get involved in making more substantive improvements to the Brazilian Navy.
38
  In 
April the Committee fielded a request from the Colombian government to send up to twenty 
additional personnel to the U.S. naval mission there, with an emphasis on officers expert in 
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  Chief of Naval Operations William Leahy feared such developments.  If the 
mission in Colombia were expanded, he argued, then other Latin American nations would 
undoubtedly demand similar treatment.  Welles, however, citing Colombia’s “special 
position” in the Americas, expressed unhesitating approval.
40
  Deeper naval-military 
cooperation with South American nations, he believed, would yield both practical benefits 
and political benefits for Washington’s inter-American policy.   
 In key cases like Brazil and Colombia, such aid could help improve navies that the 
Roosevelt administration believed could make real contributions to a U.S.-led defense of the 
Americas, while closer naval and military links with other South American nations, whose 
militaries were less likely to contribute operationally, would nevertheless burnish 
Washington’s political efforts to build solidarity among the American republics.  The 
political imperative became even more important after the outbreak of war in Europe in early 
September 1939.  That month the SLC decided the United States should offer naval and 
military missions to all Latin American nations that were losing European missions to the 
exigencies of the war.
41
  One such nation was Peru’s southern neighbor, Chile, part of the 
continent’s “southern cone” that had historically maintained close naval and military ties 
with Great Britain and Germany.
42
  At the September meeting of the SLC, Welles reported 
that the Roosevelt administration had just received a request for “assistance of a practical 
kind” from Chile to improve its Navy and Army.  It was the first time Chile had sought such 
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assistance from Washington, he noted, and he recommended that the Committee do 
everything within its power to respond favorably to the request.  Underscoring the political 




 The outbreak of war in Europe and subsequent developments in inter-American 
affairs confirmed the essentially political function of the U.S. naval mission in Peru.  
Members of the mission continued to judge their progress against the advances made by their 
Leguía-era predecessors, and focused on making substantive improvements to the Peruvian 
Navy.  However, they found their efforts held in check when they ran counter to the thrust of 
U.S. hemispheric policy.  In late September, just weeks after Hitler’s Wehrmacht had 
stormed into Poland, representatives of all the American republics gathered in Panama to 
assess the war’s impact on the Americas.  Delegates to the meeting unanimously approved a 
general statement of neutrality, established mechanisms to boost inter-American trade, and 
most importantly, created an offshore buffer zone of between three hundred and one 
thousand miles around the Americas that was to be “free from the commission of any hostile 
act by any non-American belligerent.”
44
  The zone was to be patrolled jointly by the navies 
of the American republics.  However, most Latin American nations lacked the naval power to 
make meaningful contributions to its enforcement.
45
  It was a problem that many Latin 
American nations, interested in improving their military establishments, would aim to 
address during the war years. 
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 Many nations, Peru among them, saw in the war an opportunity to gain U.S. support 
for their military and naval plans under the banner of hemispheric defense.  In late 1939 
Captain Canaga, whose frustrations with the mission’s lack of impact throughout its first year 
and a half were well known in Washington, gave voice to the Peruvian Navy’s aspirations by 
drafting a reform program calling for new ships and equipment as well as substantial 
increases in annual appropriations.  Even though the U.S. mission was equipped with 
executive authority, his memorandum stated that it would be a waste of Peruvian resources to 
maintain the naval mission without giving the Navy the resources required “to justify the 
work of the mission.”  The plan specified appropriations of four to five million dollars per 
year as the minimum needed to achieve a meaningful overhaul of the Peruvian fleet.  Mindful 
of the diplomatic difficulties that had attended naval mission chief Clark Woodward’s 
proposed naval buildup in 1923, the State Department put an end to Canaga’s effort before 
the officer could even present his recommendations to Peru’s Minister of Marine.  Such high 
naval expenditures would place an undue burden on the already strained finances of Peru’s 
government, embassy staffer George Butler wrote to Sumner Welles in Washington.  Beyond 
that, he continued, permitting the U.S. naval mission to guide a buildup of the Peruvian Navy 
at that moment could endanger American aims for hemispheric defense.  Outside of perhaps 
Brazil and Argentina, Butler argued, U.S. assistance to South American navies could only 
serve to improve their effectiveness against neighboring countries and would yield no real 
benefits for a broader U.S.-led defense of the Americas.  The risk was that by extending such 
help, the United States could embolden countries with longstanding grievances against 
neighbors to resort to force.  To the Roosevelt administration, peace and tranquility 
throughout the hemisphere was essential to ensuring that the Americas could withstand a 
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possible assault by Germany.  Tensions among Latin American nations, such as those that 
lingered between Peru and Ecuador, were seen as possible threats to inter-American unity. 
 Butler’s memorandum underscored the administration’s position that American naval 
and military missions should do nothing to raise tensions in South America.  Such missions 
had “a distinct political value apart from their technical work,” he stressed, and in countries 
like Peru, whose Navy operated under “serious handicaps,” the “political aspect…may be 
more important than [the naval mission] doing the best professional job.”  Certainly it was 
“most desirable to maintain the mission and to do the best possible job under existing 
conditions,” he added, for mission members could “do much toward assuring discipline, 
good organization and honesty in administration” in the Peruvian Navy without jeopardizing 
Washington’s inter-American policy.  But in Peru as in so many other Latin American 
countries, the “political aspect” was of overriding importance.
46
  Sumner Welles and 
Laurence Duggan, the State Department’s leading voices on Latin American issues, agreed.
47
  
In short, Butler’s message confirmed, the work of naval and military missions in Peru, and 
throughout Latin America, was fundamentally diplomatic.  Appearances were key. 
                                                          
46
 In this remarkable memorandum, Butler offered one of the clearest statements found anywhere in State 
Department or Navy records on U.S. naval and military assistance to Latin America during the World War II 
years.  He wrote that “it seems to me that our missions must necessarily have widely different objectives in the 
respective countries.  In Brazil and Argentina they might shoot the works and aim at doing a first rate 
professional job.  But a naval or aviation mission in Ecuador – or even in Peru or Chile under present conditions 
– must start out under serious handicaps.  The material to work with simply does not exist.  It seems to me that 
the political aspect is the most important one in such cases.”  George Butler, First Secretary of U.S. Embassy to 
Laurence Duggan, October 20, 1939, RG 59, File 823.30/243 ½ , National Archives. 
47
 In a memorandum to Welles commenting on Butler’s dispatch from Lima, Duggan wrote “However irksome 
it may be to the officers on details to these countries not to have sufficient equipment with which to do a good 
professional job, nevertheless there is a very important political value in having these missions in these 
countries.  Their mere presence in times like these can contribute to the development of opinion in support of 
the things which the American countries consider valuable, as set forth in the preamble of the Declaration of 
Lima.  It does seem desirable and important, therefore, that the members of our missions have an understanding 
of the larger role that they can play in these countries in order that they not become restless and recommend 
huge military expenses to the disadvantage of trade and investment interests.”  See Laurence Duggan to Sumner 
Welles, October 30, 1939, RG 59, File 823.30/243 ½ , National Archives. 
266 
 
 Within the bounds set by the State Department, U.S. naval cooperation with Latin 
American nations intensified as the perceived threat to the Americas grew throughout 1940.  
At the beginning of that year, the U.S. goal was to signal inter-American unity by renewing 
all existing naval and military mission contracts that were set to expire, and to secure new 
mission agreements in as many Latin American countries as possible.  In Peru, this meant 
negotiating a longer-term contract to keep the U.S. naval mission in place and, in accordance 
with Peruvian wishes, formalizing its executive powers over that nation’s Navy.  
Deliberations over the naval mission’s renewal dragged on from January through April with 
little in the way of concrete progress, though, as American officials weighed Peruvian 
requests that the United States defray its costs by picking up a substantial share of the 
mission’s overall tab.
48
  Meanwhile, the original two-year contract concluded in 1938 expired 
in March.  At that point, military developments in Europe intervened and imparted a new 
sense of urgency to the negotiations.  In the span of little more than six weeks in May and 
June 1940, German armies overran the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg en route to 
conquering France.  By the end of June, only Britain stood between Hitler and total 
domination of Western Europe.
49
  To the Roosevelt administration as to much of the world, 
the Nazi military machine looked invincible, and the threat it posed to the Western 
Hemisphere loomed larger than ever.
50
  Worried that continued military success in Europe 
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might lead Hitler to unleash a strike against the Americas, in July representatives of all the 
American republics gathered in Havana, Cuba, and agreed that no “new world” European 
colonies should be allowed to fall into German hands as a result of military developments in 
Europe.  In inter-American naval and military cooperation, time was of the essence. 
 In the face of what it saw as a grave and growing threat to hemispheric security, the 
Roosevelt administration was increasingly anxious to conclude the Peruvian naval mission 
agreement along with a host of others.
51
  In short order U.S. officials agreed to shoulder a 
larger share of the financial burden not only for its mission in Peru, but for its missions 
throughout Latin America.
52
  In June 1940 the U.S. Congress passed and President Roosevelt 
signed legislation expanding the government’s authority to “assist the governments of the 
American republics in increasing their military and naval establishments.”
53
  At the same 
time, the Roosevelt administration hastened to wrap up an agreement to finally send a naval 
aviation mission to Peru – something that Peruvian officials, anxious to reconnect with the 
aviation successes achieved under Commander Grow and the Leguía-era mission, had first 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
countries will undertake immediately activities with a view to the overthrow of existing governments.”  See 
Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles to U.S. Ambassador to Chile, May 24, 1940, Sumner Welles Papers, 
Box 150, Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library, Hyde Park, NY. 
51
 Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945: With a New Afterword, 234-36.  
Dallek notes that although German documents subsequently revealed that “Roosevelt and most Americans 
greatly exaggerated the German threat to the Americas” in the summer of 1940, “Hitler’s past behavior and 
growing military capability left Roosevelt little choice but to take all possible precautions against an eventual 
attack.” 
52
 In December, 1939 Welles had written to Roosevelt notifying him that the Peruvian government was having 
difficulty finding sufficient funds to pay for a continuation of the U.S. naval mission in that country.  “A 
withdrawal of our naval mission on whatever ground,” he stressed, “would be tantamount to a rejection” of the 
advances the mission had facilitated in overall U.S.-Peruvian relations, and would open the way for greater 
European influence within Peru.  See Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles to President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, December 16, 1939, FDR Official File, OF-287, Box 1, Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library, 
Hyde Park, NY. 
53




raised in late 1938.
54
  The signing of naval mission and aviation mission contracts with Peru 
at the end of July 1940 ensured that one of Washington’s longest-running military-to-military 
relationships in the Americas, and one that in many respects had been the test bed for the 
system of naval and military advising on which U.S. designs for hemispheric defense 
depended, would continue until the external threats to the Western Hemisphere subsided.
55
  
Although its work had often fallen short of the expectations set by the Peruvian Navy and 
officers of the mission itself, from the point of view of U.S. efforts to build inter-American 
solidarity, the naval mission’s work was a success. 
GOODWILL CRUISING AND HEMISPHERIC DEFENSE 
 
 As the Roosevelt administration re-established the U.S. naval mission in Peru and 
expanded its naval and military advising efforts throughout Latin America in the interests of 
hemispheric security, it continued to employ the other component of its “good neighbor” 
naval diplomacy” – goodwill naval cruises and port visits – for the same purpose.   
Dependent as its inter-American policy was on communicating U.S. strength and cultivating 
inter-American accord, it is not surprising that the Roosevelt administration made public 
demonstrations of American naval prowess in Latin America a priority as hemispheric 
security concerns began to dominate.  The success of naval visits to Latin American ports in 
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the earlier years of Roosevelt’s presidency had made them an indispensable part of his 
administration’s “good neighbor” diplomacy, and the U.S.S. Ranger’s 1937 visit to Lima 
during the Inter-American Technical Aviation Conference had signaled the utility of such 
cruises to U.S. efforts at building hemispheric unity.  The latter underscored an emerging 
consensus in the Roosevelt administration:  U.S. naval vessels and aircraft plying the waters 
and skies of Latin America could not only send messages of friendship and good 
neighborliness, but could also send an undeniable message of U.S. strength and resolve to 
lead a defense of the Western Hemisphere from external attack.  From that point forward, 
such cruises had a clear role in Roosevelt’s efforts to build inter-American solidarity. 
 As he had earlier in his presidency, Roosevelt himself emphasized the importance of 
goodwill cruises to his administration’s inter-American policy in the late 1930s.  The subject 
of goodwill naval cruises to Latin America was among the first items discussed by the 
Standing Liaison Committee, for example, at its first meeting in April 1938.  During that 
meeting, Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles advised SLC members that “the President 
has agreed that part of the fleet should visit the east coast of South America this summer,” 
and that Roosevelt would be taking the issue up directly with the Navy Department.
56
  When 
the Committee weighed the specifics of that cruise, the centerpiece of which was the aircraft 
carrier U.S.S. Enterprise, Welles made a clear connection between that carrier’s impending 
visit to South America and the past Latin American cruises of the U.S.S. Ranger, which in 
his view had set the standard for how such visits should be conducted.  In view of the 
Ranger’s successful visit to Lima the year before, Welles noted, a visit to Brazil by the 
Enterprise without aircraft “might be seen as disappointing” to its Brazilian hosts.  Moreover, 
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memories of the performance given by the Ranger’s aircraft in the skies over Lima during the 
Inter-American Technical Aviation Conference were still fresh.  It would be better from an 
inter-American policy point of view, Welles concluded, for the Enterprise to embark with a 
full complement of aircraft and carry out aerial demonstrations wherever practicable.
57
 
 Roosevelt continued to stress the importance of naval cruises in Latin America into 
1939, as U.S. concerns about German subversion in South America grew.  In September 
1938 he had directed the Navy and State Departments to begin coordinating a springtime 
visit of a division of cruisers to South America.  The president’s stated intent was to have the 
vessels visit ports that he himself had not visited during his own trips to Latin American 
waters, meaning a great deal of its emphasis would be on west coast ports such as Valparaiso, 
Chile and Lima, Peru.
58
  In November, as planning for the cruise was just getting underway, 
Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles alerted the Standing Liaison Committee to yet 
another “German plot to create trouble in Brazil, Uruguay and Argentina.”  It was the kind of 
information that U.S. intelligence assets had been reporting to Washington with increasing 
regularity in the latter months of 1938, and to Roosevelt, seemed like confirmation of the 
assessment provided by special emissary Breckinridge Long.
59
  Administration officials, 
including the president himself, were more and more consumed with what they saw as a 
gathering Nazi threat in South America.  In such a climate, public displays of naval strength 
in Latin American waters took on even greater importance to U.S. policy.  Accordingly, 
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Roosevelt reiterated his desire to send a division of heavy cruisers to South America 
following springtime naval exercises in the Caribbean.  Now, however, for the first time U.S. 
vessels would circumnavigate the entirety of South America and make a “goodwill” cruise a 
show of force for the whole continent to behold – beginning at La Guaira, Venezuela, and 
continuing southward along the east coast before passing through the Straits of Magellan and 
proceeding up the west coast for large stops in Chile and Peru.
60
 
 In some respects, the six-week cruise of the U.S. Navy’s 7th Cruiser Division that 
took shape in April and May 1939 was little different than the goodwill cruises that had come 
before it.  At each stop the Division’s commander, Husband E. Kimmel (Rear Admiral, U.S. 
Navy), his staff, and enlisted crew engaged in public diplomacy activities intended to burnish 
their nation’s good neighbor credentials.  In large measure these activities conformed to 
what, by then, had become a familiar pattern in America’s naval diplomacy in Latin 
American waters: there were highly public displays of U.S. respect for Latin American 
nations’ sovereignty, along with efforts to maximize the visibility of the ships and their crews 
before the local public.  At Buenos Aires and in the Peruvian port of Callao, for example, 
Kimmel laid wreaths at monuments to national heroes – gestures that, as the U.S. Chargé 
d’Affaires in Argentina noted, had become “traditional” for U.S. naval crews during the good 
neighbor years.  And during the vessels’ four-day anchorage in the Argentine capital, their 
decks played host to “no fewer than” fifteen thousand local visitors while throngs of others 
gathered at the pier.
61
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 But along with these established elements of good neighbor naval diplomacy 
appeared other features that betrayed both the depth of the threat that officials within the 
Roosevelt administration perceived in South America and the sense of urgency they felt 
about confronting it.  During the ships’ stay in Argentina, a nation that had proven itself a 
thorn in the side of Roosevelt’s efforts to unify the hemisphere at inter-American meetings in 
1936 and 1938, public remarks by U.S. officials stressed the shared history and heritage of 
the Americas and sought to contrast their history of peaceful, cooperative coexistence with 
the turbulent international situation prevailing in Europe.  The American desire to influence 
Argentina’s hemispheric policy was palpable.  Addressing a gathering of Argentine and 
American officials during the ships’ visit to Buenos Aires, U.S. Chargé d’Affaires S. Pinkney 
Tuck noted that the world had recently witnessed a “collapse of the forces which modern 
civilization has developed to resolve international problems,” and emphasized that, in an 
increasingly dangerous world, it was important that “no shadow of misunderstanding or 
suspicion” exist between the American republics.
62
  In Peru, which had been more 
cooperative with U.S. efforts despite being led by a Europhile President, Oscar Benavides, 
who was reserved toward the United States, U.S. officials reinforced such rhetoric with 
gestures designed to underscore the two nations’ comparatively deep naval ties.
63
  Their hope 
was that the bonds between the two nations’ navies could help inspire Peruvian officials to 
make public statements of solidarity with U.S. aims for hemispheric security, and in doing 
so, help further built inter-American solidarity.  On the Division’s third day in the port of 
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Callao, after a full schedule of sporting competitions, receptions, and ceremonies, Admiral 
Kimmel took the extraordinary step of welcoming President Benavides and a host of high-
ranking officials aboard his flagship, the U.S.S. San Francisco, as the three vessels of the 
Division embarked for a brief demonstration of “simple maneuvers” at sea.  Just beyond the 
waters of Callao harbor, as the ships demonstrated high-speed movements, their crews 
launched two aircraft each, which subsequently flew in formation with Peruvian planes in a 
visual representation of inter-American naval cooperation.  The demonstration had the 
desired effect.  During the on-board lunch that followed, Benavides remarked that he saw in 
the U.S. ships far more than a mere display of raw naval power.  Rather, their presence in 
Peruvian waters represented “the strength of the historic ties of friendship and mutual regard 




 While officials in the Roosevelt administration welcomed such sentiments as 
evidence that Benavides and his government were moving more clearly into the U.S. fold, 
they were no doubt more encouraged by Peruvian press retrospectives on Cruiser Division 
Seven’s visit.
65
  On June 1st, the day after the American vessels departed for Panama, an 
editorial in La Cronica concluded that the six days when “the flag of the United States flew 
in Callao together with the bicolor of Peru” had been far more than “a simple expression of 
protocol.”  The visit represented a “sincere and fruitful” renewal of “expressions of fraternal 
camaraderie and continental solidarity” between the longtime partners at a time when South 
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American nations had to be guardians of their unity.  The friendship between Peru and the 
United States had been founded more than a century earlier on shared ideals, the paper stated, 
and would endure as an expression of “true americanism” in the face of gathering danger.
66
  
The positive reports flowing from Peru were “typical” of the news flowing into Washington 
about Cruiser Division Seven’s South American tour, reported the State Department’s 
Division of the American Republics.  It gave momentum to the Roosevelt administration’s 
efforts, and was entirely satisfactory to the president himself, the architect of the voyage.
67
 
 The visit of the Seventh Cruiser Division to Peru in May 1939 underscored that 
nation’s value to U.S. naval diplomacy at a critical juncture.  Peru had been the test bed for 
the system of U.S. naval and military advising that Washington was deploying throughout 
Latin America in an attempt to stiffen hemispheric defense.  At the same time, Peruvian 
shores had long been among the friendliest and oft-visited in the hemisphere for U.S. Navy 
goodwill cruises.  Indeed, Admiral Kimmel noted in his after-action report that there seemed 
a “casual” attitude and “a tendency to take things for granted” among Peruvian officials 
during the visit – developments he chalked up to the Peruvians’ comfort with a long-term 
U.S. naval presence in their country.  The naval mission had been reestablished after a five-
year absence, he noted, while American naval vessels had been “no uncommon sight” in 
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Peruvian waters throughout much of the decade.
68
  Such intimate naval ties made the U.S. 
task of keeping Peru within the inter-American hemispheric defense network considerably 
easier than it otherwise might have been. 
A DEEPENING SECURITY PARTNERSHIP 
 
 Aided in no small measure by both strands of American naval diplomacy, U.S.-
Peruvian security ties, which had grown tighter as the external threat to the Americas grew in 
the late 1930s, entered their closest period since the Leguía years with the election of Manuel 
Ignacio Prado y Ugarteche to the Peruvian presidency in late 1939.  Prado, the son of a 
wealthy, politically active family from the Peruvian aristocracy, proved to be a willing 
partner who supported U.S. and Allied aims to a degree that Benavides, who had done more 
to support American aims for hemispheric security than U.S. officials had expected, never 
entertained.  Prado’s father had been President of Peru at the outset of the War of the Pacific 
against Chile, and in the eyes of many Peruvians had tainted his family’s name by fleeing the 
country during that conflict’s opening months.  His patriotism in question because of his 
father’s actions, the younger Prado had much to prove to his countrymen both as a candidate 
and as president.  He rode the promise of a broad middle-class tax cut to victory over the 
ineffective José Quesada Larrea in the November elections, and as Daniel Masterson notes, 
set out to govern as a “conservative modernizer” once in office.  In practical terms, that 
meant Prado would pursue a more intimate economic relationship with the United States, 
which, for its part, was preparing to significantly expand its Latin American trade in order to 
capitalize on the inevitable collapse of Latin America’s European trade as a result of the war. 
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 Prado’s would be Peru’s most pro-American administration since Leguía (1919-
1930), something that was politically possible because of the unique alignment of political 
forces within the country at the time.  Most significantly, the Alianza Popular 
Revolucionaria Americana (APRA), the leftist party founded in the 1920s in opposition to 
Leguía’s brand of export-led development, and which had fought a pitched battle against the 
government of President Luis M. Sanchez Cerro in the early 1930s, was no longer staunchly 
opposed to such cooperation.  By the later part of the decade APRA, which had been forced 
underground in the later years of the Benavides administration, was busily moderating its 
core ideology in an attempt to regain its lost public standing.  Accordingly, Aprista leaders 
opted not to oppose Prado’s candidacy in the 1939 election, as they no doubt would have 
done under more normal circumstances, in the hope that he would support the party’s 
legalization once in office.
69
  Moreover, in an effort to curry favor in the United States, 
APRA founder and longtime U.S. critic Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre had even taken to 
praising both the Roosevelt administration’s Good Neighbor Policy and U.S. aims for 
hemispheric security.
70
  Such acts would have seemed incomprehensible just a few years 
before, and represented a sea-change in Peruvian politics.  Thus, by the late 1930s APRA no 
longer enjoyed the prominence it once had as the leading voice of Peru’s political left.  It also 
toned down its vocal criticism of Peru’s capitalist development, recognizing that the 
country’s improved economic fortunes had done much to undermine such appeals in the eyes 
of Peru’s voting public.  As a result, Prado faced no real political threat on his left as the 
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1939 election approached.  Nor did he encounter any real opposition from Peru’s politically-
minded military establishment.  The Army, which had played the decisive role in Leguía’s 
1930 ouster, had just come through a decade of unprecedented growth and was flush with 
resources, the product of 1) having an Army man (Benavides) as president for much of the 
time, and 2) facing a possible ground war with Ecuador.  Enjoying the higher profile that 
came with a 300-percent increase in troop strength, Peruvian Army leaders looked to Prado, 
Benavides’ hand-picked candidate, to keep the good times rolling.
71
  At the same time, the 
Navy, whose budgets were consistently lean under Benavides, was nevertheless satisfied 
both with Benavides’ embrace of a U.S. naval mission as well as Prado’s more 
enthusiastically pro-U.S. outlook, which optimistic naval officers believed could only 
portend good things for their institution.
72
 
 As President, Prado was a stalwart friend of the Allied cause and a staunch supporter 
of U.S. aims for hemispheric security.  It was his administration that concluded the 
agreement that brought a U.S. aviation to Peru in mid-1940, closing the Italian mission 
Benavides had favored and opening Peru even further to U.S. military influence.
73
  That 
same year, the Peruvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs began issuing clear statements, pleasing 
to Washington, that were supportive of “the unity and general neutrality of the Pan-American 
system.”  And, also satisfactory to the Roosevelt administration, at the July 1940 meeting of 
American republics in Havana, Peruvian representatives signaled the Prado administration’s 
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willingness to prohibit the dissemination of potentially damaging “warlike propaganda” 
within Peru.
74
   
 Peru’s cooperation with Washington under Prado only accelerated after the United 
States entered the war in late 1941.  Peru broke diplomatic relations with the Axis powers in 
January 1942, only weeks after the Japanese attack on the U.S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, 
Hawaii.
75
  It also cooperated very closely with controversial Roosevelt administration efforts 
to round up and isolate persons of suspect nationalities (principally Japanese and German) 
during the war.  Between 1942 and 1945 Prado’s government arrested and deported nearly 
two thousand Peruvians of Japanese descent to the United States, where they were held in 
internment camps for the duration of the war.  It was a measure of collaboration that historian 
Lawrence Clayton calls a “tragic persecution” of a vibrant and ultimately unthreatening 
minority of the Peruvian population.
76
  It also served as a clear indication of Prado’s devotion 
to the Allied cause. 
 Prado also put Peruvian resources at the disposal of the United States and the Allied 
war effort.  At his direction, the Peruvian Navy supported U.S. naval units guarding southern 
approaches to the Panama Canal.  In 1942 he cleared the way for the United States to build a 
new airfield, El Pato, near the northwestern coastal city of Talara, to further assist with Canal 
security and to provide protection to the nearby Talara oil fields.
77
  Perhaps most 
significantly, though, Prado ensured that Peru offered steadfast economic support for the 
Allied war effort.  Throughout the war years, Peru maintained steady exports of critical war 
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materials to the United States, including rubber, copper, vanadium, petroleum, cotton, and 
cinchona bark – the last an essential ingredient in the anti-malarial drug quinine needed by 
U.S. soldiers, sailors, and Marines fighting in the Pacific.
78
  As Jorge Ortiz Sotelo and Daniel 
Masterson note, although Peru made an indispensible contribution to the Allied war effort by 
continuing to ship these materials, its cooperation came at a significant cost.  Under Prado’s 
leadership the Peruvian economy, which like most Latin American economies was well-
positioned to parlay intensified wartime exchange with the United States into a sustained 
industrial and commercial boom, failed to implement a “coherent development strategy” and 
ended up becoming more dependent on U.S. assistance and foreign direct investment than 
ever before.  A sustainable development strategy could have taken shape, they argue, had 
Peru been successful – as other Latin American countries during the war were – in 
accumulating a substantial base of foreign exchange reserves.  However, in his effort to lend 
the greatest possible assistance to the Allied war effort, Prado made the fateful decision to 
maintain price controls on the war-critical raw materials Peru sent to the United States.  As a 
result, Peru’s foreign exchange reserves grew at a rate of only 55-percent during the war – far 
less than countries such as Brazil (635-percent), Colombia (540-percent), and Mexico (480-
percent), all of which let prices keep pace with market rates and whose economies derived 
greater long-term benefit from their wartime cooperation.
79
  In short, perhaps more than any 
other Latin American country, Peru embodied the ideal of wartime good neighborism 
envisaged by the Roosevelt administration.
80
  It offered unflinching support for Washington’s 
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aims before the United States became a belligerent, and only intensified that support 
afterward – at considerable cost to its own longer-term economic well-being. 
 It is important to note, however, that as one-sided as the wartime economic 
relationship between the United States and Peru ultimately turned out to be, Peru was 
successful in leveraging its broader relationship with Washington to secure other vital 
interests.  The Prado administration succeeded, for example, in securing more than $18 
million in U.S. military assistance under the 1941 Lend-Lease Act.  That assistance made the 
construction of the El Pato air base possible, and enabled to Peru to acquire a small number 
of military aircraft.  It was but a small share of the total amount of Lend-Lease aid the United 
States distributed to Latin American countries at approximately four percent, and certainly 
was not as much as Peruvians desired, but it did provide the Peru’s armed forces with a 
noticeable boost in strength.
81
 
 More significantly, Peru was able to leverage its relationship with the United States to 
effect a favorable settlement of its long-simmering border dispute with Ecuador.  The dispute 
had been especially heated dispute since Peruvian delegates walked out of U.S.-brokered 
negotiations in Washington in September 1938.  Emboldened by a military buildup 
undertaken by President Benavides and continued under Prado, Peruvian Army authorities 
made two critical strategic calculations in June 1941 aimed at resolving the longstanding 
stalemate.  First, as historian Robert Scheina notes, they determined that with the German 
Army penetrating deeply into the Soviet Union and with the Roosevelt administration 
undertaking a crash rearmament program to prepare the United States for war, Washington 
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would view the outbreak of any war in the Americas in 1941 as an “unwelcome distraction” 
and would do everything possible to settle it as quickly.  Accordingly, the Peruvian General 
Staff, confident of Peruvian Army’s superiority over Ecuador, devised a plan to rapidly 
invade, occupy, and hold the disputed areas of the frontier until Washington, desperate to put 
an end to inter-American discord, swooped in to facilitate negotiations that confirmed Peru’s 
gains.  Peruvian Army units in the contested border regions went on alert in June 1941 after 
American mediation efforts broke down entirely.   
 It was at this point that General Eloy Ureta, the Peruvian Army commander in the 
region, made a second critical strategic calculation:  he bet that President Prado, who up until 
that point had taken a firm but solidly diplomatic approach to resolving the crisis, would be 
politically unable to stop the Army from taking military action given that his family name 
was still tainted by his father’s actions during the War of the Pacific.  The president could not 
risk further sullying his family name by disavowing a military operation against Ecuador 
once it was underway, Army leaders concluded.  Their calculations were correct.  General 
Ureta ignored President Prado’s order that on-alert Army forces stand fast and avoid 
offensive action, and in late June informed the commander-in-chief that he would 
imminently be ordering units under his command to attack.  On July 5th the Peruvian assault 
went forward on two fronts – in a small disputed area near the Pacific coast and in a much 
larger area in the eastern interior.  Militarily, it was a rout for Peruvian forces.  The smaller, 
poorly equipped and ill-prepared Ecuadorian forces were no match for Peruvian ground units 
that had benefitted from years of favorable budgets and an influx of modern equipment.  The 
military campaign was over in a matter of weeks.  By mid-August, for all intents and 
purposes, the Ecuadorian Army ceased to exist as a viable field army.  Under intense 
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international pressure to halt the fighting, in October the two governments agreed on terms 
for a ceasefire.  Peruvian Army units halted active combat operations and became an army of 
occupation in the disputed areas.  For the Peruvian Army and the Prado administration, the 
wait for Washington’s diplomatic validation began.
82
 
 As Peruvian Army leaders had suspected they would, Peru’s territorial gains received 
quick validation.  The settlement was accelerated considerably by the Japanese attack on 
Pearl Harbor on December 7th, which raised the stakes for the United States and filled the 
Roosevelt administration with a new resolve to forge anti-Axis unity in the Americas.  A 
settlement of the Peru-Ecuador dispute, the only ongoing international conflict in the 
hemisphere, thus became an even more urgent matter than before.  It was a major concern of 
inter-American delegates who gathered at an emergency meeting in Rio de Janeiro in January 
1942 to address hemispheric security challenges stemming from U.S. involvement in the war.  
The meeting fell short of expectations in some respects, as Argentina and Chile, coastal 
nations that had longstanding ties with Germany and feared the prospect of military invasion, 
refused to break relations with the Axis nations.  But agreement proved easier to achieve on 
the issue of making peace between Peru and Ecuador.  Encouraged by the U.S. 
representative, Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles, and by the foreign ministers of 
Brazil, Argentina, and Chile, Peruvian delegate Alfredo Solf y Muro and Ecuadorian 
representative Julio Tobar Donoso signed a Protocol of Peace, Friendship and Limits on the 
conference’s last day.  The agreement broadly affirmed Peru’s complete military success and 
upheld Lima’s claims to most of the disputed areas.  As a result, the territorial area of 
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Ecuador was reduced by nearly one-half.  Included in the lost territory were tributaries of the 
Marañón River, which had given Ecuador access to the Amazon River and a means of 
accessing the Atlantic Ocean.  In that sense, Ecuador was a transcontinental nation no more.  
Given the highly charged diplomatic environment, however, there was little the Ecuadorian 
government – although bitterly disappointed – could do to resist.  For the United States, the 
overarching imperative was ensuring the peace and unity in the Americas.  Peru had proven 
itself a willing partner in that pursuit, and had demonstrated an ability to leverage U.S. 
concerns on behalf of its own interests.  The quick settlement of the boundary question on 
terms highly favorable to Peru underscores just how far the U.S.-Peruvian relationship had 
come since the difficult years just after the fall of Leguía.  As Lawrence Clayton concludes, it 






 For the United States, the close cooperation Peru provided before and during World 
War II served as an example of what was possible in inter-American relations, and helped 
facilitate broader inter-American collaboration in hemispheric security.  During World War 
II, few Latin American nations had stronger, more cordial diplomatic ties with the United 
States than did Peru.  Although its significance to U.S. military designs for hemispheric 
defense lagged behind that of nations like Colombia and Brazil, Peru’s history of close, 
cooperative naval relations with the United States recommended it to the Roosevelt 
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administration as a useful partner and ally in securing the Western Hemisphere from external 
threat.  The close relationship that the U.S. and Peruvian navies had developed during the 
1920s and early 1930s served as a foundation for the strong bilateral ties that bound the 
United States and Peru during the World War II years.  Moreover, it helped pave the way for 
broader naval and military cooperation that has characterized inter-American relations ever 
since.  Although the substantive accomplishments of the U.S. naval mission sent to Peru in 
1938 were comparatively modest in real terms, its presence served an important political 
purpose, and helped anchor that productive wartime relationship.  At the same time, goodwill 
visits by U.S. Navy vessels to Peruvian waters gave that cooperation a highly visible public 
dimension.  Together, both threads of U.S. naval diplomacy served as a springboard for 





 Peru offered staunch support to the United States and the Allies even after its 
territorial gains from Ecuador were confirmed at the January 1942 meeting of American 
Republics at Rio de Janeiro.  Throughout World War II, Peru continued to export critical raw 
materials to the United States at below-market prices.  The Peruvian and U.S. navies jointly 
patrolled the waters of the southeast Pacific Ocean.  And the administration of Peruvian 
President Manuel Prado carried on arresting and detaining persons of Japanese descent well 
into 1945.  In all respects, Peru was a stalwart ally of the United States, cooperating in 
strategic, economic, and diplomatic matters in equal measure.
1
  Although relations between 
the two nations had been cordial and generally cooperative before 1919, it is hard to imagine 
Peru offering such strong support to the United States and the Allied war effort during World 
War II in the absence of the interwar developments that drew the two nations together.  The 
most important of those developments, this dissertation contends, took place in the realm of 
naval affairs. 
 In the early 1920s, the naval relationship the United States developed with Peru 
enabled it to integrate the Andean nation into its expanding empire.  The key development in 
this regard was the sending of the U.S. naval mission to Peru in 1920, which gave 
Washington a substantial degree of strategic and economic influence within that country at a 
time when political conditions, both within the United States abroad, made the use of armed 
intervention in South America unthinkable.  At the invitation of Peruvian President Augusto 
                                                          
1
 Daniel Masterson and Jorge Ortiz Sotelo conclude that Peru was “one of the most ardent supporters of the 
Allied cause” throughout World War II, and that it “cooperated fully with the United States, economically, 




Leguía, naval mission members assumed positions of formal command within the Peruvian 
Navy, and quickly became key members of the president’s inner circle.  Their extraordinary 
access to the center of power gave U.S. foreign policymakers and naval leaders in 
Washington a tool with which to advance American interests in Peru and in the region.  U.S. 
Navy leaders, for example, saw the mission’s efforts to develop Peruvian naval education as 
a long-term good, believing that American security interests would be well served by having 
compatible, like-minded naval establishments in as many Latin American countries as 
possible.  This is visible also in the mission’s work to establish a modern submarine force as 
the cornerstone of the Peruvian fleet.  At the same time, U.S. diplomats looked favorably on 
mission members’ efforts to develop a national aviation system in Peru, believing that that 
nation’s need for foreign expertise in flight would create a valuable opening for American 
aviation concerns to enter the lucrative South American market.  All the while, both foreign 
policymakers and businessmen viewed the U.S. naval mission as a stabilizing influence in 
Peru.  The remarkable political stability that prevailed under Leguía, with the assistance of 
the U.S. naval mission, increased the confidence of American investors, who in turn 
showered that country with more than $100 million in loans – infusions of capital that, 
although they increased Peru’s indebtedness, fostered economic growth that further solidified 
Leguía’s grip on power.  By the late 1920s, the United States maintained no closer, more 
cordial relations with any nation in Latin America than it did with Leguía’s Peru.  The U.S. 
naval mission was integral to the development of that relationship, and helped pave the way 
for Peru’s integration into the American empire in the Western Hemisphere. 
 It is important to stress that, in casting the U.S. relationship with Peru during the 
interwar period in imperial terms, this dissertation is not suggesting that Peru stood passively 
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by as the United States dictated the course of the bilateral relationship.  Rather, it recognizes 
that Peruvian leaders retained a significant degree of agency in the relationship, and 
exercised considerable control over their nation’s relations with the United States.  In no 
aspect of the bilateral relationship was this more apparent than in naval affairs.  In the 1920s, 
for example, President Leguía proved quite adept at pushing American foreign policymakers 
further than they wished to go in lending support to his naval designs.  He pushed the United 
States to sell Peru modern naval hardware (especially submarines) early and often in his 
presidency.  When he ran into opposition, Leguía resorted to manipulating the American 
bureaucracy, playing Navy and State Department leaders against one another to create 
openings through which he could achieve his objectives.  And, as in the case of the 
Woodward imbroglio of late 1923, the dictator used the naval mission’s executive authority 
over the Peruvian Navy to give his designs the appearance of American approval.   
 Throughout his reign, Leguía strengthened his hand by using flattery and public 
professions of fondness for American values to ingratiate himself to Washington.  For 
example, he declared the Fourth of July a Peruvian national holiday, and hung a large portrait 
of U.S. President James Monroe – father of the “Monroe Doctrine,” the cornerstone of U.S. 
hemispheric policy since the 1820s – in the presidential palace.
2
  Moreover, rarely did Leguía 
or his representatives speak publicly of the United States without referring to it as the “Great 
Republic of the North.”
3
  Over time, moves such as these caused U.S. foreign policymakers 
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to see Leguía as an enlightened leader worthy of their nation’s full support.  Each adoring 
superlative Leguía lobbed at the United States reinforced American diplomats’ deep-seated 
belief (conditioned by racial attitudes) that the mestizo Leguía was uniquely suited to lead the 
heavily indigenous, “ignorant” nation to a brighter, more prosperous future.
4
  Leguía’s highly 
public, freely expressed admiration for the United States had the desired effect.  U.S. support 
for his government grew consistently stronger throughout the 1920s, and by the end of the 
decade, Washington was deeply invested in his rule. 
 Another way Peruvian leaders throughout the interwar period exercised control over 
their relationship with the United States was by playing on U.S. fears of European 
encroachment in South America.  Leguía, for one, employed this tactic again and again – 
first, to secure a U.S. naval mission in 1920, and later, in an attempt wither U.S. resistance to 
the idea of sending his government a mission of Army officers to complement the work of 
the naval mission.  As proficient as he was in deploying the boogeyman of European 
meddling to get what he wanted from Washington, however, Leguía’s accomplishments in 
this regard were surpassed by those of President Oscar Benavides (1933-1939), whose 
Europhilic tendencies gave American foreign policymakers fits in the late 1930s.  In late 
1937 Benavides’ government dangled the prospect of accepting a British naval mission in 
order to press ongoing naval mission negotiations with Washington toward a productive end.  
To U.S. officials preoccupied with inter-American solidarity and hemispheric security, the 
prospect of Europeans (even the British) gaining sway over a Latin American military 
establishment was unacceptable.  The move had the effect the Peruvians desired, as the U.S. 
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State Department moved quickly to close the deal and dispatch a new naval mission to Lima.  
In another shrewd, well-timed move, at almost the same moment Benavides contracted with 
the Mussolini government of Italy for a mission of aviation officers to advise the Peruvian 
Navy and Army.  Coming on the heels of the successful naval mission negotiations, this put 
the Roosevelt administration on edge.  The net effect was that from late 1937 until it 
ultimately succeeded in securing an agreement in 1940, the United States made sending a 
U.S. naval aviation mission to Peru to displace the Italian one a priority of its policy toward 
Peru. 
 Also visible in the naval dimensions of the U.S.-Peruvian relationship in the interwar 
period is a clear divergence, persistent in U.S. foreign policy, between professed ideals and 
actions.  In the years immediately following World War I, the United States under President 
Woodrow Wilson championed the principles of democracy and national self-determination in 
the world, and led international efforts to build a new, permanently peaceful global order.  If 
American policy at the time had been consistent with the Wilson administration’s high-
minded progressive rhetoric, U.S. relations with Peru would certainly have proceeded along a 
far different track in the 1920s.  As it stood, though, postwar U.S. policy toward Peru, and 
Latin America more broadly, turned on traditional strategic and economic concerns.  A 
strong desire to prevent European nations from reasserting their dominant influence over 
South American military and naval establishments helped drive the Wilson administration’s 
favorable response to Leguía’s request for a U.S. naval mission.  Meanwhile, the keen 
interest of American business in exploiting Peru’s rich natural resources led U.S. foreign 
policymakers to quickly embrace Leguía’s open invitation for American investment in Peru.  
Together, the prevalence of strategic and economic concerns left little room for progressive 
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idealism in Washington’s approach to Peru.
5
  To U.S. foreign policymakers, Augusto Leguía 
was the kind of leader who could protect and promote tangible American interests.  As a 
result, U.S. foreign policymakers in administrations from Wilson through Herbert Hoover 
saw Leguía’s growing authoritarianism, and the stability it provided, as a net positive for 
American interests. 
 The U.S. naval mission served as a guarantor of that prized stability.  It gave Leguía a 
measure of security from his domestic political foes.  It helped strengthen the Peruvian Navy, 
Leguía’s favored branch of national military power, and enabled it to serve as counterweight 
to the politically active Peruvian Army, of which the dictator was wary.  Without a doubt, the 
U.S. naval mission aided Leguía in fashioning a stable, orderly, and repressive dictatorship.  
More broadly it was a vital part of the large, direct, and ongoing support that the United 
States extended to Leguía’s government for more than a decade.  And in that sense, the U.S. 
naval mission to Peru was an integral player making the 1920s a watershed period in U.S.-
Latin American relations: it was the first time the United States went to great lengths to 
strengthen a Latin American dictator’s hold on power.  Today, the history of U.S. support for 
dictatorships in Latin America is well known.  Most contemporary studies trace its origins 
either to the Cold War or to the non-interventionist Good Neighbor Policy pursued by the 
Franklin D. Roosevelt administration – a period when the United States embraced Latin 
American strongmen as a way of maintaining regional order without having to wield the 
threat of intervention.  But in examining the naval dimensions of U.S.-Peruvian relations 
during the 1920s, its true origins come more clearly into focus.  In its dealings with Leguía, 
the United States exposed itself as a nation willing to depart from its ideal of promoting 
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 See Tulchin, The Aftermath of War: World War I and U.S. Policy Toward Latin America. 
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democracy and self-determination abroad when national interests could best be served, at 
least in the short term, by embracing stable, non-democratic regimes. 
 The gulf between ideals and actions in U.S. policy toward Peru is visible in the post-
Leguía years, as well.  In the late 1930s, as U.S. relations with Latin America became 
dominated by hemispheric security concerns, foreign policymakers in the Roosevelt 
administration redoubled their efforts to burnish the good neighbor image of the United 
States throughout Latin America.  Driving this effort was the belief that, whether or not they 
were capable of contributing to a military defense of the hemisphere, all Latin American 
nations had important roles to play in resisting both armed attacks and possible subversive 
efforts mounted by external powers.  Courting the maximum degree of cooperation, U.S. 
officials used public statements to emphasize the common heritage of the Americas, North, 
South, and Central: their experience throwing off European colonialism, their mutual 
embrace of democratic institutions and republican government, and their shared belief in the 
superiority of the “new world” over the old.
6
  Accordingly, U.S. naval and military assistance 
to Latin American nations before and during World War II was billed publicly as an effort to 
help improve their ability to make substantive contributions to the defense of shared 
American ideals.  Behind the scenes, however, it was a different story.  As this dissertation’s 
examination of the reestablished naval mission to Peru demonstrates, in Peru as throughout 
much of Latin America, U.S. military assistance served the fundamentally diplomatic 
purpose of keeping up appearances.
7
  With the exceptions of Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico, 
                                                          
6
 David Rock, "War and Postwar Intersections: Latin America and the United States," in Latin America in the 
1940s: War and Postwar Transitions, ed. David Rock (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 19-20. 
7
 Brazil and Mexico eventually contributed troops to Allied military efforts in Europe, and were the two largest 
recipients of U.S. military assistance under the Lend-Lease Act.  In State Department correspondence from the 
late 1930s, Colombia, because of its geographic location vis-à-vis the Panama Canal and its naval capabilities, 
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each of which was viewed as capable of making a significant military contribution to 
hemispheric defense, the priority of such assistance to Latin American nations was visibility.  
It was important that the United States be seen as helping to provide for Latin America’s 
defense needs.  Less important was whether that assistance was significant in scope, or 
whether it contributed materially to actual improvements in Latin American nations’ defense 
capabilities. 
 Finally, the naval relationship the United States forged with Peru during the interwar 
period demonstrates the centrality of non-coercive naval power to U.S.-Latin American 
relations.  The U.S. naval missions to Peru, first in the 1920s and later from 1938 into the 
World War II years, represented a clear break from the gunboat diplomacy that had 
characterized U.S. naval involvement in Latin America in the early twentieth century.  Both 
were of fundamental importance to the course of U.S.-Peruvian relations during challenging 
times.  For all the problems and challenges that flowed from the Leguía-era naval mission, its 
achievements laid the foundation for a close, enduring naval relationship between the two 
countries.  Moreover, in the longer-term, the naval mission’s work demonstrated that inter-
American cooperation in the naval-military realm could achieve significant results.  In that 
sense the U.S. naval mission to Peru stands out as the forerunner to the extensive network of 
naval and military advisers that the United States has maintained throughout Latin America 
ever since World War II.  Today, these advisory groups remain a cornerstone of inter-
American military cooperation, and of U.S. foreign policy in the region more generally.   
 Naval power has remained a central feature of U.S. policy toward Latin America in 
another key respect, as well:  since the Hoover and Roosevelt administrations first embraced 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
was often cited as an example of a Latin American nation that could make a meaningful contribution to 
hemispheric defense.  See Child, Unequal Alliance: The Inter-American Military System, 1938-1978, 48. 
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it as an instrument of policy during the interwar period, the United States has continued to 
employ naval cruises for the purposes of directly reaching and convincing Latin American 
peoples of its good neighbor intentions.  That is, goodwill naval cruises have continued to 
play a key role in U.S. public diplomacy in the Western Hemisphere.  Prior to Hoover’s pre-
inaugural goodwill tour of Latin America in late 1928 and early 1929, U.S. naval vessels and 
personnel had been agents of a long-term policy of armed interventionism which was reviled 
throughout Latin America and increasingly unpopular at home.  Following Hoover’s journey 
through Central and South American waters, changes in U.S. naval policy reflected the 
importance that U.S. diplomats and naval leaders began attaching to foreign goodwill cruises.  
Such cruises, they increasingly thought, could help substantially improve U.S.-Latin 
American relations.  Indeed, changing the U.S. approach to Latin America was one of the 
few things on which Hoover and his successor, Roosevelt, could agree.
8
  Despite their 
myriad differences in other areas, both saw value in using the Navy to facilitate real change.   
 Upon assuming office, Roosevelt, who had served as Assistant Secretary of the Navy 
during the Woodrow Wilson administration, took a personal interest in employing the Navy 
as the face of good neighborism in Latin America.  After some early successes, most notably 
the 1934 shakedown cruise of the U.S.S. Ranger, Roosevelt dispatched active elements of the 
U.S. Fleet on public diplomacy missions aimed at fostering goodwill.  These missions 
consistently featured activities intended to demonstrate a neighborly respect for the 
sovereignty of Latin American nations, maximize the direct contact local populations had 
with U.S. ships and naval personnel, and showcase the technological advancement and 
strength of the United States.  The high-profile goodwill cruises the Navy made to Peru in 
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1936, 1937, and 1939 were particularly influential in helping to repair bilateral relations that 
had been troubled since the overthrow of the U.S.-backed Leguía dictatorship.  They 
confirmed to key officials in the Roosevelt State Department, especially Under Secretary of 
State Sumner Welles, that the Navy had an integral, ongoing role to play in the nation’s 
public diplomacy.  Goodwill naval cruises helped clearly align Peru and much of Latin 
America with U.S. designs for hemispheric defense.  And more broadly, they became key 
components of U.S. public diplomacy in the Western Hemisphere in the longer term.  Today, 
more than seventy years later, ships of the U.S. Navy routinely cruise in Latin American 
waters.  Most often, as in the cases of the hospital ship USNS Comfort’s regular visits to 
Latin America and the U.S. Navy’s participation in the annual inter-American UNITAS 
naval exercise, their itineraries are packed with public diplomacy activities.
9
  That naval 
cruises have continued to play important roles in U.S. public diplomacy in Latin America 
further underscores the importance of the changes that took place during the interwar period. 
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APPENDIX 1: PHOTOS 
 
PHOTO 1: Augusto B. Leguía y Salcedo, President of Peru, 1908-1912, 1919-1930.  
Source: Library of Congress 
 
PHOTO 2: William O. Spears (Captain, U.S. 
Navy) in Peruvian Naval Uniform, 1930.  




PHOTO 3: U.S. President-Elect Herbert Hoover with Peruvian President Augusto Leguía in Lima, 1928.  
Source: Herbert Hoover Presidential Library and Museum 
 
PHOTO 4: U.S. Sailors and Marines render honors at the tomb of Peruvian Almirante Miguel  
Grau Seminario, 1936. Source: National Archives 
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APPENDIX 2: MAPS 
 
 
MAP 1: Map depicting the 1929 settlement of the Tacna-Arica dispute stemming from the War of the Pacific.  












MAP 2: Map of Peru depicting its distinct regions: the costa (coastal desert), sierra (mountains),  
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